Crouch v. Crouch

72 Citing cases

  1. Cary v. Cary

    937 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1996)   Cited 47 times
    Holding that a provision in an antenuptial agreement waiving alimony is not void as contrary to Tennessee public policy unless enforcement of the provision would render the waiving spouse a public charge

    WAIVER OF ALIMONY Although this Court has not previously considered the validity of a provision in an antenuptial agreement limiting or waiving alimony, the issue is not new to this State and has resulted in conflicting intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions "could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited."

  2. Kahn v. Kahn

    756 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn. 1988)   Cited 64 times
    Finding the Wilson Management quote applicable to divorce cases

    Therein, this Court noted the enactment by the General Assembly of Public Acts 1980, chapter 492, codified as T.C.A. § 36-3-501, but other than observing that prior to that statute Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn. App. 1983) had held that antenuptial agreements attempting to limit liability for future alimony were not enforceable, the effect of the statute upon the case law of Tennessee was not relevant to the issues and was not discussed. The rule rendering unenforceable a limitation on the amount of alimony in antenuptial agreements was adopted in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964). Judge Chattin, later a member of this Court, writing for the Court of Appeals, Middle Section, held that such provisions tend to promote divorce by inducing a mercenary husband "to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited."

  3. Posner v. Posner

    233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970)   Cited 81 times
    In Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970), the court held that antenuptial agreements settling alimony and property rights upon divorce are not void ab initio as contrary to public policy.

    And it is this same public policy that is the basis for the rule that an antenuptial agreement by which a prospective wife waives or limits her right to alimony or to the property of her husband in the event of a divorce or separation, regardless of who is at fault, has been in some states held to be invalid. See the cases collected in the annotation in 57 A.L.R.2d 942 et seq.; 27 Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, Sec. 275, p. 881, and Sec. 326, p. 923; Werlein v. Werlein, 1965, 27 Wis.2d 237, 133 N.W.2d 820; Crouch v. Crouch, 1964, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288; Motley v. Motley, 1961, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422. The reason that such an agreement is said to "facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce" was stated in Crouch v. Crouch, supra, as follows: —

  4. Fickle v. Fickle

    287 S.W.3d 723 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 36 times

    Additionally, an award of attorney's fees is within the trial court's discretion, and this Court will not interfere with such an award absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tenn. 1995) (citing Storey v. Storey, 835 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964.)) In contrast to the above standards, no presumption of correctness attaches to a trial court's conclusions of law. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 327.

  5. Fickle v. Fickle

    No. W2007-01509-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2008)   Cited 1 times

    Additionally, an award of attorney's fees is within the trial court's discretion, and this Court will not interfere with such an award absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tenn. 1995) (citing Storey v. Storey, 835 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964)). In contrast to the above standards, no presumption of correctness attaches to a trial court's conclusions of law.

  6. Evans v. Evans

    No. M2002-02954-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 6, 2004)   Cited 1 times

    An award of attorney's fees in a divorce action is also within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not interfere with such an award unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tenn. 1995) (citing Storey v. Storey, 835 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964)). All questions of law are reviewed by this Court de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the trial court.

  7. Quinn v. Quinn

    Shelby Chancery No. D27744-2 R.D (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 1999)

    Wife contends that given the comparative needs of the parties and their ability to pay their attorneys, the trial court should have required Husband to pay all of Wife's attorneys' fees. Husband argues that as Wife received half of the parties marital assets, alimony, child support and has considerable amount of separate property, Wife clearly has adequate funds from which to pay her attorney's fees. Husband contends this holding should be reversed and each party ordered to pay their own attorney's fees. The trial court has wide discretion in determining the amount, if any, of attorney's fees to be awarded. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 605; 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964). At the conclusion of a divorce case, if the wife is without sufficient resources properly to compensate her attorney, and if the financial provisions made for the wife by way of alimony, periodic or in solido, do not include the means out of which counsel fees can reasonably be paid, the court is authorized to grant to the wife additional alimony for the purpose of enabling her to pay her attorney.

  8. Gilliam v. Gilliam

    776 S.W.2d 81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 156 times
    Upholding award of attorney's fees against husband because of his litigation tactics

    The appellate courts are not inclined to alter such awards except where the record reflects that such discretion has been abused. See Newberry v. Newberry, 493 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. App. 1973); Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964). The record not only reflects that Wife presently has a need, but it also clearly establishes that Husband is able to pay a fairly substantial amount of alimony.

  9. Andrew B. v. Abbie B.

    494 P.3d 522 (Alaska 2021)   Cited 3 times
    Explaining that " prenuptial agreement is a contract . . . so normal rules of contract interpretation apply" but, unlike contracts, "prenuptial agreements are enforceable only 'if certain standards of "fairness" are met'" (quoting Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Alaska 1987))

    Brooks v. Brooks , 733 P.2d 1044, 1048-49 (Alaska 1987).Id . at 1048 (footnote omitted) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 190 ( Am. Law Inst. 1979) ); see also Crouch v. Crouch , 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964), overruled by Cary v. Cary , 937 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1996) ("[S]uch [a] contract is promotive of divorce and void on grounds of public policy.").Brooks , 733 P.2d at 1049 (footnote omitted) (citing Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview , 19 Fam. Law Q . 331, 438 (1986)) ("With the advent of no-fault divorce laws and the changes in society such laws represent, the traditional rule has rapidly given way to the more realistic view that prenuptial agreements are not void ab initio but are valid and enforceable if certain standards of ‘fairness’ are met.").

  10. Aaron v. Aaron

    909 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1995)   Cited 420 times
    In Aaron this Court awarded alimony in futuro to a homemaker with a high school education who had never worked outside the home.

    As for attorney's fees, the trial court ordered Mr. Aaron to pay $35,184.98 to Ms. Aaron for legal fees and expenses. The allowance of attorney's fees is largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not interfere except upon a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Storey v. Storey, 835 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964). Here, Mr. Aaron incurred $62,885.