Summary
holding that an appellate court's award of appellate fees under an offer of judgment statute during an original appeal on the merits became law of the case prohibiting a party from arguing that the offer of judgment statute did not apply to whistleblower actions at the trial court level
Summary of this case from Langer v. FelsOpinion
No. 1D07-6060.
October 24, 2008.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Leon County, P. Kevin Davey, J.
Marie A. Mattox and James Garrity of Marie A. Mattox, P. A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Harold A. Mardenborough, Jr., and Jason Taylor of Carr Allison, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
The appellant challenges an order by which the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the appellee under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, the offer of judgment statute. The trial court's order was entered subsequent to this court and the Florida Supreme Court awarding appellate attorney's fees to the appellee based on an offer of judgment after establishing that the appellant was not entitled to relief under sections 112.3187- 112.31895, Florida Statutes, the Whistle-blower's Act. Crouch v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 913 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), rev. denied 933 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2006). The appellant argues that the offer of judgment statute does not apply in whistle-blower actions. However, as applicability has been determined through the law of the case doctrine, we affirm. See Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Elliott, 924 So.2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Further, this court declines to address the manifest injustice exception to the doctrine because applicability of the offer of judgment statute was established by a higher appellate court during the original appeal on the merits.
Affirmed.
BARFIELD, ALLEN, and KAHN, JJ., concur.