matter of statutory right. (E.g., Palache v. Hunt (1884) 64 Cal. 473, 474 [2 P. 245] ["an appeal may be taken . . . from a judgment of a Superior Court, granting or denying an application for a writ of mandamus"]; see also Burrus, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d 233, 236-239 [court obligated to entertain appeal from superior court judgment denying petition for writ of mandate challenging pleading ruling in municipal court]; Gilbert v. MunicipalCourt (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 723, 728-734 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 897] (hereafter Gilbert) [same; appeal from superior court judgment denying petition for writ of mandate or prohibition].) Without specifically addressing the issue of appealability, courts also routinely entertained appeals of superior court judgments in matters like the present one, i.e., an appeal of the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari following an order of contempt in the municipal court. (See Bobb v. MunicipalCourt (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 860 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 270, 39 A.L.R.4th 432]; Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 428 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 216]; Vaughn v. Municipal Court (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 348 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 575]; Thorne v. Municipal Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 249 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 749]; Blake v. MunicipalCourt (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 131 [ 300 P.2d 755]; Ingold v. MunicipalCourt (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 651 [ 193 P.2d 808]; Turkington v. Municipal Court (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 631 [ 193 P.2d 795]; Gillen v. Municipal Court, etc. (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 428 [ 99 P.2d 555]; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 78, p. 103 ["When a municipal court makes an order in a contempt proceeding, that order is reviewable in the superior court by certiorari. But the judgment of the superior court in the certiorari proceeding is appealable as a final judgment in a special proceeding."].
The case is therefore not conclusive on the question whether nothing but a "clear and present danger" test will do. Crosswhite v. Municipal Court, 260 Cal.App.2d 428 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 216] also considered the "clear and present danger" criterion, but actually held that the publication there under consideration posed no danger at all. In any event, neither case involved an attack on a protective order by the prosecutor.
(1) On review of a judgment of contempt the basic question before the appellate court is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to render the judgment under review. ( Crosswhite v. Municipal Court, 260 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 216]; In re Chapman, 141 Cal.App.2d 387, 389-390 [ 295 P.2d 573]; In re Lake, 65 Cal.App. 420, 424 [ 224 P. 126].) The determination of this question ordinarily as here, depends on whether or not substantial evidence supported the trial court's decision; if there was such substantial evidence the contempt judgment must stand.
The sole purpose of the court's order was to assure a fair trial, and in the highly charged atmosphere in which the order was made its formulation and announcement was not merely justified but was required by directions contained in Sheppard.[4] Appellants cite and rely upon Crosswhite v. Municipal Court, 260 Cal.App.2d 428 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 216]. That case is not helpful to them.
The Los Angeles Teachers Union case concerned First Amendment rights of teachers; Zeitlin was an obscenity case. In Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 428, 431, 67 Cal.Rptr. 216, 218, the Court of Appeal stated: 'On review of a contempt judgment it is settled that the sole question before the reviewing court is one of jurisdiction of the trial court to render the judgment under review (citation). Ordinarily in such a case a review of the evidence is limited to determining whether there was any substantial evidence before the trial court to sustain its jurisdiction (citation).
The question of appealability was not discussed in any of those cases and we do not consider them as authority on this issue. (See McCann v. Municipal Court (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 527, 270 Cal.Rptr. 640; Bobb v. Municipal Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 860, 192 Cal.Rptr. 270; Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 428, 67 Cal.Rptr. 216; Vaughn v. Municipal Court (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 348, 60 Cal.Rptr. . 575; Thorne v. Municipal Court (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 249, 46 Cal.Rptr. 749; Blake v. Municipal Court (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 131, 300 P.2d 755; Turkington v. Municipal Court (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 631, 193 P.2d 795; Ingold v. Municipal Court (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 651, 193 P.2d 808; Gillen v. Municipal Court, etc. (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 428, 99 P.2d 555.) This is the fourth attempt by Bermudez to have reviewed a $100 nonappealable municipal court contempt order.
In reviewing a First Amendment right case, our duty as appellate court judges is to make 'an independent examination of the whole record.' (Cox v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 536, 545, 85 S.Ct. 453, 459, 13 L.Ed.2d 471; Edwards v. South Carolina (1963) 372 U.S. 229, 235, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697; Zeitlin v. Arnebergh (1963) 59 Cal.2d 901, 909, 31 Cal.Rptr. 800; Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Board of Education (1969) 71 A.C. 572, 578, 78 Cal.Rptr. 723; Crosswhite v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 428, 431, 67 Cal.Rptr. 216). Under an independent examination of the record, we would first determine whether the obstruction to traffic was Reasonable or Unreasonable, giving full consideration to the fact that appellants were conducting a peaceful demonstration and to the time, place, and manner in which this demonstration was being conducted.