Opinion
2013 CA 0394
02-19-2014
CROWN OILFIELD SERVICES, INC. v. LOUISIANA OILFIELD CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION INSURANCE FUND
Timothy W. Hassinger Patrick J. Schepens Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith Mandeville, LA Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Crown Oilfield Services, Inc. James R. Lewis Crawford Lewis, PLLC Baton Rouge, LA Attorney for Defendant-Appellant Louisiana Oilfield Contractors Association Insurance Fund
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the 16th Judicial District Court
Parish of St. Mary, Louisiana
Docket No. 121,978, Division "F"
Honorable Edward M. Leonard, Jr., Judge Presiding
Timothy W. Hassinger
Patrick J. Schepens
Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins,
Burr & Smith
Mandeville, LA
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellee
Crown Oilfield Services, Inc.
James R. Lewis
Crawford Lewis, PLLC
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
Louisiana Oilfield Contractors
Association Insurance Fund
BEFORE: PARRO, GUIDRY, AND DRAKE, JJ.
PARRO, J.
In this appeal, a workers' compensation insurance fund appeals a partial summary judgment in favor of one of its former insureds. After a de novo review of the designation of this partial summary judgment as final, we conclude that the trial court erred in so designating it. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand this matter to the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Louisiana Oilfield Contractors Association Insurance Fund (LOCAIF) provides workers' compensation benefits to members of the Louisiana Oilfield Contractors Association (LOCA). LOCAIF issued workers' compensation insurance policies to Crown Oilfield Services, Inc. (Crown), an oilfield services company, for the following policy periods: August 1, 2004 through August 1, 2005; August 1, 2006 through August 1, 2007; August 1, 2007 through August 1, 2008; and August 1, 2008 through June 1, 2009. At the beginning of each of these policy years, LOCAIF calculated Crown's premium by multiplying the risk rate assigned to each employee classification code by the amount of Crown's projected payroll for the coming year. At the end of each policy year, LOCAIF conducted an audit of Crown's payroll records to determine if the correct premium was paid. Depending on the results of each annual audit, Crown either paid the additional premium owed or received a credit for overpayment of its premium.
Crown chose a different workers' compensation insurer for its 2005 policy year.
After the final policy period ended on June 1, 2009, LOCAIF conducted an underwriting review of the four policy periods; determined the classification codes that had been used for certain of Crown's employee positions for all four policy periods were incorrect; amended the final audits for each policy period to change certain classification codes; and, in January 2010, billed Crown for $1,245,108.00 in additional premiums due for the four policy periods. Crown refused to pay the invoice, and LOCAIF refused to release Crown's letter of credit at a local bank.
According to Mark Spivey, Crown's president, the letter of credit was originally issued as security for any additional billings due to LOCAIF by Crown.
On June 30, 2010, Crown filed this suit against LOCAIF in St. Mary Parish for damages, breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and other relief. In its petition, Crown alleged that LOCAIF "knowingly and/or purposefully misrepresented and manipulated the worker classification codes in order to deceive and take advantage of Crown," and that such action constituted unfair and deceptive acts in violation of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, LSA-R.S. 51:4101, et seq., for which LOCAIF owed Crown damages, costs, and attorney fees. Crown also alleged that LOCAIF's actions constituted a breach of the workers' compensation insurance contract between the parties. Crown asserted that it had relied to its detriment on representations made by LOCAIF, its underwriters, and/or agents, and that LOCAIF should be estopped from attempting to "arbitrarily" change the classification codes when those codes were chosen exclusively by LOCAIF, its underwriters, and/or agents. Further, Crown sought declaratory relief declaring that: (1) the original classification codes LOCAIF provided at the inception of the first policy period in 2004, and continually used through the subsequent three policy periods, were the "proper" codes for Crown's business; (2) LOCAIF was estopped from changing the classification codes; (3) Crown owed LOCAIF no additional money; and (4) LOCAIF was required to release Crown's letter of credit. Crown also sought a jury trial.
