Opinion
No. 04-17-00338-CV
08-29-2018
Travis CROW, Britt A. Crow, Laurian Crow Edison, and Karen A. Kraft, Appellants v. Heddie Knappick LOOKADOO, Lisa Knappick Lucas, Mary Brown, Margaret Brown Nugent, Charles Brown, Joseph Gallagher, Josephine Brown Noll, Pamela Gallagher Palmer, and Irene B. Zoeller, Appellees
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 218th Judicial District Court, La Salle County, Texas
Trial Court No. 14-10-00188-CVL
Honorable Donna S. Rayes, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART
BACKGROUND
This appeal arises out of the trial court's order granting and denying summary judgment motions regarding a legal dispute concerning the ownership of mineral interests in land located in LaSalle County. The underlying dispute originates in three real estate transactions or conveyances.
The Transactions/Conveyances
Warranty Deed and Correction Deed
On June 4, 1983, Kathaleen Brown conveyed the property to Irene and Arno Zoeller ("the Zoellers") via Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien. The conveyance was made subject to a list of exceptions and outstanding mineral and royalty interests. The Warranty Deed, however, did not contain a mineral reservation in favor of Kathaleen. On August 4, 1983, Kathaleen executed a Correction Deed, which was not signed by the Zoellers. The Correction Deed purports to replace the June 1983 Warranty Deed and contains a reservation in favor of Kathaleen and her heirs.
The Correction Deed includes the following language:
SAVE AND EXCEPT, and there is hereby reserved unto Grantor, her heirs and assigns, forever, and [sic] undivided one-half (1/2) royalty interest in all of the oil, gas[,] and other minerals now owned by Grantor in and under and that may be produced from the above property. ...
Upon Grantor's death, her heirs and assigns, shall not participate in the making of any oil, gas, or mineral lease covering said property, nor shall they participate in any bonus which may be paid for any rental or shut-in gas well royalty to be paid under any such lease, and this instrument is made by Grantor and accepted by Grantees in order to correct said mistake, and in all other respects confirming said former deed.
Assumption Deed
On June 1, 1987, the Zoellers conveyed the land to Clyde and Georgia Crow in an Assumption Warranty Deed, which is the conveyance through which the Crow heirs ("the Crows") claim title to the property. The Assumption Warranty Deed references the reservations contained in the Correction Deed. The Assumption Warranty Deed contains the following language:
AND SAVE AND EXCEPT, and there is reserved unto Kathaleen E. Brown, during her lifetime, an undivided one-half interest in the oil, gas and other minerals now owned by Kathaleen E. Brown, together with the right to share equally in the executive and leasing rights and the right of ingress and egress at all times, during her lifetime, for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, operating and developing said lands for oil, gas and other minerals and removing the same therefrom, and during her lifetime shall participate in any bonus which may be paid
for oil, gas or mineral leases, and shall participate in any rental or shut-in gas well royalty to be paid under any said lease, all as more particularly described in Volume 253, pages 254-258, Deed Records of LaSalle County, Texas, and upon the death of Kathaleen E. Brown, her heirs and assigns shall not participate in the making of any oil, gas or other mineral lease covering any said property in said deed described, nor shall they participate in any bonus which may be paid for an [sic] rental or shut-in gas well royalty to be paid under any lease as described in said deed.
AND SAVE AND EXCEPT and there is reserved, excepted and retained by the grantors herein [the Zoellers], their heirs and assigns, and not conveyed hereby, a royalty interest equal to an undivided one-half of all oil royalty, gas royalty, casinghead gas royalty, royalty in other gaseous and hydrocarbon substances, and royalty in other minerals as now owned by grantors as their ownership interest may appear of record.
...
Such reservation of royalty interest by grantors herein shall be for the lifetime of grantors [the Zoellers], save and except that upon the death of the last surviving grantor, then such royalty interest shall not lapse should production be in effect or shut-in royalties are being paid, then, in such event, such royalty interest herein retained shall continue to be paid to grantors['] heirs and assigns until the termination of production or lapse of the lease under which royalty interest are paid, at which time such royalty reservation herein shall revert back to grantees named herein, their heirs or assigns.
