Crutchfield v. State

3 Citing cases

  1. Almanza v. State

    686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)   Cited 4,697 times
    Holding standard of review for nonconstitutional jury charge error is whether error is so egregious and created such harm that defendant did not receive fair and impartial trial

    The vast weight of authority establishes that whenever the accused has claimed fundamental error, including error involving omission of an entire element from the authorization paragraph, the Court has reviewed not only the entire jury charge, but also the state of the evidence in the case, before deciding whether the error was so harmful as to require reversal. E.g., Canterberry v. State, 101 Tex.Crim. 550, 275 S.W. 1040 (1925); Crutchfield v. State, 68 Tex.Crim. 468, 152 S.W. 1053 (1913). The modern trend of the Court first to label certain errors "fundamental" then automatically reverse convictions without regard to the nature and harm of the error in the case, was not necessarily an innovation of Robinson v. State, 553 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); but with Robinson, supra, this movement became almost suddenly firmly entrenched as a policy of the Court.

  2. Whitlock v. State

    146 Tex. Crim. 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944)   Cited 4 times
    Providing that "in the absence of any proof on the part of the appellant of the want of intent to kill, the legal presumption would obtain that he intended that which was the natural and probable consequences of his act"

    Under the peculiar facts of this case, we do not believe that the failure to give the instruction suggested by appellant was such an omission as calls for a reversal. See Crutchfield v. State, 152 S.W. 1053, 68 Tex.Crim. R..

  3. Davis v. State

    296 S.W. 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1927)   Cited 6 times

    Elizando v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. Rep.." Analogous expressions are found in the opinion of this court by Judge Ramsey in Puryear v. State, 56 Tex.Crim. Rep., and those of Judge Davidson in Thomas v. State, 71 Tex. Crim. 185; and McDowell v. State, 55 Tex.Crim. Rep.; and the opinion of the court in Crutchfield v. State, 68 Tex. Crim. 468. That it has been the opinion of this court throughout its history that the statute mentioned does not offend against the fundamental law is furnished additional illustration in the great number of cases in which that part of Art. 666, C. C. P., stating "all objections to the charge and to the refusal or modification of special charges shall be made at the time of the trial," has been given effect to waive by the accused an error in the charge against which there was addressed no written exception before the charge was read to the jury as required by Art. 659, C. C. P., 1925. With the utmost deference to the contrary view of counsel for the appellant, we are unable to perceive aught in the fundamental or statutory law opposing the operation of the statute (Art. 666, supra) upon the case in hand.