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Crowley v. Pinebrook, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Jul 21, 2011
439 F. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2011)

Opinion

No. 10-2398.

Submitted: July 12, 2011.

Decided: July 21, 2011.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Jillyn K. Schulze, Magistrate Judge (8:08-cv-03427-JKS).

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marilyn Crowley, Appellant Pro Se. Heidi Elizabeth Dudderar, LAW OFFICES OF HEIDI E. DUDDERAR, PC, California, Maryland, for Appellee.


Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.


Marilyn Crowley appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment and denying her claim that her employment was terminated in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e- 2000e-17 (West Supp. 2010) and the Jury System Improvement Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1875 (2006). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the magistrate judge.Crowley v. Pinebrook, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-03427-JKS (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2006).

AFFIRMED


Summaries of

Crowley v. Pinebrook, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Jul 21, 2011
439 F. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2011)
Case details for

Crowley v. Pinebrook, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:MARILYN CROWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PINEBROOK, INCORPORATED…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Date published: Jul 21, 2011

Citations

439 F. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2011)

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