The Stipulation of Interest
In 1990, Meridian, an oil and gas company, expressed interest in leasing the property. Meridian requested that Kathaleen, Clyde and Georgia Crow, and the Zoellers execute a stipulation of interest clarifying the parties' interests prior to entering oil and gas leases covering the property. Meridian prepared the Stipulation of Interest, which Kathaleen, Clyde and Georgia Crow, and the Zoellers executed and recorded. The Stipulation states that because certain ambiguities had arisen from the Warranty Deed, Correction Deed, and Assumption Deed concerning mineral and/or royalty interests in the Subject Land, Kathaleen E. Brown, the Zoellers, and Clyde and Georgia Crow "desire to stipulate and agree among themselves as to the mineral and/or royalty interest that each has in the Subject Land." The Stipulation further provides that "each of the undersigned hereby grant and convey to the others such interest as are necessary to effectuate the terms and provisions of this Stipulation of Interest." The Stipulation of Interest refers back to the Warranty Deed, Correction Deed, and Assumption Deed, and the pertinent portion reads as follows:
(a) That as a result of the above described Deed and Correction Deed from Kathaleen E. Brown to [the Zoellers], Kathaleen E. Brown owns in and to the oil, gas and other minerals in the Subject Land for her lifetime an interest equal to 1/2 of the mineral interest owned by her in the Subject Land on June 4, 1983, the date of the above described Deed from Kathaleen E. Brown to Arno C. Zoeller and wife, Irene B. Zoeller, together with a like interest in and to all bonus, delay rentals, and royalties reserved and payable pursuant to any oil and gas lease in existence affecting the Subject Land, such mineral interest to be for the lifetime of Kathaleen E. Brown, and at her death, said mineral interest shall cease to exist and be of no further force and effect, at which time the heirs, devisees, or assigns of Kathaleen E. Brown shall own a non-participating royalty interest in the Subject Land equal to 1/2 of the percentage mineral interest in the Subject Land owned by Kathaleen E. Brown on June 4, 1983 in and to all of the royalties reserved and payable under any oil and gas lease in existence covering the Subject Land.
(b) That as a result of the above described Deeds and Correction Deed, [the Zoellers], their heirs and assigns, own a non-participating royalty interest in the Subject Land equal to 1/2 of their percentage mineral interest in the Subject Land on June 1, 1987, the date of the above described Assumption Warranty Deed, in and to all of the royalties reserved and payable under any oil and gas lease in existence covering the Subject Land.
(c) That as a result of the above described Deeds and Correction Deed, all interests of Kathaleen E. Brown, and Arno C. Zoeller and wife, Irene B. Zoeller, in the Subject Land were conveyed to and acquired by Clyde L. Crow and wife, Georgia Crow, SAVE AND EXCEPT the specific mineral and non-participating royalty interest described as being owned by Kathaleen E. Brown, her heirs and assigns, in (a) above, and the non-participating royalty interest described as being owned by Arno C. Zoeller and wife, Irene B. Zoeller, in (b) above.
The Property
The property subject to the Stipulation (Stipulated Property) is described as follows:
Being all of Tract Nos. 19, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 in Section No. 70, and being Tract Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 29, 30, 31, in Section No. 72, and being Tract No. 8 in Section No. 71, and Tract No. 16 in Section No. 79, all in the Gardendale Colony Land Subdivision, La Salle County Subdivision, as per Subdivision Map recorded in Volume U, Page 135, Deed Records of La Salle County, Texas.In addition to the property conveyed in the Warranty Deed, in the Assumption Deed, the Zoellers also conveyed to Clyde and Georgia the property described below. This property (Non-Stipulated Property) was not included in the Stipulation of Interest but is included in the trial court's judgment:
Tracts 18 and 28 in Section 70, and Tracts 1, 10, and 20 in Section 72 of the Gardendale Colony Land Subdivision, La Salle County Subdivision, as per subdivision map recorded in Volume U, Page 135 of the Deed Records of LaSalle County, Texas.
The Underlying Suit
In May 2010, the Crows entered into an oil, gas, and mineral lease with Sierra Resources that was later assigned to Chesapeake Exploration. Royalty Payments from that lease are currently suspended.
The Crows subsequently sued Kathaleen Brown's heirs ("the Browns") and Irene Zoeller ("Zoeller"). In their lawsuit, the Crows alleged Irene Zoeller breached her fiduciary duty by depleting the corpus of the estate; the Browns and Zoeller have no right, title, or interest in the Stipulated Property; the Browns and Zoeller hold money that belongs to the Crows; and the defendants were overpaid royalties that belong to the Crows. The Crows also requested attorney's fees.
The Crows' Motions for Summary Judgment
After the Browns and Zoeller filed their respective answers, the Crows filed a traditional motion for partial summary judgment against the Browns and Zoeller. In their motion, the Crows alleged the non-participating royalty interests reserved to Zoeller and the Browns have terminated and vested in the Crows. The Crows asked the trial court to declare the Crows own all the mineral interests that were subject to and covered by the Stipulation. The Crows also requested restitution for the royalties unjustly paid to Zoeller and the Browns.
