So we are of the opinion that the plaintiff, in determining to probate this will, in qualifying as executor and in executing the same in part, became estopped, `upon grounds of public policy and good faith,' from asserting his rights under the contracts sought to be enforced in this case." See also Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 S.E.2d 859), and Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464 ( 12 S.E.2d 877), where the rule was applied to administrators. The plaintiff in error contends that the ruling in Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 64, supra, is not applicable here because (a) his action is one seeking redress as a creditor of the testatrix; (b) he and his wife do not claim the entire estate of the testatrix; and (c) the rule is not applicable where there is more than one executor.

Id. This rule of estoppel has often been applied to preclude the claims of executors and administrators seeking as individuals to obtain title to all or a portion of the estate they represent. See Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664 ( 135 S.E. 195) (1926); Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464, 466 ( 12 S.E.2d 877) (1941); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774, 775 ( 10 S.E.2d 859) (1940); Spratlin v. Spratlin, 216 Ga. 27, 28 ( 114 S.E.2d 370) (1960); Maxwell v. Hollis, 216 Ga. 224, 226 ( 115 S.E.2d 360) (1960). As in the cited cases, it was incumbent upon Strickland to elect whether to pursue a claim of title to the estate under the alleged contract to devise, or to act in a fiduciary capacity for the estate.

The appellants seek a decree of title and affirmative equitable relief, which cannot be granted in the Civil Court of Fulton County. The civil court action should have been enjoined, and the actions consolidated for trial in a court having jurisdiction of the claims of both parties. Butler v. Mitchell, 128 Ga. 431 (3) ( 57 S.E. 764); Kirkpatrick v. Holland, 148 Ga. 708 ( 98 S.E. 265); Otis v. Graham Paper Co., 188 Ga. 778 ( 4 S.E.2d 824, 125 ALR 333); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 (1) ( 10 S.E.2d 859). It was error to dissolve the order restraining the prosecution of the civil court action by the appellee. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

In the Cavanaugh case, supra, the plaintiff as administratrix of the estate of her aunt had filed an equitable petition against the heirs praying for direction as to the distribution of the estate and for a decree declaring her to be the adopted daughter and sole heir at law of the intestate, by reason of an alleged contract by the decedent to adopt her and make a will to devise her entire estate to her. It was there held that the petition was properly dismissed on demurrer because the administratrix, under the provision of Code § 38-117, could not after acceptance of the trust claim adversely thereto. It was there said that this rule operates to preclude an administratrix from asserting an individual claim to the estate by reason of the alleged contract by the decedent to adopt her and devise her estate by will to her. See also Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664 ( 135 S.E. 195); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 S.E.2d 859); Spratlin v. Spratlin, 215 Ga. 27 ( 114 S.E.2d 370). (b) As to the joint claim of Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Hollis against the estate for alleged services rendered the intestate, this is an unliquidated claim.

being one seeking to abate the present equitable action by reason of the pendency in the court of ordinary of an application by the defendant executor to sell the tract of land, the subject matter of the alleged contract, and alleging that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law to file his objections to the sale of the land, and having failed to do so, he is now barred from proceeding with the present action — the pendency of the application of the executor to sell the land, the subject matter of the alleged contract, and the failure of the plaintiff to object to said proceeding and to an order directing the sale, did not operate to abate the equitable petition, nor as a bar to the plaintiff proceeding in this action to enforce the alleged contract and to enjoin the sale of said land; and it was error to sustain the defendant's plea and dismiss the petition. See Frith v. Roe, 23 Ga. 139; Bird v. Trapnell, 148 Ga. 301 ( 96 S.E. 417); Chapple v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629 ( 131 S.E. 505); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 S.E.2d 859). 3. The petition having been dismissed solely on the defendant's plea in abatement and not upon its merits, our ruling here is confined solely to the questions raised by the assignments of error on the order of dismissal.

