Opinion
24408.
ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 1967.
DECIDED JANUARY 5, 1968.
Construction of will. Emanuel Superior Court. Before Judge McMillan.
Allen Edenfield, Francis W. Allen, for appellants.
Spivey Carlton, Milton A. Carlton, Randall O. Palmer, for appellees.
The language of the will in the present case is clear and unambiguous and can be given legal effect as it stands, and the courts will not, by construction, give the will a different effect.
ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 1967 — DECIDED JANUARY 5, 1968.
The plaintiffs filed a petition seeking a construction of the will of Dora E. Lewis, deceased. Item Two of the will reads as follows: "I will, bequeath and devise all of my farm land to be divided equally among my children to wit: Johnnie N. Lewis, Jottie L. Lewis, Ottie W. Lewis, Dora Mae Lewis, Joe E. Lewis and Callie Belle Lewis. My son, Tommie Lewis, formerly owned an undivided interest in the farm home place which I bought at administrator's sale, and the proceeds of said sale went to heirs at law. It is my will and desire that my executors hereinafter named pay to the children of Tommie Lewis, deceased, to wit: William Lewis, Nell Waller, Mary Emma Lewis, Lillian Lewis, Tom Lewis, Lucille Lewis, Virginia Lewis and Geneva Lewis, the sum of $400 in order to make said children share equally in said estate. I have already given Tommie Lewis the sum of $700. It is my will and desire and I hereby bequeath and devise said farm land aforesaid to my children hereinbefore set out to them and each of them for and during their natural life only, and at their death, said farm land is to be the property of the children of my heirs at law first above named." The plaintiffs contend that they, as heirs of Tommie Lewis, are entitled to an interest in the property since the life tenants are now dead. The trial court, hearing the case without the intervention of a jury and upon an agreed stipulation of fact, found for the defendants and it is from this judgment that the plaintiffs appeal.
The appellants rely upon decisions of this court holding under Code § 113-806 that the courts shall seek diligently for the intention of the testatrix and may transpose sentences, and so forth to determine such intention. However, such contention ignores the last clause of the Code section, "but if the clause as it stands may have effect, it shall be so construed however well satisfied the court may be of a different testamentary intention."
"Where the language of a will is clear and can be given legal effect as it stands, the courts will not, by construction, give the will a different effect." McClelland v. Johnson, 211 Ga. 348 ( 86 S.E.2d 97), and citations. See also Bedgood v. Thomas, 220 Ga. 262 ( 138 S.E.2d 313).
The language in Item Two is not ambiguous. The testatrix makes it clear by this item that her living children are to receive a life estate in her farm land with the remainder going to their children. The other items of the will neither authorize nor imply a different result, and the judgment of the trial court so holding must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.