Opinion
14-P-1309
09-01-2015
CROW POINT COMMUNITY CLUB & others v. DAWN MARTEL & others.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiffs appeal from a second revised judgment entered by a judge of the Land Court in a dispute involving ownership of, and access to, a beach in Hingham Harbor situated near the defendants' homes. The plaintiffs argue that the judge, on remand, erred in refusing to adjudicate the rights of certain plaintiffs unless the Downer estate is brought into the litigation as a party. We vacate this particular aspect of the second revised judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.
Background. For a detailed factual background of the dispute over the beach and walkways, we refer to the decision of the Appeals Court in Kane v. Vanzura, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 749 (2011) (Kane). Of particular relevance here, Kane reversed a portion of the judgment entered by the judge regarding ownership of the fee interest in the beach and ruled that the estate of Samuel Downer, at the time of the 1929 conveyance of rights to use the beach and walkways, possessed the rights that the estate purported to convey by that deed. Id. at 757, 759. The 1929 deed, executed by a trustee under the will of Samuel Downer, conveyed:
Notably, the second revised judgment ruled:
"the Downer Estate (as defined in Land Court Decision 1) owns the fee interest in the Beach and the easterly portion of Alice Walk adjacent to Lot 1, and as a result it may have granted rights in the Beach, the easterly portion of Alice Walk adjacent to Lot 1, and Melville Walk, to certain Plaintiffs in the May 1929 Deed."
"as appurtenant to the land on Downer Avenue and Jarvis Avenue in that part of said Hingham called Crow Point . . . the right, so far as I have power to grant the same, to use the beach and shore of Hingham Harbor opposite the end of Melville Walk and Lot 1 on [a certain recorded plan] for bathing, boating, and all proper forms of recreation."Id. at 751-752. In Kane, we identified a subset of plaintiffs that were designated the "deeded rights plaintiffs":
"The plaintiffs claiming rights under the 1929 Downer deed (to whom we shall refer collectively as the 'deeded rights plaintiffs') are James and Irene Kane (Kanes); Donald and Geraldine Mann (Manns); Melinda Ponder; Stacy A. Dow; Alfred and Edythe Cox (Coxes); Mark G. Patrolia and Gayle Callahan; and Anthony and Kathleen Arnold (Arnolds)."Id. at 751 n.5 (Kane footnote). In Kane, we explicitly declined to determine the scope of any rights held by this subset of plaintiffs. Rather, we remanded the case for a "determination of the rights held by the deeded rights plaintiffs" because the judge had not yet considered the issue. Id. at 759.
According to the judge's second revised decision, "Valerie B. Robin and Brian J. Cavanaugh are the successors in interest in the Mann[s'] property; Michael Kranzley is the successor in interest in Ponder's property."
In the second revised decision, dated May 16, 2014, the judge stated that interpreting the 1929 deed requires, first, determining the identity of the deeded rights plaintiffs, and second, determining what rights they hold.
Regarding identification of the deeded rights plaintiffs, the judge noted that the plaintiffs argued that this group included each party mentioned in the Kane footnote, while the defendants argued that the number of deeded rights plaintiffs is fewer because some plaintiffs mentioned in the Kane footnote are outside the chain of title. The judge reached the following conclusion: "This court, however, feels that its determination of who the 'deeded rights plaintiffs' are requires the Downer Estate being a party to the case, as the Downer Estate has the right to weigh in on who has rights in its Beach." Regarding the scope of the rights, the judge similarly stated that he could not make a determination as to the rights of the parties without the Downer estate in the case.
In a footnote in his second revised decision, the judge stated, "As a practical matter, it is unclear to this court as to why there is a need to determine who the 'deeded rights plaintiffs' are, since there cannot at the present time be a determination of what rights these parties would have in the Beach."
Relevant to this appeal, the judge's second revised judgment, also dated May 16, 2014, modified the earlier judgment based on the rulings in Kane but concluded that "this court cannot adjudicate any rights under the May 1929 Deed unless the Downer Estate is brought in as a party." The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on June 13, 2014. Following the allowance of a motion to enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal, the defendants filed their notice of appeal on July 25, 2014.
Identity and rights of deeded rights plaintiffs. The only issue that the plaintiffs raise in this appeal is whether the judge erred in declining to adjudicate the rights of the deeded rights plaintiffs without the Downer estate becoming a party to the litigation. The defendants argue in their appeal that because the plaintiffs declined to add the Downer estate as a party, the judge erred in not dismissing the claims of the deeded rights plaintiffs. We see no merit in the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' claims should have been dismissed, and agree with the plaintiffs that the judge below can, and should, resolve the issues of identity and rights of the deeded rights plaintiffs without the Downer estate as a party.
The remainder of the defendants' brief presents arguments on the identity of the deeded rights plaintiffs (involving chain of title issues), and the scope of their rights (involving easement by implication issues). We decline to consider such arguments until the judge has made such determinations in the first instance. See Kane, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 751 n.5.
"Because there are no material facts in dispute, the only issue is the interpretation of the language in the deed, 'an issue that is purely a question of law.'" World Species List -- Natural Features Registry Inst. v. Reading, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 305 (2009), quoting from McGregor v. Allamerica Ins. Co., 449 Mass. 400, 402 (2007). See Rivers v. Warwick, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 593, 596 (1994) ("The interpretation of the documents [deed and other records] was in this case a matter of law for the court"). "The basic principle governing the interpretation of deeds is that their meaning, derived from the presumed intent of the grantor, is to be ascertained from the words used in the written instrument, construed when necessary in the light of the attendant circumstances." White v. Hartigan, 464 Mass. 400, 410-411 (2013), quoting from Patterson v. Paul, 448 Mass. 658, 665 (2007).
Based on the applicable guide to interpretation of a deed, we conclude that the judge erred in reasoning that he could not interpret the 1929 deed without the Downer estate as a party. Interpretation of the deed is a matter of law and does not require evidence to be taken unless the meaning of an essential term or phrase is ambiguous. See World Species List -- Natural Features Registry Inst. v. Reading, 75 Mass. App. Ct. at 305. The meaning of the 1929 deed "is to be ascertained from the words used in the written instrument." White v. Hartigan, 464 Mass. at 411. Contrary to the judge's assertion that the Downer estate "has the right to weigh in on who has rights in its Beach," the language of the deed itself, combined with any relevant circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed in 1929, provides a sufficient basis for determining the scope of the rights granted. See ibid.
To the extent that the judge, on remand, considers issues raised by the defendants that some of the deeded rights plaintiffs are actually outside the chain of title from the 1929 deed, and therefore do not have any rights under that instrument, the judge may consider any appropriate evidence from the parties. See Pazolt v. Director of the Div. of Marine Fisheries, 417 Mass. 565, 570 (1994) (judge may examine multiple deeds in chain of title to reach determination).
We vacate the portion of the second amended judgment declining to adjudicate any rights under the 1929 deed unless the Downer estate is added as a party. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.
So ordered.
By the Court (Trainor, Agnes & Blake, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
Clerk Entered: September 1, 2015.