The Crows additionally filed a traditional motion for partial summary judgment against Zoeller. In their motion, the Crows asked the trial court to declare the non-participating royalty interest reserved by the Zoellers in the Assumption Deed is a life estate rather than a fee simple interest. The Crows also requested the trial court declare Zoeller owed a fiduciary duty, which she breached. Finally, the Crows requested the trial court order that a constructive trust be established and funded by Zoeller with the royalties she received, and that all future royalties be paid into the trust.
Zoeller's Motions for Summary Judgment
Zoeller filed both traditional and a no-evidence motions for partial summary judgment. In her no-evidence motion for summary judgment, Zoeller asserted there was no evidence the interests reserved by the Zoellers in the Stipulation have terminated and vested in the Crows. In her traditional motion for summary judgment, Zoeller asked the trial court to declare that the Zoellers, their heirs, and assigns own a non-participating royalty interest in the stipulated property equal to one-half of their percentage mineral interest in the property on June 1, 1987, which interest shall be for the lifetime of the Zoellers, save and except that upon the death of the last surviving Zoeller spouse, the royalty interest shall not lapse and should production be in effect or shut-in royalties are being paid, then, in such an event, such royalty interest shall continue being paid to the Zoellers' heirs and assigns until the termination of production or lapse of the lease under which royalty interest is paid, at which time such royalty reservation shall revert back to the Crows, their heirs or assigns.
The Browns' Motions for Summary Judgment
The Browns also filed both traditional and no-evidence motions for partial summary judgment. In their no-evidence motion, the Browns allege, with respect to the Crows' unjust enrichment claim, that there is no evidence the Browns: made any misrepresentation to the Crows; coerced the Crows in any regard; and took undue advantage of the Crows. With regard to the Crows' money had and received claim, the Browns argue there is no evidence they hold money that belongs to the Crows in equity and good conscience. In their traditional motion for summary judgment, the Browns argue the trial court should declare the Browns are vested with perpetual non-participating royalty interests burdening the property. The Browns also asked the trial court to enter judgment that the Crows were estopped from challenging a mineral reservation contained in the Correction Deed.
The Trial Court's Judgment
The trial court granted the Browns' motions and Zoeller's motion for traditional partial summary judgment. The trial court denied Zoeller's no evidence motion and the Crows' motions. In its order, the trial court "declare[d] as follows:"
1) The following lands located in LaSalle County, Texas are in dispute in this suit:
All of the following Tracts out of the Gardendale Colony Land Subdivision, LaSalle County Subdivision, as per Subdivision Map recorded in Volume U, Page 135 of the Deed Records of LaSalle County, Texas: Tract Nos. 19, 25, 26, 27, 30, and 31 in Section No. 70; Tract Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 29, 30, and 31 in Section No. 72; Tract No. 8 in Section 71; and Tract No. 16 in Section 79 (the "Stipulated Property").
and
Tracts 18 and 28 in Section 70, and Tracts 1, 10, and 20 in Section 72 of the Gardendale Colony Land Subdivision, LaSalle County Subdivision, as per subdivision map recorded in Volume U, Page 135 of the Deed Records of LaSalle County, Texas (the "Non-Stipulated Property").
2) The August 4, 1983 Correction Deed ... is valid and enforceable, relates back to the June 4, 1983 Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien ... and reserved for the benefit of Ms. Brown's heirs, devisees or assigns a perpetual non-participating royalty interest in and to all of the royalties reserved and payable under any oil and gas lease that may cover the Stipulated Property being equal to one-half (1/2) of the percentage mineral interest in the Stipulated Property owned by Ms. Brown at the time she conveyed the Stipulated Property to Arno C. Zoeller and Irene B. Zoeller;
3) The Assumption Warranty Deed ...conveyed no portion of the mineral or royalty interest reserved by Kathaleen E. Brown in the Correction Deed;
4) The Stipulation of Interest ... did not divest Kathaleen E. Brown's heirs, devisees, or assigns of the perpetual non-participating royalty interest reserved by [Kathaleen] in the Correction Deed;This appeal followed.
