Opinion
23-35610
07-23-2024
DAVID A. CROSSETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF IDAHO; ADA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; ASHLEY HAGEMAN-TURNER; DANIEL WILKINS; IDAHO JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; DERRICK O'NEILL; ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE; KATELYN FARLEY; THE COX LAW FIRM, PLLC; JON COX; ELCOX AND SALAZAR; EDWINA ELCOX; KELON WATERS; LUCY JUAREZ; DOES, John/Jane, 1-50, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted July 16, 2024 [**]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho Amanda K. Brailsford, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 1:23-cv-00389-AKB
Before: SCHROEDER, VANDYKE, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM [*]
David A. Crossett appeals pro se from the district court's order dismissing his action alleging federal claims arising from his ongoing state criminal proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's sua sponte abstention determination under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Crossett's action under the Younger abstention doctrine because federal courts are required to abstain from interfering with pending state judicial proceedings where the federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state judicial proceeding, and Crossett failed to show that an exception to Younger applies. See Matteucci, 986 F.3d at 1133 (setting forth requirements for Younger abstention); Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth exceptions to Younger abstention; a claimed constitutional violation "does not, by itself, constitute an exception to the application of Younger abstention").
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be futile).
Although the dismissal of Crossett's action was proper, dismissal based on Younger abstention is not a determination on the merits and should be without prejudice. See Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005); Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm the dismissal but instruct the district court to amend the order to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice.
All pending requests are denied.
AFFIRMED with instructions to amend the dismissal order.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).