This clarification does "not amount to a material deviation from the terms" of the 1998 Adoption Agreement "so as to evidence substitution of the new agreement for the original [adoption] agreement." See Crow v. Cook , 215 Ga. App. 558, 561 (1) (a), 451 S.E.2d 467 (1994) (no novation where amendment to lease "was merely an agreement to correct an apparent error" in the prior lease). See also Brown v. Lawrenceville Properties, LLC , 309 Ga. App. 522, 524 (1), 710 S.E.2d 682 (2011) (parties’ corrections to lease did not amount to a novation).
Sprayberry Crossing Partnership v. Tuley, 198 Ga. App. 53, 56-57 (2) ( 400 SE2d 334) (1990).Crow v. Cook, 215 Ga. App. 558, 562 (1) (b) ( 451 SE2d 467) (1994). In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court noted that Fagbemi did not file a response to the motion and made no request for oral argument and the court had ruled on brief.
As recognized in Crow v. Cook, a novation's release of the original debtor and substitution of a new debtor "may be by express terms, or may be inferred from the acts of the parties or by necessary implication from a construction of the new agreement." 215 Ga. App. 558 ( 451 S.E.2d 467) (1994). (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
(b) OCGA § 53-12-199 (c) provides: "A judgment rendered in an action brought against the trust shall impose no personal liability on the trustee or the beneficiary." Though Crow v. Cook, 215 Ga. App. 558, 563 (3) ( 451 S.E.2d 467) (1994) questioned whether this statute effectively abolished the common law rule allowing trustees to be held liable, Altama Delta has cited no cases suggesting that beneficiaries might also be held liable, even under the common law. The trial court did not err in limiting the potential liability of White, White-Plouffe, and Pontello to the amount they would otherwise have received as trust beneficiaries, and its order is affirmed.