Crown's original petition, as well as many other filings in this suit, were fax-filed and followed with hard copy filings, as permitted by LSA-R.S. 13:850. In this opinion, unless otherwise indicated, any reference to the date of a filing will be to the fax-filed date, if applicable.
On October 5, 2010, LOCAIF answered Crown's petition, and also filed a reconventional demand against Crown, seeking payment of the unpaid premiums and other amounts. According to LOCAIF, a LOCA member's workers' compensation insurance premium was calculated based on the nature of the member's business and on the extent of the member's prior losses. LOCAIF alleged improper classification codes were applied to Crown's account for the four policy periods and that Crown had failed to disclose a prior $11 million loss it had incurred. LOCAIF further alleged that, consequently, Crown's premiums were substantially lower than that generally charged for the type of services performed by Crown, Crown was aware of this fact, and Crown received the benefit of being insured for a higher class of risk, while only paying a premium on a lower risk category. LOCAIF claimed Crown's failure to pay the premiums due for the insurance coverage it received constituted a breach of the parties' workers' compensation insurance contract.
In 2009, LOCAIF filed suit in Lafayette Parish against several entities previously involved in the administration of the workers' compensation insurance fund, including a claims adjuster, a general/claims administrator, an actuary, and two insurance agents allegedly instrumental in the issuance of Crown's policies (Lafayette Parish suit). According to LOCAIF's allegations in the Lafayette Parish suit, some of these defendants were potentially liable for the improper classification codes applied to Crown's account for the four policy periods at issue. After Crown filed the instant suit against LOCAIF in St. Mary Parish in 2010, LOCAIF filed a separate suit in Lafayette Parish against Crown, amended the first Lafayette Parish suit to add Crown as a defendant, and filed a declinatory exception pleading the objection of lis pendens in the instant suit. In October 2010, the trial court in the instant suit denied LOCAIF's lis pendens exception. The current status of the Lafayette Parish litigation is unknown.
Over the next several months, the parties engaged in discovery and filed various exceptions not at issue in this appeal. On May 18, 2012, Crown filed a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(E) on four specific issues. LOCAIF opposed the motion, and the trial court ultimately held a hearing. On June 28, 2012, the trial court signed a judgment, granting a partial summary judgment on the four issues, as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by [Crown] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT the original worker classification codes and experience modification factors for Crown's insurance policies issued by [LOCAIF] in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2008 were exclusively chosen by [LOCAIF] through its underwriter and not by Crown.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT [LOCAIF] had no authority to conduct an "underwriting review" of Crown's policies or change classification codes and experience modification factors after annual final audits were already performed by [LOCAIF].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT [Crown] was the only [m]ember of the [LOCA] who was issued an invoice seeking additional premiums by changing their classification codes and experience modification factors after final audits were already performed by [LOCAIF].
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT
[LOCAIF's] allegations in Paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of its Reconventional Demand that Crown failed to disclose a prior loss are untrue and are hereby dismissed with prejudice at [LOCAIF's] sole costs.
After the trial court signed the above partial summary judgment, Crown filed a second motion for partial summary judgment under LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(E), seeking a judgment: (1) declaring that Crown owed no additional premiums, money, fees and/or costs to LOCAIF; (2) ordering that Crown's letter of credit with the local bank be released without further delay; and (3) dismissing LOCAIF's reconventional demand with prejudice. LOCAIF filed an opposition to Crown's second motion for partial summary judgment. While that motion was pending, LOCAIF filed a motion to designate the June 28, 2012 judgment as a final judgment under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915, or alternatively, a motion to revise the judgment to remove all findings of fact from it. Crown filed an opposition to the designation of the June 28, 2012 judgment as a final judgment or to any revision of the judgment.
The trial court held a hearing on Crown's second motion for partial summary judgment, and on LOCAIF's motion to designate the June 28, 2012 judgment as final, and then took the matter under advisement. On September 24, 2012, the trial court signed a judgment, granting LOCAIF's motion to designate the June 28, 2012 judgment as a final judgment, and denying its alternative motion to revise the judgment. On the same day, the trial court signed "reasons for judgment" denying Crown's second motion for partial summary judgment.
