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Crown Andersen Inc. v. Georgia Gulf Corp.

251 Ga. App. 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)
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Crown Andersen Inc. v. Georgia Gulf Corp.

7 Citing cases

  1. Barna Log Homes of Georgia, Inc. v. Wischmann

    310 Ga. App. 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 3 times

    Lucas, 289 Ga. App. at 515-516 (2). See also Crown Andersen, Inc. v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 251 Ga. App. 551, 554 (2) ( 554 S.E.2d 518) (2001). Compare with American Southern Ins. Group v. Goldstein, 291 Ga. App. 1, 13-14 (7) (b) ( 660 S.E.2d 810) (2008) (explaining the difference between a statement that imputes a tradesman's general reputation and therefore is not barred by the single-instance rule and a statement that alleges merely an act of negligence, mistake, or ignorance on a single occasion).

  2. American Southern Ins. v. Goldstein

    291 Ga. App. 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 7 times
    Finding that evidence that individuals failed to meet with a sales agent after another agent stated that she was a liar who worked for a fraudulent company was insufficient to support a tortious interference claim because it would require speculation to conclude that, absent the alleged interference, the individuals were reasonably likely to have entered into a business relationship with the plaintiff through that sales agent.

    Goldstein also cites Holder Constr. Co. v. Ed Smith Sons, wherein this court determined that a letter accusing plaintiff of failing to inquire into the hazards of blasting in a particular area (leading to a damaged water line) could not constitute libel per se, for it imputed mere) negligence to plaintiff as to a single transaction and was therefore insufficient to impute gross negligence or unskillfulness generally in the trade. 251 Ga. App. 551 ( 554 SE2d 518) (2001). Id. at 554 (2).

  3. Lucas v. Cranshaw

    289 Ga. App. 510 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 25 times
    Explaining that Georgia case law has incorporated the definition of slander into the definition of libel, rendering "that which is slander per se also . . . libel per se"

    Language imputing to a business or professional man ignorance or mistake on a single occasion and not accusing him of general ignorance or lack of skill is not actionable per se. This is because a charge that plaintiff in a single instance was guilty of a mistake, impropriety or other unprofessional conduct does not imply that he is generally unfit.Crown Andersen v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 251 Ga. App. 551, 554 (2) ( 554 SE2d 518) (2001) (citations and punctuation omitted). And the Lucas plaintiffs make no claim of libel per se under OCGA ยง 51-5-4 (a) (2).

  4. Skylake Property v. Powell

    281 Ga. App. 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 9 times

    Further, that the trial court entertained motions for summary judgment does not prohibit the Powells from amending. The rule is that a plaintiff may not amend his complaint after the grant of summary judgment because the plaintiff has an obligation to present his case in full in opposing the summary judgment motion or run the risk of an adjudication against him. Summer-Minter Assoc, v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 605 ( 203 SE2d 173) (1973); Crown Andersen, Inc. v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 251 Ga. App. 551, 553 (1) (b) ( 554 SE2d 518) (2001). Because summary judgment was not granted in the Association's favor, the rule does not act to bar the amendment.

  5. Kace Investments, L.P. v. Hull

    629 S.E.2d 26 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the plaintiff could not complain that it was unable to comply with the trial court's order to respect the defendant's easement because of its lease with a third party, where plaintiff had entered into lease knowing that property was subject to an easement

    "The Supreme Court of Georgia held that this was too late, as plaintiffs had the obligation [under OCGA ยง 9-11-56 (e)] to present their case in full in opposing the summary judgment motion or run the risk of an adjudication against them." Crown Anderson, Inc. v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 251 Ga. App. 551, 553 (1) (b) ( 554 SE2d 518) (2001). Here, Hull is not attempting to recast his complaint to avoid summary judgment.

  6. ESI, Inc. v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc.

    254 Ga. App. 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 10 times

    Andrews, P.J., and Eldridge, J., concur. See Northgate Village Apartments v. Smith, 207 Ga. App. 479, 480-481 (1) ( 428 S.E.2d 381) (1993); cf. Crown Anderson, Inc. v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 251 Ga. App. 551, 553-554 (1) (b) ( 554 S.E.2d 518) (2001). MILLER, Judge.

  7. Henick v. Fast-Track Anesthesia Assocs., LLC

    No. 11-1145 (W. Va. Nov. 26, 2012)   Cited 1 times
    In Henick v. Fast-Track Anesthesia Associates, LLC, No. 11-1145, 2012 WL 5908939, at *5-6 (W.Va. November 26, 2012) (memorandum decision), we recently relied on our decision in Milan to uphold an award of general damages in the amount of $100,000.

    "Crown Andersen, Inc. v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 554 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga.App.2001) (internal footnotes omitted). Petitioner argues that respondents' counterclaim for defamation per se is based on a single mistake, not a habitual course of conduct, and does not imply any lack of skill on the part of Dr. Palumbo. As such, respondents' counterclaim for defamation per se is not actionable against petitioner under the single mistake rule.