Id.Gaskill v. Trainer, 3 Cal. 334 (Cal. 1853); Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Ill. 238, 34 N.E. 476 (1893); National Lumber Co. v. Hobbs, 74 Ind.App. 476, 129 N.E. 255 (1921); Basic Refractories v. Bright, 72 Nev. 183, 298 P.2d 810 (Nev. 1956); Crutcher v. Block, 19 Okla. 246, 91 P. 895 (Okla. 1907); Schneider v. Delwood Center, Inc., 394 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Civ.App. 1965); Cornelius v. Washington Steam Laundry, 52 Wash. 272, 100 P. 727 (Wash. 1909); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 863 (3rd Cir. 1964); Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962); Meek v. Parker, 63 Ark. 367, 38 S.W. 900 (Ark. 1897); Archibald v. Iacopi, 120 Cal.App.2d 666, 262 P.2d 40 (Cal.Ct.App. 1953); Horn v. Clark Hardware Co., 54 Colo. 522, 131 P. 405 (Colo. 1913); J.B. Ehrsam Sons Mfg. Co. v. Rice, 153 Kan. 483, 112 P.2d 95 (Kan. 1941); Basic Refractories v. Bright, 72 Nev. 183, 298 P.2d 810 (Nev. 1956); Schwartz Co. v. Aimwell Co., 236 N.Y. 672, 142 N.E. 330 (N.Y. 1923); Blalack v. Hoshall's A A Plumbing Co., 318 P.2d 878 (Okla.
Id.Gaskill v. Trainer, 3 Cal. 334 (Cal. 1853); Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Ill. 238, 24 NE 476 (Ill. 1893); National Lumber Co. v. Hobbs, 74 Ind. App. 476, 129 N.E. 255 (Ind.Ct.App. 1920); Basic Refractories v. Bright, 72 Nev. 183, 298 P.2d 810 (Nev. 1956); Crutcher v. Block, 19 Okla 246, 91 P. 985 (Okla. 1907); Schneider v. Delwood Center, Inc., 394 SW2d 671 (Tex.Civ.App. 1965); Cornelius v. Washington Steam Laundry, 52 Wash 272, 100 P 727 (Wash. 1909); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 863 (3rd Cir. 1964); Clay v. Sandal, 369 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1962); Meek v. Parker, 63 Ark.367, 38 SW 900 (Ark. 1897); Archibald v. Iacopi, 120 Cal App.2d 666, 262 P.2d 40 (Cal.Ct.App. 1953); Horn v. Clark Hardware Co., 54 Colo 522, 131 P 405 (Colo 1915); J.B. Ehrsam Sons Mfg. Co. v. Rice, 153 Kan 483, 112 P.2d 95 (Kan. 1941); Basic Refractories v. Bright, 72 Nev 183, 298 P.2d 810 (Nev 1956); Schwartz Co. v. Aimwell Co., 236 NY 672, 142 NE 330 (N.Y. 1923); Blalack v. Hoshall's AA Plumbing Co., 318 P.2d 878 (Okla 1957); Stetson-Post Mill v. Brown, 21 Wash 619, 59 P 507 (Wash 1899). The legislative purpose supporting the development and adoption of mechanics' lien statutes was to secure priority of payment for the value of work completed and materials provided in building or repairing a structure and, as s
* * * The fact that the project site as owned by the United States in fee simple did not make NADLQ's lease and NADLQ's interest in the leasehold improvements immune from such liens. Basic Refractories v. Bright, 72 Nev. 183 298 P.2d 810 (1956); Crutcher v. Block, 19 Okla. 246, 91 P. 895 (1907). * * *
"A materialman who furnishes material to be used in the construction of improvements on premises to a party who is in the peaceable and lawful possession of said premises under and by virtue of an executory contract to purchase the same from the legal owner thereof has a lien upon the equitable interest of the vendee in said contract together with the building in the construction of which the material was used." In Crutcher v. Block, 19 Okla. 246, 91 P. 895, we said that the general rule is that it is not necessary that the person for whom a building is erected should own the fee-simple title, but the word "owner", as used in the statute, includes every character of title, whether legal or equitable, fee-simple or leasehold. In Crutcher, materials were furnished for the construction of a building by a subcontractor for the benefit of Crutcher who had a lease upon and was in possession of a building lot. It was contended that since Crutcher did not have legal title to the lot, no lien could attach.
The rule is stated in 95 A. L.R. at 1095: See Eastern Ohio Oil Co. v. McEvoy, 75 Kan. 515, 89 P. 1048 (1907); Sorg v. Crandall, 233 Ill. 79, 84 N.E. 181 (1908), and Crutcher v. Block, 19 Okla. 246, 91 P. 895 (1907). * * * The vendee in possession under an executory contract of sale is usually regarded as the owner, within the provisions of mechanics lien statutes confining such liens to claims for labor or materials furnished for improvements made under contract with the owner.
