Opinion
Civil Action No. 7:07-cv-59 (HL).
June 12, 2007
ORDER
This Court conducts an initial review of each case. The initial review ensures that each case has a proper jurisdictional basis. Proper jurisdiction is important because federal courts only have limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army, 639 F.2d 1100, 1102 (5th Cir. 1981). They possess only that power authorized by the United States Constitution and by federal statutes. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377; Save the Bay, 639 F.2d at 1102. Therefore, federal courts should constantly examine a case's jurisdictional basis — even on their own initiative if necessary. Save the Bay, 639 F.2d at 1102 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Louisville Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the case law of the former Fifth Circuit handed down as of September 30, 1981, as its governing body of precedent. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981). This body of precedent is binding unless and until overruled by the Eleventh Circuit en banc. Id.
I. PROPER JURISDICTION
The requirements for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which states that federal district courts have original jurisdiction "of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(1) (West 1993 Supp. 2004). Further, "complete diversity" must exist for the court to retain jurisdiction, that is, every plaintiff must be diverse from every defendant. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs' allegation of diversity jurisdiction in this case contains errors. The Court will address each in turn.
A. Citizenship: Natural Persons
Federal courts interpret citizenship under § 1332 as requiring a natural person to be a United States citizen and be domiciled in a state. See, e.g., Las Vistas Villas, S.A. v. Petersen, 778 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd, 13 F.3d 409 (11th Cir. 1994). Thus, there are two necessary inquiries regarding citizenship for diversity jurisdiction: (1) whether the person is a United States citizen, and (2) whether the person is domiciled in a particular state. 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 102.30 (3d ed. 2004).
Under the first inquiry, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Regarding the second inquiry, domicile — synonymous with "state citizenship" in diversity jurisprudence — generally requires two elements: (1) physical presence in a state; and (2) the intent to make the state one's home. Duff v. Beaty, 804 F. Supp. 332, 334 (N.D. Ga. 1992). A complaint merely alleging residency, as opposed to state citizenship or domicile, may be insufficient to invoke diversity jurisdiction. Id.; e.g., Held v. Held, 137 F.3d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1998). This is because domicile is not always the same as residence, as a person may reside in one place but be domiciled elsewhere. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989). Therefore, a party must plead citizenship distinctly and affirmatively. Toms v. Country Quality Meats, Inc., 610 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1980); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Am. Emp. Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 15, 16 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Duff, 804 F. Supp. at 334.
Here, Plaintiffs failed to plead citizenship correctly. To illustrate, Plaintiffs alleged, "[Plaintiff Chris] Norman is an individual residing as 163 Springhill Drive, Tifton, Georgia, 31793, which is within the Middle District of Georgia." (Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs further alleged "Norman is, and at all times relevant to this action was, a full-time resident of Georgia." (Compl. ¶ 17.) Allegations regarding residency tell the Court nothing. In lieu of residency, Plaintiffs must allege United States citizenship and the states of which the natural person Plaintiff is a "citizen" or "domiciliary." Consequently, Plaintiffs must amend their Complaint to cure this jurisdictional defect.
B. Citizenship: Unincorporated Business Entities
Regarding natural persons, there is no statutory definition of what constitutes a "citizen" for diversity purposes. 15 Moore's, § 102.30 (citingGalva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991)). Regarding limited liability companies, however, their citizenship for the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction is much clearer. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that "[t]o sufficiently allege the citizenship of [such an] unincorporated business entit[y], a party must list the citizenships of all the members of the limited liability company." Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). This requirement reflects that for purposes of diversity of citizenship in the Eleventh Circuit, "a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen." Id.
Plaintiffs' Complaint states "[Plaintiff] CrossLink [Orthopaedics, LLC] is a Georgia limited liability company with its principal place of business at 3300 NE Expressway, Building 7, Atlanta, Georgia 30341." (Compl. ¶ 1.) This allegation of citizenship is deficient for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs have approached the citizenship of CrossLink Orthopaedics, LLC as if it was a corporation. It is not. As indicated by its name, CrossLink Orthopaedics, LLC is a limited liability company. Second, Plaintiffs have failed to offer the Court any indication of where the members of CrossLink Orthopaedics, LLC are citizens. Therefore, the Court cannot determine whether it has jurisdiction over this case. While Plaintiffs do later assert that "[t]his Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332" (Compl. ¶ 6), this statement is a legal conclusion which the Court is entitled to make independently after reviewing the proper jurisdictional allegations. Consequently, Plaintiffs must amend their Complaint to cure these jurisdictional defects.
II. CONCLUSION
SO ORDERED.
The Court notes Plaintiffs' Complaint may contain a third jurisdictional defect. It is unclear to the Court whether Defendant Synthes Spine Company, Ltd is a limited liability company or a corporation. If it is the former, then Plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations are deficient for the same reason as discussed above in regards to CrossLink Orthopaedics, LLC. If it is the latter, then Plaintiffs' jurisdictional representation is sufficient, at least as it relates to this party.