Opinion
B187621
4-23-2007
ABEL CRUZ et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. SHAWN AYROMLOO, Defendant and Appellant.
Law Offices of Pollie Okoronkwo and Pollie Okoronkwo for Defendant and Appellant Shawn Ayromloo. OMelveny & Myers, Paul B. Salvaty, Catalina J. Vergara and Shannon Keast; Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles and T.E. Glenn for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiffs in their action for wrongful eviction arising from their emergency evacuation from his rent-controlled building. Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding that he was required formally to evict the displaced tenants prior to re-renting the apartments, that his increased profits due to the re-renting of the units was not the proper measure of damages, and that his conduct did not cause the tenants emotional distress. The tenants cross-appeal, contending the trial court erred in failing to find defendants conduct was an unfair business practice under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.) or that his conduct constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs were the tenants of an 11-unit rent-controlled apartment building that defendant owned located at 1065 South Norton Avenue. Many of the tenants were long-term tenants, having lived in the building in excess of 10 years. In April 2003, the building was flooded with raw sewage, and after news coverage on local television, the Los Angeles Health Department (LAHD) inspected the building and determined it was in a hazardous condition. The LAHD ordered the tenants evacuated, and further ordered that the building remain vacant until defendant completed necessary repairs and brought the building into habitable condition. After the repairs were completed, defendant refused to allow the plaintiffs to return to their apartments, in spite of their requests to do so, and instead rented the apartments to new tenants at higher rents.
Plaintiffs complaint filed October 3, 2003, sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief, and stated 10 causes of action for forcible detainer, wrongful eviction, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of contract, quiet title, unfair business practices, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.
A bench trial began on April 7, 2005. The evidence established that the building had problems at the time defendant bought it in December 2002. Defendant began renovating the building before escrow closed, and repaired some plumbing problems. Defendant discovered the building had significant leaks; there was a huge puddle of water underneath the building that took two days to pump out. The waste pipes were deteriorated and broken, and defendant replaced the sewage pipe with a new pipe. At the time defendant bought the building, he approached some of the tenants and told them he would repair their apartments in exchange for additional rent.
At trial, the tenants testified there was insufficient hot water, and the building had roaches and mice. The tenants noticed that defendant would start repairs, but would not finish them. In attempting to fix the units, defendant made holes in the walls, exposing pipes, but did not close up the holes, and some of the tenants had to live for many months with unrepaired holes in their walls. Defendant contended that the walls were left open after the repairs to ensure that the leakage did not recur. There was a sewage leak in the basement that caused an odor so bad some tenants had to leave their doors and windows open. The tenants contended the smell had been present at least a month before they were asked to evacuate the building. The tenants also expressed the concern that part of the roof overhang would collapse due to deterioration in the roof.
At trial, tenants from each of the units testified. We summarize their testimony.
After some of the tenants spoke to an entity known as ACORN (a community grass-roots organization), a news story was broadcast. As a result, the LAHD was called; LAHD issued a notice to vacate the building because its inspection disclosed conditions on the property that constituted an imminent hazard to the safety of the occupants of the building. The most urgent situation at the building was the overflowing sewage under the building and a portion of the roof that was in danger of collapse. Defendant contended that when he left the country on business on March 17, 2003, the sewage problem did not exist, and he claimed that the sewage pipe under the building had been cut in an act of sabotage, or the spill was an accident.
When the LAHD required the tenants to leave on April 11, 2003, they were given less than three hours to remove only necessary belongings. They were told they needed to leave for the weekend and could go to stay in a hotel or shelter in Van Nuys; the shelter where the tenants were sent was also occupied by drug users and prostitutes. The shelter cost $60 per day.