LOCAIF devolutively appeals from the June 28, 2012 judgment. Because we determine the judgment is not a final appealable judgment and dismiss the appeal, we pretermit discussion regarding the assignments of error raised by LOCAIF on appeal.
APPEALABILITY OF JUDGMENT
Appellate courts have the duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Rush v. Rush, 12-1502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/25/13), 115 So.3d 508, 510, writ denied, 13-0911 (La. 5/31/13), 118 So.3d 398. A partial summary judgment rendered pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(E) may be immediately appealable during ongoing litigation only if it has been properly designated as a final judgment by the trial court, pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Although a trial court may designate a partial judgment as final under LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B), that designation is not determinative of this court's jurisdiction. Id., 115 So.3d at 510-11. We must independently ascertain whether this court has appellate jurisdiction to review the partial judgment from which the appeal was taken. See R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122.
At the time the trial court signed the June 28, 2012 judgment granting Crown's first motion for partial summary judgment, LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(E) stated, in part: "A summary judgment may be rendered dispositive of a particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense, in favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the summary judgment does not dispose of the entire case[.]" Although LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(E) was amended after the partial summary judgment was rendered in this case, the amendments are not implicated in the issues presented in this appeal. See 2012 La. Acts, No. 257, §1, effective August 1, 2012, and 2013 La. Acts, No. 391, §1, effective August 1, 2013.
At the time the trial court signed the June 28, 2012 judgment granting Crown's first motion for partial summary judgment, LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B) provided:
(1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.Although LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B) was amended after the partial summary judgment was rendered in this case, the amendments are not implicated in the issues presented in this appeal. See 2013 La. Acts, No. 391, §1, effective August 1, 2013.
(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any order or decision which adjudicates fewer than all claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal. Any such order or decision issued may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
The appellate jurisdiction of this court extends to "final judgments." While a final judgment is appealable, an interlocutory judgment is appealable only when expressly provided by law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083. A final judgment is one that determines the merits, in whole or in part, while an interlocutory judgment is one that does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841. A partial final judgment rendered pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915 must be sufficiently final in that it disposes of the claim or dispute as to which the partial judgment is rendered. See Doyle v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America, Inc., 99-0459 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/31/00), 764 So.2d 1041, 1047, writ denied, 00-1265 (La. 6/16/00), 765 So.2d 338; see also Marquez v. Jack Ussery Construction, 06-1852 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/8/07), 964 So.2d 1045, 1048, writ denied, 07-1404 (La. 10/12/07), 965 So.2d 400, and City of Baton Rouge v. American Home Assurance Company, 06-0522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 1113, 1117.
In certifying a partial judgment as final, a trial court should give explicit reasons on the record as to why there is no just reason for delay; mere conclusory statements do not suffice. See Shapiro v. L&L Fetter, Inc., 02-0933 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 406, 410. In this case, the trial court designated the June 28, 2012 judgment as final, stating "there was no just reason for delay"; but, the trial court failed to give explicit reasons for its designation. When the propriety of the certification is not apparent, and the trial court has failed to give reasons for its certification, we review the certification de novo, taking into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. Messinger, 894 So.2d at 1122; Marquez, 964 So.2d at 1048 n.1; City of Baton Rouge, 951 So.2d at 1118. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to: (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the trial court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; and (4) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. Messinaer, 894 So.2d at 1122. Further, in determining whether a partial judgment is a final one for the purpose of an immediate appeal, a court must always keep in mind the historic policy against piecemeal appeals. Id.
On the issue of the finality of the June 28, 2012 judgment, in reasons for judgment, the trial court stated: "[LOCAIF] has not sustained its burden in opposing the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of Crown. Having thus made these findings and determining that there is no just reason for delay, the Court grants [LOCAIF's] Motion to Designate Judgment for Partial Summary Judgment As Final Judgment in accordance with [LSA-C.C.P.] art. 1915(B)(2)... ."
