The proximity of the dates was purely coincidental. A similar situation arose in Cruz v. Clark, 684 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.Va. 1988) where the defendant raised an ex post facto issue to the NAB on appeal of his initial parole determination. The NAB affirmed the Parole Commission's initial decision.

administrative remedies before this Court may entertain a habeas petition challenging the actions of the Commission. SeeFuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir.1994) (“A prisoner challenging a Parole Commission decision is required to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief.”); Jenkins, 2014 WL 5784084, at *2 (stating that failure to exhaust administrative remedies “precludes bringing a habeas petition to challenge the Parole Commission's decision”); King v. Hasty, 154 F.Supp.2d 396, 400 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (“A petitioner must exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing a petition for habeas corpus relief, including in the parole context.”). Requiring such exhaustion aids the judiciary, as it: (1) permits a complete factual record to be developed; (2) affords the agency an opportunity to correct its own errors; and (3) “conserves the court's time by foreclosing the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level.” Cruz v. Clark, 684 F.Supp. 1335, 1337 (E.D.Va.1988) (citing Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir.1984) ). In light of Rahim's uncontested failure to seek recourse through administrative channels, the majority of his claims against the Commission are barred as a matter of exhaustion in addition to waiver.

In the context of federal habeas petitions challenging sentence computations, parole determinations, or good time credit calculations, courts have required petitioners first to exhaust their administrative remedies. See United Stales v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335-36 (1992); see also Cruz v. Clark, 684 F.Supp. 1335, 1337 (E.D. Va. 1988) ("Judicial review of a claim challenging a Parole Commission decision is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after exhaustion of administrative remedies."). If an inmate procedurally defaults on his federal administrative remedies, the exhaustion requirement may only be excused upon a showing of cause and prejudice. Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 634-35 (2d Cir.2001), cited in McClung v. Shear in, 90 F. App'x 444, 445-6 (4th Cir. 2004). Owens-el must exhaust his claim through the Administrative Remedy Program, which the Bureau of Prisons established to address inmate grievances.

Appeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal. Federal prisoners may pursue judicial challenges to BOP conduct affecting sentencing matters under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 only after they have exhausted available administrative remedies. See United States ex rel. D'Agostino v. Keohane, 877 F.2d 1167, 117374 (3rd Cir. 1989); Guida v. Nelson, 603 F.2d 261, 262 (2d Cir. 1979); Cruz v. Clark, 684 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (E.D. Va. 1988); see also United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 33133, 335 (1992). There is no showing that Petitioner has satisfied exhaustion requirements.

isoners may seek judicial review of these computations after exhaustion of their administrative remedies); United States v. Bayless, 940 F.2d 300,304-305 (8th Cir. 1991) (refusing to reach petitioner's challenge to computation of his sentence because petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the BOP); United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554,1555-56 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a dissatisfied prisoner may only avail himself of judicial review after an adverse administrative decision by the BOP regarding his sentence calculation); Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e think the rule of complete exhaustion should apply to federal-prisoner cases."); United States v. Woods. 888 F.2d 653, 654 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that because the BOP has the initial discretion to credit a prison term with time spent in custody before commencement of the sentence, a defendant must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review): see also Cruz v. Clark. 684 F. Supp. 1335,1337 (E.D. Va. 1988) ("Judicial review of a claim challenging a Parole Commission decision is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after exhaustion of administrative remedies."). If an inmate procedurally defaults on his federal administrative remedies, the exhaustion requirement may only be excused upon a showing of cause and prejudice. Carmona v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629,634-35 (2d Cir. 2001), cited in McClune v. Shearin, 90 F. App'x 444, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2004). Although the Fourth Circuit has yet to provide binding authority addressing this issue, it has required exhaustion in the following unpublished opinions: Crosson v. South Carolina. No. 93-6720, 1994 WL 12032, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 1994) (holding that a petitioner "must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 2241 action" challenging denial of parole); United States v. Bailey. No. 92-5592, 1991 WL 359485, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 16, 1993) (noting that the challenged sentence computation was properly under the BOP'

Parole guidelines provide guidance as to the exercise of agency discretion as opposed to prescriptive laws created by legislative branches of government that impose restrictions on agency authority.") (citing Sheary v. United States Parole Comm'n, 822 F.2d 556, 558 (5th Cir. 1987); Prater, 802 F.2d at 954; DiNapoli v. Northeast Reg'l Parole Comm'n, 764 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985)); Cherry v. Garraghty, 2003 WL 23332751, at *4 (E.D. Va. 2003) (not published) ("Courts have rejected challenges to the Commission's District of Columbia guidelines on ex post facto grounds," including because the guidelines are not laws for ex post facto purposes.) (citing Allston, 158 F.Supp.2d. 76; Cruz v. Clark, 684 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (E.D. Va. 1988)). But the vast majority of cases, including cases in which the court states that parole guidelines are not subject to ex post facto challenges such asWells, Reynolds, and Cruz, nonetheless undertake a substantive analysis.Cf. Bryant v. Williamson, Civ. No. 06-2082, 2007 WL 210792, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan.25, 2007) (slip op.) (stating that the Commission's parole guidelines may not be laws for ex post facto purposes, but not analyzing issue because of insufficient statistical record and proceeding to merits analysis); Brown v. Williamson, Civ. No. 06-0851, 2006 WL 1896166, at *1 n. 3 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2006) (slip op.) (stating that "it appears that an Ex Post Facto claimant must satisfy a prerequisite before the Court will" conduct a merits review, but avoiding the analysis and proceeding to the merits).

See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969) (requiring exhaustion of a § 2241 petition when the challenged action involves the agency's discretion or relies upon the agency's particular expertise.); United States v. Bayless, 940 F.2d 300, 304-305 (8th Cir. 991) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in a sentence computation challenge pursuant to § 2241); Cruz v. Clark, 684 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (E.D.Va. 1988) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies with the Parole Commission before bringing a § 2241 habeas petition). C. Merits

5. Petitioner's second claim alleges that the Board's application to his 1993 and 1986 sentences of policies, practices and procedures which the Board modified pursuant to the 1994 amendment to Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-159 violates the ex post facto clause. It is not clear that these guidelines, policies and procedures rise to the level of "penal statutes" or "laws," see Cruz v. Clark, 684 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that most courts do not deem federal parole guidelines "law" for purposes of the ex post facto clause), and see Woodley v. Department of Corrections, 74 F. Supp.2d at 631-32 (finding that the policy change implementing § 53.1-159 is a discretionary act, involving procedural matters rather than a legislative act implicating ex post facto clause). Notwithstanding the legal status of respondent's policies, practices and procedures, since the undersigned has concluded that the statute does not violate the ex post facto clause, it follows that the policies, practices and procedures applying that statute do not either. The Virginia Supreme Court's decision denying petitioner's habeas appeal as to claim 2 therefore was neither unreasonable nor contrary to federal law, and the undersigned recommends that the court find petitioner's claim 2 not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).