The tenants were forced to leave most of their belongings behind. Defendant testified the City told him to have the tenants retrieve their belongings so work in the building could proceed. On May 14, 2003, defendant sent the tenants a memo telling them to pick up their belongings, and they went back to the premises to collect them. Defendant also advised them that they would not be able to return to their former apartments because "[t]he locks will have to be changed and admission to the premises will be denied thereafter." Defendant wished his tenants "luck and a new beginning." The tenants discovered some of the locks had been broken, and some had keys broken inside the locks.
The tenants apartments looked like "dumps," their possessions had been damaged, and their personal items had been disturbed. The workers repairing their apartments did not cover up their furniture and other personal property while they were painting. One of the tenants lost work tools worth $1,000. The tenants testified that they suffered emotional distress as a result of the evacuation and inability to move back into their units, although none of them sought medical help. One tenant had to evacuate just days after giving birth to a child with severe health problems; one elderly tenant suffered depression and subsequently died; many tenants slept on the floor at friends and relatives houses after the evacuation; and other families were separated.
At LAHDs direction, defendant paid the occupants of each unit $2,000 or $5,000, depending upon the number of occupants and their age, for a total of $40,000 in relocation fees, although there remains $15,000 unpaid. Defendant never returned the tenants security deposits.
The tenants wanted to return to their units because many of them had lived in the neighborhood for a long time. On May 3, 2003, each of the tenants, through Guadalupe Gonzales of ACORN, sent defendant a letter asking to return, but never received a reply. The letters were sent to Post Office Box addresses on the tenants rental agreements. Tai Glenn, who acted as attorney for some of the tenants, also told defendant the tenants wanted to return to the building. Defendant told her the tenants could return if they did not take their relocation money. On June 10, 2003, defendant responded to Gonzalez by email, stating that his relationship with the plaintiffs had ended on April 11, 2003, with LAHDs order to evacuate the building. He advised her that "after spending over $100,000 to renovate and enhance, you must be dreaming that [the tenants] would be allowed to return and reoccupy the building at the same rent as before with $5000/$2000 of my money in their pockets."
The tenants eventually found housing elsewhere, after spending many weeks and months staying with relatives or in hotels. The children of the tenants had problems at school because they were forced to transfer schools.
As a result of the evictions, defendant was able to enter into leases with new tenants beginning in August 2003. He has been able to charge higher rents, and has been able to reduce the number of tenants in the building. The higher rents gross an additional $2,000 per month. The new tenants had moved in by the end of August 2003. Defendant claimed the inspector told him that after his relationship with the tenants was terminated, they could not come back until all of the repairs were completed, and even so, there would have to be a new rental agreement. Currently, the property is fully rented.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court issued a statement of decision. On the tenancy issues, the court found that defendant committed forcible detainer under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1160, subdivision (2) by refusing the tenants request to move back into their units. The court also found defendant liable for wrongful eviction and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment because neither the evacuation nor the payment of relocation monies terminated the tenancies, and defendant failed to commence an action to terminate the tenancies under the Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO), Los Angeles Municipal Code section 151.09, subdivision (A)(11).
On the personal injury issue, the court found that because the tenants had commenced a separate action for habitability and emotional distress against defendant and the former owner of the building, it would only consider emotional distress damages from and after the date of the evacuation. The court found that because there was no evidence defendant intentionally caused the evacuation, there could be no liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but that the tenants were entitled to damages for defendants negligent infliction of emotional distress.
On the remaining issues, the court found defendant in breach of the rental agreements because the tenants were not given proper notice nor were they legally evicted. The court declined to find defendant liable for unfair business practices under Business & Professions Code section 17200 because defendant believed he was acting under a legal right when he refused to permit the tenants to return and re-leased the units to new tenants at a higher rent.
Finally, the court found that because other low income tenants had moved into the building, the tenants could not be permitted to move back into the units, and monetary damages constituted their only remedy. The court calculated defendants additional profit at $240,000, awarding $29,819 per unit. The court also awarded each of the tenants individualized damages, as applicable to each tenant, for lost security deposits, emotional distress, and loss of their personal property. Judgment was entered on September 15, 2005.
