Summary
relying on Local Rule 7.1B in denying motion to reconsider dismissal of action, but considering merits
Summary of this case from Rodrigues v. Genlyte Thomas Group LLCOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-11749-RGS
February 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER
The following facts are relevant. On June 27, 2003, the underlying complaint was filed in the Massachusetts Superior Court, asserting among other claims, causes of action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On September 11, 2003, the case was removed to the federal district court on federal question grounds. On November 13, 2003, a motion to dismiss was filed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Superintendent of the State Police, and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the latter sued in their official capacities), and George Haroutunian, an administrative law judge assigned to the Registry of Motor Vehicles. District Court Local Rule 7.1(B)(2) required plaintiff, absent the grant of an enlargement of time, to file an opposition to the motion to dismiss within fourteen days. As of December 22, 2003, no opposition had been filed or extension sought. The court consequently allowed the motion to dismiss.
On January 12, 2004, Plaintiff's counsel filed the instant motion to reconsider, citing his unawareness of the pendency of the motion to dismiss as the explanation for his failure to file an opposition. Among the factors a court is directed to consider in ruling on a motion for reconsideration of a dismissal order entered because of a plaintiff's failure to file a timely opposition are the reasons for the tardiness, the degree of prejudice the allowance of the motion would cause to the non-moving party, and "whether the belated filing would, in any event, be more than an empty exercise." United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17, 22 (1 st Cir. 1992). The court may also consider its institutional interest in preserving the integrity of its rules of procedure. "Valid local rules are an important vehicle by which courts operate. Such rules carry the force of law,. . . and they are binding upon the litigants and upon the court itself." Air Line Pilots Association v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., 26 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 1994). A district court has "great leeway in the application and enforcement of its local rules." Roberts, 978 F.2d at 20. See also Ramsdell v. Bowles, 64 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1995) (court properly struck opposition to summary judgment filed one day late under District of Maine Local Rules). "[I]t is within the district court's discretion to dismiss an action based on a party's unexcused failure to respond to a dispositive motion when such response is required by local rule, at least when the result does not clearly offend equity." Nepsk, Inc. v. Town of Houlton, 283 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002).
Here, counsel's admitted inattention falls far short of any showing of an excusable failure on his part. A litigating attorney has a duty to monitor the progress of his case on the court's docket and cannot delegate that responsibility to the court or to opposing counsel.Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 64-65 (1st Cir. 2001). While any prejudice to the defendants that would result from granting the motion to reconsider is not large (given the early stage of the proceedings), it is doubtful that consideration of plaintiff's belated opposition to the motion to dismiss would alter the result. Under the Sovereign Immunity Clause of the Eleventh Amendment, a state, its agencies, and agency officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" subject to suit under section 1983 for money damages, either in state or federal court. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-67 (1989);Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hospital, 384 Mass. 38, 44-45 n. 7 (1981); Laubinger v. Department of Revenue, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 601-602 (1996). The same grant of immunity from suit applies to actions brought under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. Commonwealth v. Elm Medical Laboratories. Inc., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 76 (1992). Finally, a state official performing a judicial function is absolutely immune from suit for his adjudicatory acts. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509 (1978) (administrative law judges); Johnson v. Rhode Island Parole Board Members, 815 F.2d 5, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1987) (parole board members); Wang v. New Hampshire Bd. of Registration in Medicine. 55 F.3d 698, 701 (1st Cir. 1995) (members of a medical disciplinary board). Cf. Comins v. Sharkansky, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 37, 39 (1995) (arbitrators exercising judicial functions).
The remaining claims insofar as they implicate the official defendants fare no better. While the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, G.L. c. 258, § 1 et seq., permits the substitution of the Commonwealth as a defendant in cases involving torts committed by its employees, the Act does not cover intentional torts. Id., § 10(c). See MacLean v. Delinsky, 407 Mass. 869, 878 n. 6 (1990). The claims asserted against Trooper Lindsay fall within the category of intentional torts and are therefore not redressable under the Act. The allegation that Plaintiff's civil rights were violated by the failure of Registry of Motor Vehicle officials (assuming that the Registry is not an "arm of the state" immune from suit) to follow proper procedures in suspending her driver's license is not actionable under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H, I, absent a plausible pleading of "threats, intimidation, or coercion." Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 404 Mass. 325, 332-333 (1989). Cf. Fresenius Medical Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 322 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2003). Indulging the same assumption that the State Police is a proper "person" subject to suit under the Civil Rights Act, it cannot be sued on a theory of respondent superior for violations committed by employees acting outside the lawful scope of their employment. Cf. Sarvis v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 47 Mass. App. Ct. 86, 97 (1999). The allegations directed against Trooper Lindsay are beyond the rim of any plausible description of his official duties. Finally, the Commonwealth and its officials are not subject to suit under G.L. c. 214, § 1B, for the disclosure of information properly in their possession. Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. 1201, 1235 (1996).
Count XIV, which alleges that the State Police violated Plaintiff's rights to due process under the "Articles of Man" (presumably the Declaration of Rights) and the laws of Massachusetts, appears to be based on the same theory of vicarious liability.
It is not clear whether plaintiff is objecting to information about her arrest being disseminated in the official records of the criminal justice system, or to the use of the same information by the prosecutor at her trial. If the latter, the litigation privilege precludes any cause of action. See Doe v. Nutter, McClennan Fish, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 140-141 (1996).
In sum, sustaining the dismissal does not offend equity as Plaintiff's attempt to cast a net over the official defendants is a largely hopeless undertaking. She may object to the summary disposition of a substantial portion of her case by a federal court, rather than having it resolved by the courts of Massachusetts where she originally filed suit, but it was her choice to bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thus creating the grounds for removal. While the usual practice is to remand supplemental claims upon the dismissal of foundational federal claims, see Camelio v. American Federation, 137 F.3d 666, 672 (1st Cir. 1998), I see no reason to do so here where the reason for the dismissal is by way of a sanction for the failure to observe the court's rules and where the surviving federal claims against Trooper Lindsay would result in an awkward splitting of an action where all claims arise out of the same nucleus of common facts. See Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256-257 (1st Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff is correct that the motion to dismiss does not run to defendant Phillip Lindsay. The Clerk will restore that portion of the case that involves Trooper Lindsay to the active docket.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.SO ORDERED.