See Practice Book ยงยง 61โ2 and 61โ3. As a result of these different appeal periods, different appellate stays of execution arise, and any automatic stay that is extended as the result of filing an appeal from a counterclaim will not stay proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment on the complaint.Such a construction of our rules of practice is consistent with our Supreme Court's decision in Cronin v. GagerโCrawford Co., 128 Conn. 401, 23 A.2d 149 (1941). In that case, which began as an action for strict foreclosure, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale but denied the plaintiffs' claim for a deficiency judgment.
A motion to erase the appeal was denied. See 128 Conn. 401. J. Rodney Smith, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Finally, the plaintiff thereafter could have taken an appeal challenging the trial court's order to the receiver to pay the balance of the water charges. See Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 401, 404, 23 A.2d 149 (1941) ("[w]e can see no valid reason why an appeal may not properly be taken from a portion of a judgment which is so distinct and severable that, should error be found and the case [be] remanded for further proceedings, the remaining portion would be in no way affected, and we see distinct advantages in allowing such an appeal").
This limitation is well recognized. Cottier v. Sullivan, 47 Wyo. 72, 31 P.2d 675 at page 677; Wills v. Morris, 100 Mont. 504, 50 P.2d 858 at page 860; State v. Todd, 117 Mont. 80, 158 P.2d 299 at page 300; In re Kesl's Estate, 117 Mont. 377, 161 P.2d 641 at page 643; F. E. Warren Mercantile Co. v. Myers, 48 Wyo. 232, 45 P.2d 5; Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 401, 23 A.2d 149; 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, page 204, ยง 109. Conceding the judgment as entered was erroneous as attempting to grant a nonsuit without prejudice, it is not separable, as it is apparent the court did not intend to grant a nonsuit as an absolute bar.
Ordinarily the denial of a motion to reopen a judgment is not a final judgment within the appeal statute; its effect at most is that, if filed within the time when an appeal is required to be taken, it may postpone the time within which the appeal need be taken; but, if filed after the time within which a party has a right to appeal, it will not revive that right. Daland's Application, 81 Conn. 249, 70 A. 449; Glazer v. Rosoff, 120 Conn. 120, 179 A. 407. The denial of such a motion falls within the rule that, in a proper case, supplemental proceedings following a judgment may be assigned as error in an appeal from the judgment. Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 401, 404, 23 A.2d 149; Conn. App. Proc., 5. In Carrington v. Muhlfeld, 122 Conn. 334, 337, 189 A. 184, we stated that we had, in that case, no occasion to consider whether an appeal may be taken from the refusal of a trial court to open a judgment of foreclosure. If an appeal would lie from such a ruling, it would be because the grounds upon which relief was claimed arose after the time to appeal from the original judgment of foreclosure had passed.
"(3) May the judgment of the trial court be separated into two parts, the remittitur and the twenty day time limit? See Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 401, 404, 23 A.2d 149 (1941). "If so, does an appeal from the remittitur stay the remaining portion of the judgment, specifically the judgment notwithstanding the verdict twenty days after the remittitur was ordered?
Generally, in the absence of statutory authority, an appeal cannot be taken from only a part of a single judgment. Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Company, 128 Conn. 401, 403 (1941). In addition, the plaintiff argues that the appeal does not stay the appointment of the receiver and, since this order is in furtherance of the receivership, it is not stayed. The plaintiffs cites Hartford Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Tucker, 192 Conn. 1 (1984), in support of her position. There the defendant argued that he could not be held in contempt of a rent receivership order when he was pursuing an appeal from the judgment of foreclosure in which he was contesting the validity of the receivership.
The plaintiff now moves to terminate the automatic stay on appeal under Practice Book ยง 4046 claiming that the defendant's appeal is taken only for delay or that the due administration of justice requires it, so that the plaintiff may be allowed to proceed with the foreclosure sale. The plaintiff also claims that a stay is not appropriate, as its judgments on the complaint for foreclosure and on the counterclaim are distinct and separate, citing [Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co.], 128 Conn. 401 (1941), and that in any event there can be no appeal on its foreclosure judgment. I.
The same conceptual approach should logically apply here. Konover argues that such an approach is inappropriate in this case because the issues he presented on appeal in Patron II involved only a portion of the judgment in Patron I. If the appeal had been taken from a separable portion of the judgment; see Cronin v. Gager Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 401, 404, 23 A.2d 149 (1941): this argument might carry considerable force. That is not, however, what happened here.
It has been held that an appeal from a portion of a judgment does not stay enforcement of those parts of the judgment from which no appeal was taken. Cronin v. Gager-Crawford Co., 128 Conn. 401, 404 (1941). It has also been held that where judgment is entered not jointly, but either severally or severably, against two defendants, an appeal by one defendant does not affect the enforceability of the judgment against the other defendant.