Opinion
No. 06-04-00065-CR
Submitted: January 10, 2005.
Decided: January 25, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court, Gregg County, Texas, Trial Court No. 30,587-B.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Francisco Gutierrez Cruz was convicted of the offense of burglary of a habitation. His punishment was assessed at ten years' imprisonment. Imposition of sentence was suspended, and Cruz was placed on community supervision for a period of ten years. A few weeks later, the State filed a motion to revoke community supervision, alleging Cruz had violated the terms and conditions of his supervision by committing a new offense, theft of a vehicle, and by failure to make payments, as ordered, during the first month of his supervision, for restitution, supervision, court costs, and reimbursement for court-appointed counsel. A hearing was held on the State's motion, and Cruz pled "not true" to the State's allegations. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the allegations true, revoked Cruz' community supervision, and imposed the original sentence of ten years' imprisonment. Cruz appeals, contending the State presented insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that he violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision. We affirm. David Growden, the victim, testified his 1998 Dodge Caravan was stolen from his driveway. He testified that he did not loan his vehicle to Cruz and that he did not permit Cruz to use or exercise control over it. James Fulmer, a police officer with the Longview Police Department, testified he located Growden's vehicle in a park the day after it was stolen. Fulmer "dusted" the minivan and recovered a fingerprint from the inside of the driver's side window. Tim Eaton, a police officer with the City of Longview, submitted the fingerprint recovered by Fulmer to compare it with the fingerprints of Cruz. Eaton chose to compare Cruz' fingerprints with the recovered fingerprint because Cruz was also suspected in another case where the offense was unauthorized use of a vehicle taken from the same neighborhood. Dan Reigstad, an employee of the Longview Police Department, testified the recovered fingerprint from the minivan matched the "No. 3 finger, which is the right middle finger" of Cruz. Cruz did not testify at the revocation hearing and did not present any evidence of how his fingerprint could have been inside the minivan. "To revoke probation, the State must prove every element of at least one ground for revocation by a preponderance of the evidence." Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 21). A trial court has extremely broad discretion over the conditions of community supervision, the revocation of community supervision, or the decision to continue a defendant's community supervision. Pierce, 113 S.W.3d at 436. Given the unique nature of a revocation proceeding, the general standards for appellate review of factual or legal sufficiency challenges do not apply to a trial court's decision to revoke community supervision. Id. (citing Cochran v. State, 78 S.W.3d 20, 27 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2002, no pet.); Becker v. State, 33 S.W.3d 64, 66 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.)). Instead, we must determine whether the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violated any single term of the community supervision. If so, then we will not find the trial court abused its discretion. Pierce, 113 S.W.3d at 436. Here, we cannot say the trial court's finding that Cruz violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by committing a new offense, theft of Growden's vehicle, is against the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accordingly, we find the trial court's judgment is based on a reasonable belief Cruz had violated at least one condition of his community supervision. See Briones v. State, 363 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Crim.App. 1963). Because we find the great weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief Cruz violated the condition of his community supervision requiring him to "[c]ommit no offense against the laws of Texas, any other State, or the United States," we need not decide whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Cruz also violated the other terms and conditions of his supervision as alleged in the State's motion. We overrule Cruz' sole point of error and affirm the judgment.