DISCUSSION
I. THE LAHDS EVACUATION ORDER AND DEFENDANTS PAYMENT OF RELOCATION BENEFITS TO THE TENANTS DID NOT OPERATE TO TERMINATE THEIR TENANCIES.
Defendant contends that the plaintiffs acceptance of relocation benefits severed their tenancies, and therefore he cannot be liable for forcible detainer or wrongful eviction. He further asserts that he cannot be liable for forcible detainer because the tenants were not in possession of their units when he allegedly unlawfully entered. Finally, plaintiff argues that because he sought to regain possession of the units in order to comply with the Citys order to vacate the building, he was not required to bring an action to evict the tenants. Defendant is incorrect.
A. Payment of Relocation Benefits Did Not Terminate the Tenancies.
Defendant argues that payment of relocation benefits under former Health & Safety Code section 50651 operates to terminate the tenancies. He contends the benefits are available only if continuing to reside in the building would endanger the tenants health and safety, and tenants cannot be expected to return to such a building; the dictionary definition of "relocate" indicates a permanent move; and the amount of the benefit payable under the statute (two months rent) indicates the legislature contemplated a permanent move.
The relevant provisions of the Health & Safety Code pertaining to relocation benefits is now found at Health & Safety Code sections 17975-17975.6. In 2004, the legislature repealed sections 50651-50653 and enacted the current sections, effective January 1, 2005. (Stats. 2004, ch. 473, § 1. AB 3022.)
We review matters of statutory construction as questions of law. (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142.) It is elementary that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. The first step in determining that intent is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and common sense meaning. (Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 775.) Furthermore, we must select a construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences. (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003.)
Here, nothing in the statutory language supports defendants position. The statutes do not state that the payment of relocation benefits terminates the tenancies, or that such payments operate in lieu of formal eviction proceedings. Defendants attempt to fill in this statutory blank by relying on a narrow meaning of "relocation" and an analysis that such benefits are paid to permanently remove the tenants from their units is unavailing. Such an interpretation would defeat the purposes of the legislature to compensate the tenants for being put out of their homes; would undermine significant public policies embodied in landlord-tenant law that landlords may not resort to self-help (non-judicial) remedies to evict tenants; and would impair the RSOs purpose to provide tenants with safe, stable, and affordable housing.
B. Defendants Failure to Resort to Judicial Process to Evict the Tenants Constituted Forcible Detainer and Wrongful Eviction.
Under the common law, a rental agreement or lease conveys possessory rights. The tenant acquires the right to exclusive use and possession during the lease term. Upon termination of the tenancy, the rights to use and possession revert to the landlord. (Howard v. County of Amador (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 962, 972.) If the landlord wishes to end the tenancy involuntarily prior to its termination, it may not use self-help to obtain possession; the landlord must use judicial process to acquire the right to dispossess the tenant. (Glass v. Najafi (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 45, 48-49.) Until the landlord obtains a valid writ of execution or possession, the tenant is entitled to possession of the premises. (People v. Thompson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1270; Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149; see Civ. Code, § 1940, et seq.)
Furthermore, in the City of Los Angeles, the RSO additionally circumscribes a landlords ability to evict a tenant. (See L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.09.) Section 151.09, subdivision A.11, permits a landlord to evict a tenant where "[t]he landlord seeks in good faith to recover possession of the rental unit in order to comply with a governmental agencys order to vacate, order to comply, order to abate, or any other order that necessitates the vacating of the building housing the rental unit as a result of a violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code or any other provision of law." However, this landlord did not take such action. (L.A. Mun. Code, § 151.90, subd. (A)(11).) Furthermore, the Housing Code provides that if an evacuation order is made, the landlord may bring an eviction action only pursuant to the RSOs eviction provisions found in section 151.09. (L.A. Mun. Code, § 161.806.)
