Opinion
No. 05-04-01515-CV
Opinion Issued October 31, 2005.
On Appeal from the Probate Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 01-3490-P(a) and 03-952-P2/P.
Reversed, Remanded.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, MOSELEY, and O'NEILL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In four issues, Donna Gale Crump challenges the probate court's judgment enforcing the terms of a mediated settlement agreement. We conclude the trial judge erred in entering the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Harold Crump and his wife, Bernice, created an intervivos trust, naming Compass Bank as the successor trustee. In August 2001, Bernice died. In May 2002, Harold Crump married Alice Jeannine Fuller. Shortly thereafter, Harold executed a new will leaving all of his estate to his new wife. After Harold died, Donna (Harold and Bernice's daughter) challenged Harold's new will. The bank filed a separate action, seeking a ruling concerning distribution of the trust.
The two matters were mediated together beginning June 10, 2004. During the early hours of June 11, the interested parties-including Donna-executed a settlement agreement. Thereafter, certain parties filed an "Application for Approval of Agreement to Settle Estates." The day before the scheduled hearing, Donna filed a "Motion in Opposition to Settlement," claiming she signed the settlement agreement under duress and demanding a jury trial. The next day, after an evidentiary hearing, the probate judge signed a judgment enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement. This appeal ensued.
Donna complains the trial judge erred in: (i) approving the mediation agreement and summarily entering judgment after she withdrew her consent, (ii) approving the mediation agreement where an express contingency in the agreement was not met, (iii) summarily entering a judgment that contained an addendum that was not part of the mediated agreement, and (iv) summarily approving the mediation agreement and entering judgment where Donna had raised duress as a defense and demanded a jury trial. In each of her issues, Donna argues the trial judge erred in summarily entering judgment based on the mediated settlement agreement because the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not provide for such an expedited procedure. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 154.071 (Vernon 2005).
Section 154.071 of the civil practice and remedies code contemplates traditional methods of enforcing settlement agreements as contracts; it does not authorize a "summary" proceeding so as to deprive an objecting party of the right to be confronted by appropriate pleadings, an opportunity to conduct discovery and assert defenses, or a chance to have the dispute determined by a judge or jury. Cadle Co. v. Castle, 913 S.W.2d 627, 631-32 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) (motion to enforce settlement insufficient "pleading" to support entry of judgment on breach of mediated settlement agreement).
Because Donna withdrew her consent to the settlement agreement, the judgment in this case is not an agreed judgment. See Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 461-62 (Tex. 1995). As in Cadle, the only document to support enforcement of the mediation agreement is the "Application for Approval of Agreement to Settle Estates." This document does not allege breach of contract, and the proponents of the mediation agreement did not file any pleading asserting breach of contract. Although the judge did receive some evidence at the hearing-the day after Donna filed her objection raising the defense of duress-the procedure deprived Donna of the right to be confronted by appropriate pleadings, to conduct discovery, and to present factual disputes to a fact finder. We conclude that the probate judge erred in approving and incorporating the terms of the mediated settlement agreement into a final judgment.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the probate court's judgment and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.