In Strause v. Dutch, 250 Ill. 326, it was held that a mortgagee who obtains a deficiency decree against a mortgagor in a foreclosure proceeding stands in the same position as any other decree or judgment creditor of the mortgagor and has a right, under the statute, to redeem from his own foreclosure sale. This case was followed in Crowder v. Scott State Bank of Bethany, 365 Ill. 88. Under the holdings in the foregoing cases, it is clear appellees were judgment creditors in the sense that term is used in section 20, and it makes no difference whether their judgment be considered as a separate and independent judgment or treated as a deficiency decree. The fact that Sullivan disposed of the title to the premises prior to the foreclosure proceedings would not change their status as judgment creditors.
Annot., 108 A.L.R. 993; 55 Am.Jur.2d, Mortgages § 874; 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judicial Sales § 342. The parties have cited to us the cases of Crowder v. Scott State Bank of Bethany, 365 Ill. 88, 5 N.E.2d 387 (1936), 108 A.L.R. 991, and Leavitt v. Continental Trust Co., 71 Colo. 3, 203 P. 666 (1922). Both cases are distinguishable as the applicable statutes granted the right of redemption to judgment creditors without the obligation that they have a lien on the land.
" Counsel for the Valkanets rely on the language of the dissenting opinion in Strause v. Dutch, but it should be noted that the majority decision in this case was followed without dissent in the later cases of Crowder v. Scott State Bank of Bethany, 365 Ill. 88, 91, and Nudelman v. Carlson, 375 Ill. 577, 582. Counsel also urge that under equitable considerations the sum in question should be turned over to them. The only equitable consideration which they suggest is that Elliott purchased the property sold at the foreclosure sale for $90,000 and later purchased the property at the redemption sale for $131,000. They contend that since Elliott bid $90,000 at the first sale and $131,000 at the second sale, his first bid was fraudulent and he should not be permitted to retain the $28,009.
" Plaintiff cites Hack v. Snow, 338 Ill. 28; Williams v. Williston, 315 Ill. 178; Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank v. McCambridge, 343 Ill. 456; Crowder v. Scott State Bank of Bethany, 365 Ill. 88, and says that these "more recent" cases hold that "both before and after sale under a foreclosure the owner of the equity of redemption has the same estate in the land." The opinions in these cases say this, which is no doubt true under the circumstances appearing in each of them but not at all applicable here.
It arises by virtue of the debt, and it appears that such a creditor is on the same footing as any other judgment creditor. Strause v. Dutch, 250 Ill. 326, 331; Crowder v. Scott State Bank of Bethany, 365 Ill. 88, 91, 92. A foreclosure in equity is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and is not intended ordinarily to act in personam. Without the aid of the statute (Ill.