At the time of tenants evacuation in April 2003, there was a moratorium in effect on evictions for the purpose of major renovation, and effective May 2, 2005, the City removed major rehabilitation as a legal ground for eviction, replacing it with the Primary Renovation Program now found at section 152.03. (L.A. City Ord. 175,544.)
Wrongful eviction occurs where the landlord has no right to dispossess the tenant from possession of the property. (Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 1141 at pp. 1149-1150.) Forcible detainer, a similar unlawful dispossession, occurs where the landlord takes possession of the property and refuses to surrender the property at the tenants request. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1160, subd. (2); Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597, 607.)
Here, the tenants had the right to possess their apartments under their rental agreements. They were forced to leave their units involuntarily; the fact that they were temporarily barred from physical occupation of their units did nothing to affect their legal right to possess those units under those rental agreements. Defendant undertook no eviction proceedings or other measures to terminate their right to possession, and defendant refused to permit them to return when they asked to do so. Thus, defendants actions in derogation of the tenants possessory rights constituted forcible detainer and wrongful eviction. Further, defendants attempt to transform the LAHDs emergency evacuation order, caused by defendants own failure to maintain the building to habitable standards, into an eviction proceeding is indefensible. Defendants arguments that the evacuation gave him rights tantamount to those resulting from a lawful eviction confuse the tenants loss of actual occupancy with their legal right to possession. The tenants did not voluntarily quit the premises, nor did they relinquish their possessory rights.
On appeal, defendants arguments are limited to those two causes of action.
II. DAMAGES WERE PROPER UNDER CIVIL CODE SECTION 3334.
Defendant argues that Civil Code section 3334 was not the proper measure of damages because he did not wrongfully occupy his own property, and the statute does not apply to actions by tenants against landlords. He further argues the trial court erred in awarding damages from the time of the wrongful eviction until trial, and instead should have awarded damages only for the terms of the tenants leases. We disagree.
Civil Code section 3334 provides the measure of damages for wrongful occupation as "[t]he detriment caused by the wrongful occupation of real property, . . . [which] is deemed to include the value of the use of the property for the time of that wrongful occupation. . . ." (Civ. Code, § 3334, subd. (a).) The "value of the use of the property" is defined as "the greater of the reasonable rental value of that property or the benefits obtained by the person wrongfully occupying the property by reason of that wrongful occupation." (Civ. Code, § 3334, subd. (b)(1); 11382 Beach Partnership v. Libaw (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 212, 218.)
Here, defendant again confuses his right of reversion with the tenants right of possession. Defendants wrongful conduct in refusing to permit the tenants to return to their apartments contravened their right of possession, making defendant the party in wrongful possession of the apartments. Thus, the benefits defendant obtained from his wrongful possession were the increased rentals defendant received from the new tenants. The same rationale underlies the calculation of the proper dates for damages, namely, the time that defendant wrongfully occupied the property. The lengths of the various tenants leases are irrelevant to this figure, because but for defendants wrongful conduct, the tenants would have remained in possession of their apartments; defendant cannot use his own wrongful conduct to reduce the amount of his damages.
Under the common law, either party could terminate a periodic tenancy simply by giving notice. (Civ. Code, § 1946; Schmitt v. Felix (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 642, 647-648; Camp v. Matich (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 660, 665.) However, under rent control ordinances, such as the RSO, eviction controls supplant this common law right. (See e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 148; Castillo v. Friedman (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 15 [City of Los Angeles RSO limits grounds on which landlord may recover rental unit].) Thus, the only lawful manner for defendant to obtain possession was under the specific circumstances and through the specific procedures set forth in section 151.09 of the RSO, and here it is undisputed that defendant did not avail himself of the provisions of section 151.09.
III. THE TENANTS WERE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
Defendant contends that because there was no evidence he was negligent or that his negligence led to the evacuation of the building, the award of emotional distress damages was improper. We disagree.
Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort; it is the tort of negligence. (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.) Damages for emotional distress are recoverable only if the defendant has breached a duty to the plaintiff. This independent duty may be imposed by law, assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship between the parties. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984-985.)