5) Plaintiffs do not own any portion of the perpetual non-participating royalty interest in the Stipulated Property reserved by Kathaleen E. Brown in the August 4, 1983 Correction Deed ...;
6) Kathaleen E. Brown's heirs, devisees, or assigns own an interest in the Stipulated Property equal to one-half (1/2) of the royalty estate owned by Kathaleen E. Brown prior to her conveyance of the Stipulated Property to [the Zoellers], being a perpetual non-participating royalty interest equal to one-half (1/2) of the percentage mineral interest in the Stipulated Property owned by Kathaleen E. Brown at the time she conveyed the Stipulated Property to [the Zoellers], in and to all of the royalties reserved and payable under any oil and gas lease covering the Stipulated Property, including but not limited to, the Chesapeake Lease and any future lease; and
7) With respect to the Stipulated Property and the Non-Stipulated Property, that certain June 1, 1987, Assumption Warranty Deed ...executed by [the Zoellers], as Grantors, to Clyde Crow and Georgia Crow, as Grantees ... is valid and enforceable and reserved a non-participating royalty interest ("the Zoeller NPRI") for the benefit of Irene B. Zoeller equal to one-half of all royalty interest [the Zoellers] owned in the Stipulated and Non-Stipulated Property as of June 1, 1987, ... Such reservation of the Zoeller NPRI is a defeasible term interest, not a life estate interest, that shall last for the lifetime of the last survivor of the marriage of [the Zoellers]. If there is no production or payment of shut-in royalties at the time of the death of Irene Zoeller, then the Zoeller NPRI will vest in Plaintiffs, their heirs and assigns at the time of Irene Zoeller's death. If there is production or payment of shut-in royalties at the time of the death of Irene Zoeller then the Zoeller NPRI shall not vest in the Crows, their heirs and assigns until the production or payment of shut-in royalties occurring at the time of Irene Zoeller's death ceases;
8) The Stipulation of Interest ... did not divest Irene Zoeller, her heirs, devisees, or assigns of the Zoeller NPRI as to the Stipulated Property; and
9) The only interest Plaintiffs own with respect to [the] Zoeller NPRI is a reverter interest in the defeasible term interest owned by Irene Zoeller.
THE APPEAL
The Crows raise four issues on appeal, contending the trial court: erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the Browns and Zoeller because the Stipulation of Interest limited the duration of the Browns' and Zoeller's interest in the property; improperly relied on the Correction deed in its interpretation of the Stipulation of Interest; and incorrectly interpreted the Assumption Deed. The Crows additionally contend they presented more than a scintilla of evidence on their claims for unjust enrichment and money had and received and also established their claims as a matter of law.
Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Graham v. Prochaska, 429 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant to determine whether the movant proved there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Valence, 164 S.W.3d at 661; Medina Interests, Ltd. v. Trial, 469 S.W.3d 619, 621-22 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied); Graham, 429 S.W.3d at 654; Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 466 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied). When, as here, the parties file competing motions for summary judgment, and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, we review the summary judgment evidence presented by both parties and determine all questions presented. S. Crushed Concrete, LLC v. City of Houston, 398 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. 2013).
Interpreting the Stipulation of Interest
We interpret a stipulation the same way that we interpret a contract because a stipulation constitutes a contract. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas v. Kinabrew, 589 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We apply the rules for interpreting contracts to the interpretation of stipulations. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Horton & Horton Custom Works, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We construe contracts as a whole and use an interpretation that gives effect to every part of the agreement so that no provision is rendered meaningless. See J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex. 2003). We apply a de novo review to a trial court's interpretation of an unambiguous contract. See Heil Co. v. Polar Corp., 191 S.W.3d 805, 809-10 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
When we review a contract, our goal is to determine the parties' true intentions as expressed in the instrument. See Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). We do not read any provision in isolation, but consider each provision with reference to the whole. See id. If the language in the contract can be given a definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and we will construe the contract as a matter of law. See El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d 802, 806 (Tex. 2012) (citing Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 333 (Tex. 2011)). A contract is ambiguous if, after applying the principles of contract construction, it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors Inc., 473 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex. 2015).
During oral argument, no party argued the ambiguity of the Stipulation of Interest. Construing the Stipulation of Interest as a whole, giving effect to each part of the stipulation, we agree the Stipulation of Interest is unambiguous.
Discussion
As a preliminary matter, we note that in two issues, the Crows complain the trial court either improperly relied upon or improperly interpreted a document other than the Stipulation of Interest. In their second issue, the Crows contend the trial court erred by relying on the Correction Deed in determining Kathaleen reserved a mineral interest because the Correction Deed was void ab initio and should not have been recorded. In their third issue, the Crows contend the trial court misinterpreted the Assumption Deed because the interest reserved by the Zoellers in the Assumption Deed is a life estate, not a defeasible fee interest.