An executor or administrator, after acceptance of the trust, can not claim adversely thereto. Harris v. McDonald, 152 Ga. 18, 22 ( 108 S.E. 448); Dozier v. McWhorter, 117 Ga. 786 (5) ( 45 S.E. 61); Benjamin v. Gill, 45 Ga. 110, 112; Allen v. Solomon, 54 Ga. 483, 485; Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 S.E.2d 859); Code, § 38-117. Although this principle is not applicable to an administrator, who as an heir or next of kin merely claims and receives his proper share of the estate, or as a creditor holds a claim which was liquidated or arose in the ordinary course of business between the decedent as debtor and the claimant as creditor ( Crummey v. Crummey, supra; Code, § 113-1202 (5); Groves v. Williams, 68 Ga. 598 (4), 603; Weaver v. Cosby, 109 Ga. 310 (4), 318, 34 S.E. 680; Williams v. McHugh, 17 Ga. App. 59 (2), 64, 66, 86 S.E. 272, and cit.; Harris v. Longino, 20 Ga. App. 311 (2), 93 S.E. 29, and cit.), the rule operates to preclude an executor from asserting an individual claim to the properties disposed of by will, or an administrator from claiming an entire estate, by virtue of an alleged contract by the decedent to adopt the claimant as his child or to make a will leaving to him all of the estate.

However, the question is not whether the joint tenancy was "destroyed," or whether his claim is valid under Code Ann. § 16-431 and applicable cases cited supra, but whether, under principles of fiduciary law, he should be precluded or estopped from asserting a claim to the accounts regardless of whether his claim is otherwise valid; and it is clear that the validity of the claim standing alone is irrelevant when a breach of fiduciary duty is found, and that the fact the source of his claim predated the inception of the trust does not relieve him of fiduciary duties in regard to the subject matter of the trust to which he asserts an individual claim. Scott v. Haddock, 11 Ga. 258; Allen v. Solomon, 54 Ga. 483; Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 682 ( 135 S.E. 195) and cases cited; Wright v. Thompson, 190 Ga. 173, 177 ( 8 S.E.2d 640); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 ( 10 S.E.2d 859); Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464 ( 12 S.E.2d 877); Gammage v. Perry, 29 Ga. App. 427 ( 116 S.E. 126). As stated in Bogert, § 543, supra p. 478: "Again a trustee may find at the commencement of the trust, or during the course of its administration, without any action on his part, that he has a property or other interest which conflicts with that of the trust beneficiaries.

Such an action may not be maintained for two reasons: (1) Having qualified as co-executor under the will, the plaintiff is estopped to assert a position contrary to the express provisions of the will. Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 682-9 (4) ( 135 S.E. 195); Crummey v. Crummey, 190 Ga. 774 (2) ( 10 S.E.2d 859); Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464 ( 12 S.E.2d 877); Spratlin v. Spratlin, 216 Ga. 27 ( 114 S.E.2d 370); Maxwell v. Hollis, 216 Ga. 224, 226 (3a) ( 115 S.E.2d 360); and, (2) One of several co-executors cannot maintain a suit at law in his individual capacity against the other co-executors. Williams v. McHugh, 17 Ga. App. 59 (2) ( 86 S.E. 272). While the rule in this latter regard may be otherwise in an equitable proceeding in that one co-executor may sue another ( McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256, 116 S.E. 596) or a co-executor suing as an individual may be joined in his representative capacity as a defendant ( MacDougall v. National Bank of Columbus, 150 Ga. 579 (2), 104 S.E. 630), this case is not an equitable one since it was originally carried to the Supreme Court and by that court held not to be within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition was properly dismissed by the trial court after the plea of estoppel had been sustained.

Furthermore, the plaintiff in error cannot have a judgment revised or amended which is not offered for inspection, and is not before the court. Crummey v. Crummey, 152 Ga. 628 ( 110 S.E. 891); Jones v. Whitehead, 167 Ga. 849 ( 146 S.E. 768). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

(Emphasis supplied.) Crummey v. Crummey, 58 Ga. App. 57 (1) ( 197 S.E. 501); see Redfearn, supra at § 338, p. 80; 29 EGL, Year's Support, § 20; 40 Mercer Law Rev., Wills, Trusts Administration of Estates, § 2. A., p. 475.