Opinion
Thomas C. Singer, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.
Martin P. Miller, Littleton, for defendant-appellee.
DUFFORD, Judge.
Appellant obtained a judgment in the amount of $4,500 against the appellee for damages arising out of an automobile collision. Thereafter the appellee was adjudicated a bankrupt, and upon his failure to pay the judgment against him, the appellant, pursuant to the Colorado Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S1963, 13--7--1, et seq., notified the appropriate authorities and the appellee's driver's license was suspended. The appellee then filed a motion with the trial court pursuant to 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--7--27, requesting an order fixing monthly payments on the judgment so that the Director of Revenue could authorize the restoration of his driver's license. After hearing, the trial court ordered appellee to pay $5 per month on the judgment and directed that the order be lodged with the Colorado State Department of Revenue so that upon proof of appellee's financial responsibility his driver's license could be reinstated. The trial court found, in effect, that appellee could not afford to pay anything on the judgment, but concluded that the applicable statute required some payment. Appellant then filed this appeal.
The appellant argues here that the trial court abused its discretion and acted without jurisdiction in permitting the reinstatement of the appellee's driver's license conditioned only upon his making installment payments of $5 per month on a $4,500 judgment. Appellant points out that the $5 payment is less than one-fourth of the monthly interest which accrues on such judgment. Also inherent in this apppeal is the point urged by the appellee that the appellant lacks any standing to challenge the trial court judgment and to bring this appeal since his interest is only that of a judgment creditor. Necessarily, we consider this last question first.
We hold that if a money judgment the requirements of 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--7--24, and constitutes the statutory basis for a driver's license suspension, then the holder of that judgment does have standing as a party in judicial proceedings initiated by the suspended driver seeking restoration of his driving privileges under the provisions of 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S1963, 13--7--27, of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act.
Where suspension of the license rests upon and occurs as the result of the Director of Revenue being notified by the holder of a judgment meeting the requirements of 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--7--24, that his judgment has remained unpaid for 30 or more days, 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S1963, 13--7--25, specifically directs that such suspension shall remain in effect until that particular judgment is satisfied. The suspension may be lifted only if specified conditions of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act are satisfied. This section of the Act also specifies that a discharge in bankruptcy will not relieve the suspended driver from the requirements of the Act.
The only relief in the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act to a suspension for failure to pay a judgment applicable in this case, is that afforded by 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S1963, 13--7--27, which authorizes the court which entered that judgment to permit payment of the judgment in installment payments. The license suspension may then be lifted if the judgment debtor is proven financially responsible, and it may remain lifted so long as the installment payments on the judgment are paid as they become due. By the express provisions of that section, the judgment debtor may apply for such relief only if he gives the judgment creditor five days' notice of his application. No provision is made in the law for notifying the Director of Revenue of, or for making him a party to, such proceedings. These proceedings are, therefore, ancillary to the original action in which the judgment was entered. Only those parties who were parties to such action are involved, and the ultimate result of the proceedings may be a modification of the judgment entered in that action. Upon consideration of these matters, we conclude that, by design, the Act confers upon the judgment creditor primary standing and power to request a suspension of his judgment debtor's license. Under that Act, and also because of his position as a party to the damage action from which his judgment arose, the judgment creditor also has the right to receive notice of and to appear in the court proceeding authorized by the Act. His right to appear includes the right to resist the application for modification of the judgment.
It has been expressly held by the United States Supreme Court that a motorist's financial responsibility law is not objectionable on the grounds that its provisions authorize the injured judgment creditor, the party most likely to be interested in the enforcement of the law, to set the license suspension provisions in motion and to have some power of authorization over the lifting or restoring of the sanction of such suspension. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 82 S.Ct. 807, 7 L.Ed.2d 641.
Having decided that the appellant did have the standing to appear in the trial court proceeding, and also the standing to bring this appeal, we next consider the points of error which he raises here. In this respect we conclude that the judgment of the trial court was an abuse of its discretion and must be reversed. Under the provisions of 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--7--27, the trial court which entered judgment may order payment of that judgment in installments, but it is implicit in the section that such payments must in fact operate to the ultimate end of a reasonable discharge of the judgment. In the instant case, where the installment payments which were ordered were less than the amount of the monthly interest accruing on the judgment, it is obvious that the installment payments which were ordered could not operate as 'payment of such judgment.' Not meeting the mandate of 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--7--27, such order could not furnish the basis for any action on the part of the Director of Revenue to terminate appellee's license suspension.
As we have stated, the appellee in this case was adjudicated a bankrupt subsequent to the entry of the judgment in favor of appellant. Following the time of the hearing from which this appeal has been brought, and following the time that briefs and arguments in this appeal were submitted, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in the case of Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233. Such decision declares unconstitutional a provision in the motorist financial responsibility law for the State of Arizona specifying that a judgment similar to that involved in this case is unaffected by a discharge of debts under the United States Bankruptcy Act. On such point Perez v. Campbell appears to overrule the United States Supreme Court's prior decisions in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, Supra, and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 62 S.Ct. 24, 86 L.Ed. 21. The effect of the holding in Perez upon the constitutionality of the Colorado Act is not an issue before us. However, it does raise an additional issue which may be considered by the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and ENOCH, J., concur.