Applying these precepts, we have conducted a de novo review and find the trial court erred in certifying the June 28, 2012 judgment as a partial final judgment pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Crown's petition against LOCAIF includes claims for unfair trade practices, damages, breach of contract, and declaratory relief. LOCAIF's reconventional demand against Crown claims a breach of contract and seeks payment of unpaid premiums. The June 28, 2012 partial summary judgment disposes of none of these claims on the merits, in whole or in part, and instead only addresses interlocutory matters. See Marquez, 964 So.2d at 1048; Doyle, 764 So.2d at 1047; also see Angelos v. Ruckstahl, 12-0202 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/12), 2012 WL 4335440, 2 (unpublished); Williams v. Hendry, 11-2379 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/12), 2012 WL 4335409, 2 (unpublished); Humphrey v. State, Department of Corrections, 11-2272 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/13/12), 2012 WL 2155237, 3 (unpublished). And, under a Messinger analysis, we find that allowing an immediate appeal of this partial judgment would only encourage multiple appeals and piecemeal litigation, causing delay and judicial inefficiency. City of Baton Rouge, 951 So.2d at 1120.
See Rush, 115 So.3d at 511 (A wife's petition for declaratory judgment sought a declaration that an alleged matrimonial agreement was invalid due to a vice of form and a vice of consent. The trial court rendered a partial judgment finding the agreement valid as to form and certified the judgment as final pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B). This court found the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the partial judgment as final, noting that to allow an immediate appeal of a decision deciding one, but not ail, of the issues raised in attacking the validity of the matrimonial agreement encouraged piecemeal litigation.)
For example, although the trial court determined in the June 28, 2012 judgment that LOCAIF chose the subject classification codes, the trial court did not then determine that Crown detrimentally relied on this choice; nor did the trial court render the sought-after declaratory judgment that LOCAIF was thereby estopped from changing the codes. LOCAIF's choice of the classification codes is directly related to Crown's breach of contract claim and to its declaratory relief claims as to whether the original classification codes were the "proper" codes for Crown's business and whether LOCAIF was estopped from changing them. The relationship between these adjudicated and unadjudicated issues would not necessarily narrow any of the evidence adduced at trial regarding which classification codes were proper for the four policy periods; and, if the trial court later determines LOCAIF is estopped from changing the codes, our appellate review of who chose the codes might be mooted. On the other hand, future evidence might oblige this court to revisit the issue of who actually chose the codes and whether LOCAIF's role in choosing the classification codes constituted a breach of its contract with Crown.
See City of Baton Rouge, 951 So.2d at 1119 (The trial court improperly designated a partial judgment as final when there was a direct relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated tort claims; the judgment did not necessarily narrow the issues for trial; and the appellate court might be obliged to consider the same issues a second time.)
And, although the trial court determined that LOCAIF had no authority to conduct the underwriting review or change the classification codes after performing annual audits of Crown's records, the trial court did not then determine LOCAIF had no basis to collect additional premiums from Crown. Crown's declaratory relief claims that it owes LOCAIF no additional money, and that its letter of credit should be released, as well as LOCAIF's reconventional demand seeking payment of the unpaid premiums, are directly related to LOCAIF's authority to conduct the underwriting review, and all of these claims remain to be decided. It is possible that, once the parties' respective rights and duties under their contract are further established at trial, the issue of whether LOCAIF had the authority to conduct an underwriting review, or our need to review its authority to do so, would be mooted. And, again, the partial summary judgment on this subject does not necessarily narrow the issues for trial, nor does it simplify or clarify the ongoing proceeding. In fact, the interlocutory and piecemeal nature of that part of the June 28, 2012 judgment is evidenced by the fact that, even after the partial summary judgment was rendered, Crown filed yet a second motion for partial summary judgment to resolve its declaratory relief claims and to have LOCAIF's reconventional demand dismissed. Notably, the trial court denied Crown's second motion on the basis of unresolved factual issues.
Contrast Barber v. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau, 11-0357 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/28/12), 97 So.3d 454, 461 (A partial judgment dismissing the claims of some, but not all, plaintiffs as prescribed was properly certified as a final judgment because the dismissed claims did not affect the unadjudicated claims of the remaining plaintiffs; the claims of the remaining plaintiffs may then be addressed more efficiently; and litigation expenses may then be reduced.)