Having already determined the Stipulation of Interest is unambiguous, we need not look outside the four corners of the stipulation when interpreting the document. Because we now conduct a de novo review and we need not examine the Correction Deed or the Assumption Deed as part of our review, the Crows' complaints regarding the reliance upon or interpretation of those documents is moot. The Crows' first and second issues on appeal are overruled and declarations two, three, four, five, and seven are vacated.
Issue One: Stipulation of Interest
In their first issue, the Crows contend the Stipulation of Interest limited the duration of the Browns' and Zoeller's interest in the Stipulated Property. The Crows argue the language contained in the Stipulation should be interpreted to create term non-participating royalty interests in the Browns and the Zoellers and for those interests to revert to the Crows upon termination. The Crows focus on the following language from the Stipulation:
... [Kathaleen] owns in and to the oil, gas, and other minerals in the Subject Land for her lifetime an interest equal to 1/2 of the mineral interest owned by her in the Subject Land on June 4, 1983 ... together with a like interest in and to all bonus, delay rentals, and royalties reserved and payable pursuant to any oil and gas lease in existence affecting the Subject Land, such mineral interest to be for the lifetime of [Kathaleen], and at her death, said mineral interest shall cease to exist and be of no further force and effect, at which time heirs, devisees, or assigns of [Kathaleen] shall own a non-participating royalty interest in the Subject Land equal to 1/2 of the percentage mineral interest in the Subject Land owned by [Kathaleen] on June 4, 1983 in and to all of the royalties reserved and payable under any oil and gas lease in existence covering the Subject Land.(emphasis included).
The Crows point to the "lease in existence" language to argue the duration of the Browns' interest is determined by whether an oil and gas lease was in existence at the time of Kathaleen's death. The Crows also point to the same language to argue that Zoeller's interest is tied to any oil and gas lease in existence on the date the Stipulation was executed.
As support for their arguments, the Crows list a number of cases referring to "lease in existence" language. These cases, however, are distinguishable from the facts before the court. For example, in Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., the deed specifically used the language: "...this conveyance is made subject to the terms of any valid subsisting oil, gas and/or mineral lease or mineral lease or leases on above described land ..." Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. 1998) (emphasis included). Likewise, in Garrett v. Dils Co., the specific language at issue was: "Said land being now under an oil and gas lease executed in favor of I. B. Humphreys or his assigns, it is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject to the terms of said lease ..." Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. 1957) (emphasis included). Further, in Garrett, the conveyance specifically recognizes an existing lease. Id.
Although the Crows focus on the "in existence" language, unlike the cases cited by the Crows, the interests in this case are not "subject to" a lease in existence. The phrase "subject to" has been recognized as limiting the rights granted to a party. Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. 1986). "The words 'subject to,' used in their ordinary sense, mean subordinate to, subservient to or limited by." Wenske v. Ealy, 521 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Kokernot v. Caldwell, 231 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1950, writ ref'd)).
The absence of the phrase, along with the use of the phrase "under any oil and gas lease" in later paragraphs referring to the other parties' interests indicates the parties to the Stipulation did not intend to make the interests at issue "subject to" a then-existing lease at the time of Kathaleen's death, in the case of the Browns or at the time the Stipulation was executed, in the case of Zoeller.
Accordingly, we conclude the Stipulation of Interest did not limit the duration of the Browns' and Zoellers' interest in the stipulated property as suggested by the Crows. Issue One is overruled.
Issue Four: Other Claims
In their fourth issue, the Crows contend they established their claims of unjust enrichment and money had and received as a matter of law.
The Crows explain in their brief that the basis for recovery of underpaid royalties from overpaid royalty owners is unjust enrichment. The Crows contend that the Browns interest in the property terminated prior to the current lease, and therefore, all royalties payable under the current lease belong to the Crows. The Crows argue that because the Browns received royalties that rightfully belong to the Crows, the Browns are liable to the Crows for the amount in which the Browns were unjustly enriched. The Crows argument is predicated on their above-discussed contentions regarding the royalty interests in the Stipulation of Interest.
To establish a claim for money had and received, the plaintiff must show that the defendant holds money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff. See Edwards v. Mid-Continent Office Distributors, L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). The Crows contend, as discussed above, that the Browns interest in the property terminated prior to the current lease. Therefore, according to the Crows, all royalties payable under the current lease belong to the Crows, and any royalty payments received by the Browns should be awarded to the Crows.
Having previously determined the Stipulation of Interest did not limit the Browns' interest in the stipulated property, we now conclude the Crows did not establish their claims of unjust enrichment or money had and received as a matter of law. Issue four is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we vacate declarations two, three, four, five, and seven and affirm the remainder of the trial court's Order on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
Irene Rios, Justice