Opinion
06-14-2016
Rutherford & Christie, LLP, New York (Lauren E. Bryant of counsel), for appellant. Rheingold, Valet, Rheingold, McCartney & Giuffra LLP, New York (Jeremy A. Hellman of counsel), for Gregory Cross and Jeanine Cross, respondents. Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York (Iryna S. Krauchanka and Andrea M. Alonso of counsel), for Arturo Canini–Soto and Elsa Toro Gutierrez, respondents.
Rutherford & Christie, LLP, New York (Lauren E. Bryant of counsel), for appellant.
Rheingold, Valet, Rheingold, McCartney & Giuffra LLP, New York (Jeremy A. Hellman of counsel), for Gregory Cross and Jeanine Cross, respondents.
Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York (Iryna S. Krauchanka and Andrea M. Alonso of counsel), for Arturo Canini–Soto and Elsa Toro Gutierrez, respondents.
FRIEDMAN, J.P., SWEENY, WEBBER, GESMER, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Wilma Guzman, J.), entered on or about May 22, 2015, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied defendant Continental Courier, Inc.'s (Continental) motion for summary judgment, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant Continental's motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims based on ostensible agency, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff Gregory Cross alleged that on November 13, 2008, he suffered injuries in the scope of his employment with Modell's Sporting Goods while unloading a delivery of supplies from defendant W.W. Grainger, Inc. from a Continental truck driven by defendant Arturo Canini–Soto, who was employed by Continental.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor, questions of fact exist as to whether defendant Arturo Canini–Soto was an independent contractor or an employee of Continental's for which vicarious liability would attach (Rodriguez v. Parkchester South Condominium, Inc., 178 A.D.2d 231, 577 N.Y.S.2d 52 [1st Dept.1991] ). Although Canini–Soto worked for Continental pursuant to a contract for an independent contractor, he was required to maintain insurance in an amount dictated by Continental, his delivery process was controlled by the Continental dispatcher, he used Continental's forms, was required to wear a Continental shirt, and the truck he drove bore the Continental logo. In addition, among other things, Continental dictated the type of truck Canini–Soto could use, whether it was suitable for use on any given day, and paid him based on the deliveries he made (see Anikushina v. Moodie, 58 A.D.3d 501, 870 N.Y.S.2d 356 [1st Dept.2009], lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 905, 884 N.Y.S.2d 683, 912 N.E.2d 1063 [2009] ; Araneo v. Town Bd. for Town of Clarkstown, 55 A.D.3d 516, 865 N.Y.S.2d 281 [2d Dept.2008] ).
Continental is entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claim that Canini–Soto was acting as Continental's ostensible agent, as there is no evidence that plaintiff Gregory Cross acted in reliance on the belief that Canini–Soto was a Continental employee, and the Continental logo on the truck and the forms are insufficient to demonstrate that Continental held out Canini–Soto as an employee (Mondello v. New York Blood Ctr., 80 N.Y.2d 219, 590 N.Y.S.2d 19, 604 N.E.2d 81 [1992], citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 429 ; Thurman v. United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc., 39 A.D.3d 934, 935–936, 833 N.Y.S.2d 702 [3d Dept.2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 807, 843 N.Y.S.2d 537, 875 N.E.2d 30 [2007] ).
Continental is entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 as it made a prima facie showing that it did not own the truck.
Finally, Continental is entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims for negligent hiring and negligent supervision (see Nelson v. E & M 2710 Clarendon LLC, 129 A.D.3d 568, 569–570, 12 N.Y.S.3d 51 [1st Dept.2015] ). Plaintiffs have not shown that Continental had any reason to question Canini–Soto's qualifications, who had been working for Continental for nearly a year prior to the accident (Maristany v. Patient Support Servs., 264 A.D.2d 302, 303, 693 N.Y.S.2d 143 [1st Dept.1999] ).