Cross v. Commons

6 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Wickstrom

    113 B.R. 339 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990)   Cited 66 times
    Stating that "[c]onveyances of property have legal ramifications. This court therefore must analyze the law in accordance with what happened rather than what might have happened."

    The Michigan Supreme Court held that the transfer of exempt homestead property cannot constitute a preferential transfer or a fraudulent conveyance because exempt property does not become part of the bankruptcy estate. Cross v. Commons, 336 Mich. 665, 670-71, 59 N.W.2d 41 (1953). A debtor (with his spouse) could therefore transfer such property as an "absolute right".

  2. Craft v. U.S.

    233 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 2000)   Cited 17 times
    Discussing law-of-the-circuit doctrine

    It found that under Michigan law, the August 1989 transfer could not be fraudulent, because Michigan courts have "consistently held that creditors have no right to complain of a debtor's disposition of exempt [ i.e., entireties] property because such property could not be reached to satisfy debts had it remained in the debtor's hands." See, e.g., Cross v. Commons, 336 Mich. 665, 59 N.W.2d 41, 43 (1953) (en banc). The court went on, however, to find that Don's mortgage payments were fraudulent under an exception to that rule.

  3. Nino v. Moyer

    437 B.R. 230 (W.D. Mich. 2009)   Cited 5 times
    Noting that "by recording the quitclaim deeds, there is no indication that Debtor has attempted to conceal either" transfer

    Wickstrom, 113 B.R. at 350 (citations omitted). Cf. Cross v. Commons, 59 N.W.2d 41 (Mich. 1953) ("[Because exempt] property does not constitute assets of the bankrupt, its transfer by the bankrupt is of no concern of the trustee of the bankrupt's creditors."). Debtor argues that the "no harm, no foul" rule is still good law, citing Rubel v. Brimacombe Schlecte, P.C., 86 B.R. 81 (E.D. Mich. 1988); In re Korff, 14 B.R. 189 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981); Craft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 651.

  4. Craft v. U.S.

    65 F. Supp. 2d 651 (W.D. Mich. 1999)   Cited 7 times

    The Government responds that sections 4 and 7 of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act are concerned with a "conveyance" by the debtor without limitation to the debtor's "assets" and that the definition of "assets" applies solely for the purpose of determining the debtor's insolvency under section 4. Sandra's argument finds support in numerous cases, decided both before and after Michigan enacted the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which have consistently held that creditors have no right to complain of a debtor's disposition of exempt property because such property could not be reached to satisfy debts had it remained in the debtor's hands. See, e.g., Cross v. Commons, 336 Mich. 665, 669, 59 N.W.2d 41, 43 (1953) (en banc) (holding that the debtor had "the absolute right" to transfer homestead property where the amount of the exemption exceeded his equity in the homestead); Turner v. Davidson, 227 Mich. 459, 462, 198 N.W. 886, 887 (1924) (finding that the exchange by the debtor and his wife of one entireties property for another property in the name of the wife was of no concern to creditors because "[t] he uniform rule of this court has been that creditors are not concerned with the disposition which a debtor makes of his exempt property"), overruled in part by Glazer v. Beer, 343 Mich. 495, 498-99, 72 N.W.2d 141, 142-43 (1955); Bresnahan v. Nugent, 92 Mich. 76, 81, 52 N.W. 735, 736-37 (1892) (observing that "[i]t has been frequently held that a creditor cannot complain of any disposition which a debtor sees fit to make of exempt property"); Emerson v. Bacon, 58 Mich. 526, 527, 25 N.W. 503 (1885) (holding that creditors had no right to complain of the debtor's disposition of exempt property);

  5. Mercier v. Partlow

    149 Vt. 523 (Vt. 1988)   Cited 18 times
    Recognizing judgment liens have been uniformly held to be subject to the homestead exemption

    Finally, we note that every modern decision — except a line of cases in California now overruled by statute — adopts the view that the homestead amount is part of the homeowner's equity and not part of the value subject to the mortgage. See Ouachita Nat'l Bank v. Rowan, 345 So.2d 1014 (La. App. 1977); Cross v. Commons, 336 Mich. 665, 59 N.W.2d 41 (1953); Sanne v. Sanne, 167 Neb. 683, 94 N.W.2d 367 (1959); Dallas Ceramic Co. v. Morgan, 560 P.2d 197 (Okl. 1977); Everett v. Pape Bros., Inc., 269 Or. 575, 525 P.2d 996 (1974); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 174 Wn. 185, 24 P.2d 420 (1933); Eloff v. Riesch, 14 Wis.2d 519, 111 N.W.2d 578 (1961). For the California law, see Estate of Sapin, 150 Cal.App.3d 20, 197 Cal.Rptr. 454 (1983); Estate of Durham, 108 Cal.App.2d 148, 238 P.2d 1057 (1951).

  6. Dallas Ceramic Co. v. Morgan

    1977 OK 21 (Okla. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    That is neither the law nor the spirit of statutes like ours. * * *" Also in Cross v. Commons, 336 Mich. 665, 59 N.W.2d 41 (1953), it was said: "* * * For substantial reasons of public policy, as well as individual and family benefits, we definitely held that in determining whether the value of the homestead exceeded the amount of the exemption provided by law, all mortgage encumbrances thereon must be deducted. * * *"