Croft v. Croft

8 Citing cases

  1. Markle v. Dass

    300 Ga. 702 (Ga. 2017)   Cited 2 times
    In Markle v. Dass, 300 Ga. 702, 797 S.E.2d 868 (2017), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument that a "home state" under the UCCJEA is synonymous with concepts of residency or domicile.

    We do not take OCGA § 19-9-41 (13)'s requirement that a claim of a right to legal custody be "under the laws of this state" to require that a recognized claim must be made in a proceeding in a Georgia court; to so construe that language would be contrary to the UCCJEA's purposes of combating forum shopping and avoiding jurisdictional competition. See Bellew, supra at 496, 706 S.E.2d 78 ; Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga.App. 303, 305 (1), 680 S.E.2d 150 (2009). See also In re Guardianship of Alexis C., 331 Wis.2d 108, 794 N.W.2d 533, 540-542 (18-24) (App. 2011), implicitly recognizing that the phrase "claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state" would embrace a claim recognized by the state in which jurisdiction is sought, even though the claim was made in another state.

  2. Black v. Black

    292 Ga. 691 (Ga. 2013)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that Georgia was the "home state" of the children under the UCCJEA because the mother and children had lived in Georgia for more than six months prior to the filing of the child custody petition and continued to live there at the time it was filed

    See OCGA § 19–9–66(a). In this case, the record shows that Michelle and the children had lived in Georgia since 2000 and continued to live in Georgia until sometime after Michelle and Aaron filed their respective petitions for divorce. For that reason, Georgia was the “home state” of the children for the purposes of the UCCJEA, and New York was not. Consequently, the trial court below had jurisdiction to determine questions of child custody, and it was not required under the UCCJEA to stay its proceedings in favor of any proceedings in New York. See Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga.App. 303, 306–307(1)–(2), 680 S.E.2d 150 (2009). (b) A trial court has, as Michelle contends, “discretion to stay a Georgia proceeding pending the disposition of a prior pending action in another jurisdiction.”

  3. Bellew v. Larese

    288 Ga. 495 (Ga. 2011)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that Georgia district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over child-custody proceeding regarding minor with dual Italian and United States citizenship when one parent was citizen of and resided in Italy

    Georgia adopted the UCCJEA in 2001, replacing its prior child custody act (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act), "because, in application, imprecision in [the prior act's] language often allowed for the existence of concurrent jurisdiction over custody matters in multiple states, thereby fostering competition among jurisdictions and forum shopping by the parties."Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303, 305 (1) ( 680 SE2d 150) (2009). Under OCGA § 19-9-61 (a) (1), a court has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if the court's state "is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state."

  4. Bowman v. Bowman

    No. 331870 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2016)

    Both Michigan and Georgia had adopted the UCCJEA at the time the dispute arose. Atchison v Atchison, 256 Mich App 531, 536; 664 NW2d 249 (2003); Croft v Croft, 298 Ga App 303, 305; 680 SE2d 150 (2009). The trial court, in concluding that Georgia was the more appropriate forum to exercise jurisdiction in this matter, first looked to MCL 722.1201, which governs jurisdiction over initial child-custody determinations.

  5. Kogel v. Kogel

    337 Ga. App. 137 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 7 times

    Georgia adopted the UCCJEA in 2001 and replaced its prior child-custody act (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act), because, in application, “imprecision in the prior act's language often allowed for the existence of concurrent jurisdiction over custody matters in multiple states, thereby fostering competition among jurisdictions and forum shopping by the parties.” Bellew v. Larese, 288 Ga. 495, 497, 706 S.E.2d 78 (2011) (punctuation omitted); accord Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga.App. 303, 305(1), 680 S.E.2d 150 (2009). OCGA § 19–9–101 ; accord Delgado v. Combs, 314 Ga.App. 419, 425, 724 S.E.2d 436 (2012).

  6. Collins v. Davis

    318 Ga. App. 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that clear and unambiguous language of former OCGA § 5–6–34 authorized direct appeal of any order in proceeding in which child's legal custody, physical custody or visitation was an issue, and noting that it was for legislature to narrow scope of this right of direct appeal

    See Jackson v. Irvin, 316 Ga.App. 560, 730 S.E.2d 48, 49 (2012). See Long v. Long, 303 Ga.App. 215, 217(1), 692 S.E.2d 811 (2010); Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga.App. 303, 303 n. 1, 680 S.E.2d 150 (2009). See Todd, supra at ––––(1), 703 S.E.2d 597.

  7. Dennis v. Dennis

    302 Ga. App. 791 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that service of motion for contempt was sufficient to confer trial court with personal jurisdiction

    (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11) (Ga. L. 2007, p. 554, § 2, effective January 1, 2008); see also Taylor v. Curl, 298 Ga. App. 45 ( 679 SE2d 80) (2009) ("all modifications of child custody orders filed on or after January 1, 2008 are directly appealable"); Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303, n. 1 ( 680 SE2d 150) (2009). Because the motion for contempt at issue here was filed on April 14, 2009, well after the effective date of the 2007 amendment to OCGA § 5-6-34, Billy Joe has the right to a direct appeal from the trial court's dismissal of that motion.

  8. Martinez v. Martinez

    687 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 8 times
    In Martinez v. Martinez, 301 Ga. App. 330 (687 SE2d 610) (2009), during a pending divorce action, the trial court granted the father's motion to enforce a settlement agreement pertaining to child custody.

    In 2007, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-6-34 to provide that "[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases including, but not limited to, awarding or refusing to change child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgment or orders" are directly appealable. OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11). Previously, such orders were not subject to direct appeal. See Croft v. Croft, 298 Ga. App. 303, n. 1 ( 680 SE2d 150) (2009); Moore v. Moore-McKinney, 297 Ga. App. 703, 704-707 (1) ( 678 SE2d 152) (2009). The amendment applies "to all child custody proceedings and modifications of child custody filed on or after January 1, 2008.