Further, although the trial court determined that Crown was the only LOCA member additionally invoiced by LOCAIF, the trial court did not then conclude that this determination rendered LOCAIF liable to Crown on any of Crown's claims, and in particular, its unfair trade practices claim. The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, LSA-R.S. 51:4101, et seq., is broadly and subjectively stated and does not specify particular violations. Levine v. First National Bank of Commerce, 06-394 (La. 12/15/06), 948 So.2d 1051, 1065-66. Rather, what constitutes an unfair trade practice is determined by the courts on a case-by-case basis, with the focus on whether the practice at issue offends established public policy and whether the practice is unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious. See Id. Thus, although the trial court's implied determination that Crown was somehow singled out by LOCAIF may be relevant to an unfair trade practices claim, it is a merely a minor, single aspect of an unfair trade practices claim, and is certainly not dispositive of the merits of the claim, even in part.
See Marquez, 964 So.2d at 1048 (A workers' compensation judgment determining an employee's hourly rate of pay, but not determining the extent of his disability, was not a partial final judgment, because it only decided a preliminary matter in the course of the compensation litigation.)
And, lastly, although the trial court determined that LOCAIF untruly alleged that Crown failed to disclose a prior $11 million loss, and struck these allegations from LOCAIF's reconventional demand, the trial court did not then determine that LOCAIF's reconventional demand was subject to dismissal. Thus, that part of the June 28, 2012 judgment striking paragraphs 6, 7, and 9 of LOCAIF's reconventional demand only decided a preliminary matter, and did not finally decide the merits of any claim, in whole or in part. The merits of LOCAIF's reconventional demand are yet to be decided.
See Marcel v. Tangipahoa Parish School System, 08-1287 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/19/09), 2009 WL 1706778, 2 (unpublished) (That part of a partial judgment striking a paragraph from the plaintiffs' petition regarding the use of sampling procedures in conducting a tax audit did not dispose of or address any issues in the case. Because it decided only a preliminary matter, and did not decide the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, in whole or in part, that part of the judgment was interlocutory, not final.)
In sum, none of the trial court's determinations in the June 28, 2012 partial summary judgment was "dispositive" of any particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(E). The judgment was not sufficiently final in that it did not dispose of the claim or dispute as to which the partial judgment was rendered. See Doyle, 764 So.2d at 1047. That is, the judgment did not dispose of the merits of Crown's claims for damages, breach of contract, or declaratory relief; likewise, it did not dispose of the merits of LOCAIF's reconventional demand. It is apparent that the trial court attempted to render a declaratory-type judgment, but the judgment that was rendered did not resolve the uncertainty or controversy that gave rise to the litigation, i.e., a determination as to whether LOCAIF is entitled to collect additional premiums from Crown for the four subject policy periods. Thus, the June 28, 2012 judgment is interlocutory, and as such, it may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating the parties' respective claims, rights, and liabilities. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 1915(B); City of Baton Rouge, 951 So.2d at 1120; and Doyle, 764 So.2d at 1047-48. Both sides may therefore present evidence on the four specific issues addressed in the June 28, 2012 judgment, and any challenges to the correctness of the trial court's determinations in that judgment may be addressed by this court, following the adjudication, in a future appeal. See Doyle, 764 So.2d at 1047-48. Additionally, we decline to convert this matter to an application for supervisory writs, as the granting of the writ application will not terminate the litigation at this time and the parties have an adequate remedy by review on appeal after a final judgment is rendered. See Herlitz Construction Company, Inc. v. Hotel Investors of New Iberia, Inc., 396 So.2d 878 (La. 1981) (per curiam); Angelos, 2012 WL 4335440, 2.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we find the June 28, 2012 judgment is a non-appealable, interlocutory judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the Louisiana Oilfield Contractors Association Insurance Fund.
APPEAL DISMISSED; CASE REMANDED.