Opinion
Case No. 1:05-CV-00536-REC-LJO-P, (Doc. 1).
February 27, 2006
ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT KIM
I. Screening Order
A. Screening Requirement
Plaintiff Raymond D. Crowder ("plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on April 21, 2005.
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief.See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984),citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations." Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n. 9 (1989). "[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
B. Summary of Plaintiff's Complaint
The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi. Plaintiff names Dr. K. Kim and the Medical Supervisory Committee as defendants. Plaintiff is seeking money damages.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that on April 15, 2004, he began to experience blurred vision. Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Dr. Kim on April 16, 2004, given a 3 day lay-in, and instructed to return if his vision worsened. Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Kim the next week after his vision worsened, given "natural tears," and told to return if his vision worsened. Plaintiff alleges that when he awoke on June 14, 2004, he was totally blind in his right eye. Plaintiff was taken to an outside hospital on June 15, 2004, and told that he needed to be seen by a retinal specialist within two to three days. Plaintiff was taken to a specialist on August 2, 2004, and on August 20, 2004, was informed he had a totally detached retina. Plaintiff had surgery on his eye on August 26, 2004. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the delay in receiving treatment, he is permanently blind in his right eye.
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff.See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made."Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff's federal rights.
To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison conditions must involve "the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain." Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) "the prison official deprived the prisoner of the 'minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'" and (2) "the prison official 'acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.'" Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested "when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment," or in the manner "in which prison physicians provide medical care." McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)).
Plaintiff's allegation that the delay in receiving medical treatment for his eye rendered him blind in the eye is sufficient to state a claim for relief against defendant Kim, who was his treating doctor at the prison. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a);Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002);Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004);Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 2003); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). However, plaintiff has not stated a claim against the Medical Supervisory Committee. Plaintiff must allege facts linking the acts or omissions that led to the violation of his constitutional rights to the individuals responsible for the acts or omissions. Plaintiff has neither named the members of the Medical Supervisory Committee in his complaint nor set forth any facts demonstrating that the members of the Medical Supervisory Committee violated his rights. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he so desires.
C. Conclusion
The court finds that plaintiff's complaint contains a cognizable claim for relief against defendant Kim for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, the court finds that plaintiff's complaint does not contain a cognizable claim for relief against the Medical Supervisory Committee. The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.
If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and wishes to proceed against defendant Kim on his Eighth Amendment claim only, plaintiff may so notify the court in writing. The court will then issue Findings and Recommendations recommending that the remaining defendant be dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff a summons and a USM-285 form to fill out and return to the court. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process on defendant Kim.
In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule 15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Clerk's Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:
a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this order, or
b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint and wishes to proceed only against defendant Kim on his Eighth Amendment claim; and
3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to obey a court order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.