The fact that the project site was owned by the United States in fee simple did not make NADLQ's lease and NADLQ's interest in the leasehold improvements immune from such liens. Basic Refractories v. Bright, 72 Nev. 183, 298 P.2d 810 (1956); Crutcher v. Block, 19 Okla. 246, 91 P. 895 (1907). As a matter of fact, the United States, NADLQ, and Len contemplated the possibility that mechanic's liens might exist and be enforceable.
Unlike the instant case there was no lease-back provision. On the other hand, Crutcher v. Block, 19 Okla. 246, 91 P. 895, 14 Ann.Cas. 1029, seems more nearly to approximate our particular situation wherein an action to foreclose a materialmens' lien was upheld, notwithstanding the fact that the building was located on real property, title to which was vested in the United States of America. The Oklahoma court said: "The board for leasing school, public building, and college lands of Oklahoma Territory leased to one * * * Butler * * *. He subleased, as he had a right to under the law and the written condition of his lease, to S.O. Crutcher * * *. Robinson, under contract with S.O. Crutcher, erected a house on this lot in question, and the plaintiff below, having furnished lumber for the erection of this building, and the same having been used in the building and not paid for, filed a materialman's lien for the lumber so furnished * * *. Such a lien, of course, would be subject to all of the conditions of the lease or conveyance under which the party held. Under the rule here adopted, it is immaterial that the legal title
These laws relating to mechanic's liens have quite uniformly used the word "owner" in the same sense that that word is used in our present miner's lien statute. It appears from some of the decided cases that statutes in some of the states expressly define the word "owner" so as to include the holder of a leasehold estate, but even without such definition most courts have construed this word as used in mechanic's lien statutes to include the owner of a leasehold estate. Hathaway v. Davis, 32 Kan. 693, 5 P. 29; Eastern Ohio Oil Co. v. McEvoy, 75 Kan. 515, 89 P. 1048; Owen v. Casey et al, 48 Wn. 673, 94 P. 473; Crutcher et ux. v. Block, 19 Okla. 246, 91 P. 895, 14 Ann.Cas. 1029; and see cases cited in 2 A.L.R. 794, 95 A.L.R. 1095. The Kansas court in the early case of Hathaway v. Davis, supra [ 32 Kan. 693, 5 P. 30], under a statute which provided "any mechanic or other person who shall, under contract with the owner of any tract or piece of land, * * * perform labor or furnish material * * *" Civ. Code Kan. § 630, stated: "We think the word `owner' in the statute, as it now exists, is comprehensive enough to include an owner of a leasehold estate, as well as the owner of a greater estate.
As was held in Whitfield v. Howard et al. (Ala. Sup.) 128 So. 137, Howard as the vendee of Clark, after payment of part of the purchase money and construction of the building in part compliance with the contract between Clark and Howard, had such interest in the property as made him the owner or proprietor within the meaning of the statute. Code 1923, § 8860; Gravlee v. Williams, 112 Ala. 539, 20 So. 952; Ridgeway v. Broadway et al., 91 S.C. 544, 75 S.E. 132; Salzer Lumber Co. v. Claflin et al., 16 N.D. 601, 113 N.W. 1036; Eastern Ohio Oil Co. v. McEvoy, 75 Kan. 515, 89 P. 1048; Sorg v. Crandall et al., 233 Ill. 79, 84 N.E. 181; Crutcher et ux. v. Block, 19 Okl. 246, 91 P. 895, 14 Ann. Cas. 1029. Ante, p. 171.
amended bill was also subject to the objection that its averments were inconsistent with the facts disclosed by the exhibit; the averment being that the building sought to be charged with a lien was "built by J. C. Howard and S. J. Howard, who was the agent, architect, trustee, contractor, or subcontractor of the respondent O. B. Clark and under and by virtue of a contract with the respondent O. B. Clark, and as his agent, who was the owner or proprietor of said parcel of land," while it appears from the copy of the contract attached and made a part of the bill, that J. C. Howard was the vendee of Clark, and had such equitable interest or title as made him an owner within the meaning of the statute. Code of 1923, § 8860; Gravlee v. Williams, 112 Ala. 539, 20 So. 952; Ridgeway v. Broadway, 91 S.C. 544, 75 S.E. 132; Salzer Lumber Co. v. Claflin et al., 16 N.D. 601, 113 N.W. 1036; Eastern Ohio Oil Co. v. McEvoy, 75 Kan. 515, 89 P. 1048; Sorg v. Crandall et al., 233 Ill. 79, 84 N.E. 181; Crutcher et ux. v. Block, 19 Okl. 246, 91 P. 895, 14 Ann. Cas. 1029. The averments of the bill as originally filed and as amended are not technically accurate in respect to filing the verified claim, the averment being that it was filed "in the Probate Court," while the statute requires that it be filed "in the office of the judge of probate of the county in which the property upon which the lien is sought to be established is situated."