However, where, as here, the indictment places a defendant on notice that the State will attempt to prove that he committed a crime in more than one manner, the jury is authorized to convict the defendant of that crime upon proof that it was committed in any of the several manners alleged. See Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 377-378(3) ( 511 S.E.2d 899) (1999). Under the facts of this case, we find that the trial court's charge on armed robbery could not have misled the jury into convicting Appellant for committing that crime in any way not alleged in the indictment.
This evidence fully supported the jury's determination that Hinton possessed cocaine. See Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 376 (1) (b) ( 511 SE2d 899) (1999) (defendant's "statement to the police that he smoked, and thus possessed, marijuana . . . admitted the essential elements of the offense [of possession]"); Aldridge v. State, 237 Ga. App. 209, 212 (1) ( 515 SE2d 397) (1999) (where jury concludes that defendant has ingested drugs, it is "authorized to infer that he previously possessed the drugs ingested"). Moreover, defense counsel successfully undermined the field test, establishing through the State's own expert that it was merely presumptive and lacked scientific certainty.
Ruffin, C. J., and Smith, P. J., concur. See Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 377 (3) ( 511 SE2d 899) (1999) (defendant convicted of reckless driving under an indictment charging him with following too closely, among other things); Heath v. State, 229 Ga. App. 69, 70 ( 493 SE2d 225) (1997) (evidence as to manner of driving may be taken into account for purpose of determining whether defendant was affected by intoxicant to the extent that he drove less safely than he might otherwise have done); New v. State, 171 Ga. App. 392 (5) ( 319 SE2d 542) (1984) (witness who satisfactorily shows that he had opportunity to observe, and did observe, condition of another may testify whether that person was under the influence of intoxicants and the extent thereof, stating facts upon which opinion is based); compare Allen v. State, 257 Ga. App. 246, 247 (1) ( 570 SE2d 683) (2002) and cit. (where evidence showed that defendants had been drinking but not their manner of driving or any unusual or erratic conduct or appearance after driving). PHIPPS, Judge.
Finding no error, we affirm. In Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374 ( 511 SE2d 899) (1999), we affirmed Jonathan Cronan's convictions of first degree vehicular homicide (driving under the influence of marijuana), OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), first degree vehicular homicide (speeding and following too closely), OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), driving under the influence of marijuana, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (2), reckless driving, OCGA § 40-6-390, and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, OCGA § 16-13-30. The trial court merged all of Cronan's convictions into the first degree vehicular homicide conviction and sentenced him to serve seven years in prison followed by eight years on probation.
We disagree. "[T]he introduction of oral victim impact testimony . . . is solely within the discretion of the trial court," Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 378 (4) ( 511 SE2d 899) (1999), and the trial court is vested with "unusually broad discretion in admitting such evidence. . . .
However, inasmuch as speeding alone can authorize a conviction of first degree vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, this enumeration is without merit. Deshazier v. State, 155 Ga. App. 526(1) ( 271 S.E.2d 664) (1980); see Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 377(3) ( 511 S.E.2d 899) (1999). 8. Massey argues that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested charges on proximate cause.
Even had the trial court suppressed the test results, Doster's admission, coupled with the substance found in the car and the officer's testimony regarding Doster's appearance and demeanor, would have been sufficient to support the finding of guilt. See Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 378-379(5) ( 511 S.E.2d 899) (1999). Second, we do not agree that Doster was misled.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 377-378(3) ( 511 S.E.2d 899) (1999). See Lumpkins v. State, supra.
Klaub v. State, 255 Ga. App. 40, 42 ( 564 S.E.2d 471) (2002). See Id. at 43; see also, e.g., Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 377(3) ( 511 S.E.2d 899) (1999) (first degree vehicular homicide sustained upon proof that defendant committed reckless driving by speeding); Chavous v. State, 205 Ga. App. 455, 456(1) ( 422 S.E.2d 327) (1992); Carroll v. State, 222 Ga. App. 560 ( 474 S.E.2d 737) (1996) (first degree vehicular homicide charge required proof that Carroll committed reckless driving by driving over the 35 mph speed limit); Duggan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 291 (8) ( 483 S.E.2d 373) (1997) (first degree vehicular homicide charge required proof that defendant committed reckless driving by driving at a speed exceeding the maximum speed limit). In that regard, and contrary to Putman's assertions about "the simple act of speeding", the prior acts of exceeding the speed limit did not show only the status of "speeding."
Cronan v. State.Cronan v. State, 236 Ga. App. 374, 377(2) ( 511 S.E.2d 899) (1999). Accordingly, contrary to Winfrey's assertions, Total Health and Richter did not waive their right to assert her failure to file an expert affidavit as a defense to her claims against them simply because they raised the failure in their initial response, rather than by separate motion filed contemporaneously therewith.