Opinion
No. 92 CVG 3513.
Decided August 17, 1992.
Elaine K. Croxton, agent for Dan Ritter. Amy Freisner, pro se.
A complaint was filed in this case seeking eviction and unpaid rent. The action is styled "Elaine K. Croxton, Agent for Dan Ritter, Plaintiff v. Amy Freisner, Defendant." Actions under R.C. Chapter 1923 may be brought by a "landlord," which is broadly defined at R.C. 1923.01(C)(2) as meaning "* * * the owner, lessor, or sublessor of premises, his agent, or any person authorized by him to manage premises or to receive rent from a tenant under a rental agreement * * *." It is certainly understandable that the legislature permitted "agents" to bring actions for eviction on behalf of owners, as there are numerous circumstances in which owners might be brought to serious hardship if they were required to sue in their own names. R.C. 1923.081 provides that an action for past due rent and other damages may be joined with an action for forcible entry and detention under R.C. Chapter 1923 and, presumably, that portion of the action may also be brought by an owner's agent. Thus, the court finds the caption and body of the complaint in this action to be in all respects proper.
However, the complaint is signed by "Elaine Croxton, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 4575 Fulton Rd., N.W. Canton, OH 44718." Upon confirmation with the administrative offices of the Ohio Supreme Court, no Elaine Croxton is admitted to the Bar of the state of Ohio. If the above-mentioned statute permits an agent or person authorized by him to manage rented property to bring an action in the agent's name, may the agent then proceed pro se in forcible entry, on behalf of the landlord? This court believes that such an extension of authority is beyond the purpose and beyond the authority of the statute.
As considered above, it is understandable that the legislature would authorize an agent to proceed on behalf of a landlord. However, the extension of this authority to actually signing a complaint as attorney for the landlord, presenting the case for the landlord, filing motions for the landlord, and all the other acts of advocacy called for in litigation, goes well beyond the apparent purpose of permitting an agent to be the named plaintiff in these actions. The agent quite obviously is not the real party in interest, but rather it is the landlord who seeks recovery of his property and recovery of unpaid rent and damages.
Section 2(B)( 1)(g), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution vests original jurisdiction concerning admission to the practice of law in the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, Section 5(B), Article IV provides that the Ohio Supreme Court has authority to prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state. Even if the legislature did intend to authorize agents to represent landlords in eviction actions, which this court does not believe, such an act would be contrary to Section 2, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. R.C. 4705.01 further provides: "No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counsellor at law, or to commence, conduct, or defend any action or proceeding in which he is not a party concerned, either by using or subscribing his own name or the name of another person, unless he has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in compliance with its prescribed and published rules * * *."
This court thus finds that a landlord's agent who is not licensed to practice law cannot sign a complaint on behalf of the landlord, cannot represent the landlord in the courtroom, and cannot file a motion on behalf of the landlord. Such acts constitute the practice of law.
In Williams v. Global Constr. Co., Ltd. (1985), 26 Ohio App.3d 119, 26 OBR 330, 498 N.E.2d 500, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County held that the appropriate action to be taken where a nonattorney files a complaint in a court in violation of R.C. 4705.01 is to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. Interestingly, in Williams, the person who brought the action was the trustee of a business trust, and the court found that although he was the named trustee, he could not thereby represent the interests of the trust in court, as that constituted the practice of law.
In conformity with the above discussion, the motion for default judgment filed by Elaine Croxton, agent for Dan Ritter, is overruled.
It is further ordered that the complaint in this action be and hereby is dismissed without prejudice.
Complaint dismissed without prejudice.