Here, defendant owed the tenants a duty of care to maintain the building in a safe and sanitary condition. (Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc. (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 796, 799 .) Defendant breached this duty by failing to repair the plumbing, sewage and roof problems in a timely and adequate fashion. As a result of defendants breach, the tenants were forced to relocate and ultimately were deprived of their apartments; they testified such relocations caused them emotional distress. Thus, the trial courts award of damages was proper.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO FIND DEFENDANTS CONDUCT CONSTITUTED AN UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICE.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in failing to find defendants conduct constituted an unfair business practice under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.) Defendant contends that because plaintiffs were only entitled to non-monetary damages under the UCL, reversal is not required.
The UCL prohibits unlawful, unfair, or deceptive business acts or practices. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (Cel-Tech).) Consistent with its objective of providing a streamlined procedure for prevention of ongoing or threatened acts of unfair competition, the UCLs remedies are limited to injunctive relief and restitution. Damages are not available. (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 179.) A restitutionary claim seeks an order "compelling a UCL defendant to return money obtained through an unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken, that is, to persons who had an ownership interest in the property. . . ." (Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 126-127.) Our Supreme Court has never approved non-restitutionary disgorgement of profits to individual plaintiffs as a remedy under the UCL. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1148, 1154.)
Even if we were to conclude that defendants conduct was wrongful, unfair, or deceptive, the question remains whether any remedy could appropriately be granted under the UCL. Plaintiffs UCL claim sought injunctive relief and disgorgement of the profits defendant earned through his unlawful conduct. The trial court determined no injunctive relief could be granted restoring plaintiffs to the premises because they had been leased to third parties. With respect to defendants profits obtained as a result of his wrongful conduct, those profits were properly awarded as damages for wrongful eviction, but cannot constitute restitution under the UCL because these profits were not obtained from plaintiffs.
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING NO LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in finding that because defendant did not specifically intend to inflict emotional harm on the plaintiffs, he could not be liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs additionally contend the court erred in failing to award damages prior to the evacuation date of April 11, 2003, because of plaintiffs separate habitability action based upon defendants pre-evacuation failure to maintain the building. Defendant contends plaintiffs waived any claim to pre-evacuation damages at trial, and in any event, such claim is barred by the judgment in the habitability action. We find no error.
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is established where the plaintiff shows (1) the defendants outrageous conduct (2) undertaken with the intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress to the plaintiff, (3) the plaintiffs resulting severe or extreme emotional distress, and (4) causation by defendants conduct. (Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883.) "Outrageous conduct" is conduct that exceeds the bounds of conduct usually tolerated in a civilized society. The conduct must be of a kind which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 905.)
Here, plaintiffs argue defendants conduct in driving them out of the building by permitting raw sewage to collect and refusing to acknowledge their requests to return constituted outrageous conduct. However, there is evidence to support the trial courts conclusion defendants conduct was at most negligent and was not intentional or undertaken with reckless disregard of the plaintiffs. Defendant testified he was unaware of the severity of the sewage problem until the time of the evacuation; he was uninformed concerning the true condition of the building; and apparently believed he could repair the problems with minimal expense and effort.
Furthermore, we find no error in the trial courts limitation of damages to the post-evacuation period. Plaintiffs habitability claims were based upon a different primary right than their wrongful eviction claims, and plaintiffs therefore could properly bring separate lawsuits on those claims. (Sawyer v. First City Financial Corp. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 390, 399.) However, plaintiffs election to file a separate lawsuit concerning their habitability claims operated to sever those claims, and the corresponding proof of damages and defendants liability for any damages, from the eviction claims. Thus, whether or not plaintiffs waived such damages at trial as defendant contends, their habitability claims were not before the trial court and it properly declined to award damages on that basis.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed. Plaintiffs are to recover their costs on appeal.
We concur:
JOHNSON, Acting P. J.
WOODS, J.