Opinion
I.D. No. 0208017610.
Submitted: July 2, 2003.
Decided: October 22, 2003.
Jeffrey J. Clark, Esquire, Schmittinger Rodriguez, P.A., for the Appellant. Stacey L. Bonvetti, Esquire, Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware.
ORDER
Upon the Appeal of the Decision of the Court of Common Pleas. Afflimed.
Introduction
Before this Court is the appeal of Burton Crockett of a decision of the Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of driving under the influence. The issue before this Court is whether the Court of Common Pleas properly concluded that police officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion sufficient to stop Crockett's vehicle based on his speed while driving through the neighborhood and a 911 call reporting that particular vehicle stolen. Based on the following, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas should be affirmed.
Background A. Facts
Burton K. Crockett ("Crockett" or "Appellant") was found guilty of driving under the influence in the Court of Common Pleas following a jury trial. The Delaware State Police received a 911 call from someone reporting a stolen vehicle. The caller described the stolen vehicle as a red 2000 Kia Sportage and gave the license plate number. Officer Csapo received a general broadcast from Trooper Brower informing him of the report of the stolen vehicle and the fact that he had spotted the vehicle. At approximately 2:00 a.m Officer Csapo responded to Meadowbrook Acres, a residential area in Kent County, where Trooper Brower had located the vehicle. Officer Csapo testified that he was driving behind Trooper Brower who was behind the allegedly stolen vehicle. Officer Csapo was traveling at approximately 25 to 30 miles per hour and the Kia was accelerating away from both officers. When the Kia made a right hand turn onto Pepper Drive, Trooper
Brower missed the turn, and Officer Csapo turned immediately behind the Kia, turning on his emergency lights after making the turn. After turning onto two more streets, the Kia finally entered a driveway and the driver, Crockett, exited. The resident of the home and owner of the Kia came outside and was angry with Crockett. To maintain their safety, Officer Csapo took Crockett to Troop 3 to conduct field sobriety tests on Crockett and then an Intoxilizer. Officer Csapo concluded that Crockett's blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit. Crockett was then placed under arrest.
Both parties agree that the seizure occurred when Crockett stopped his vehicle and exited.
B. Parties' Contentions
Crockett's argument on appeal is that the police lacked the reasonable and articulable suspicion required to make the stop. He bases this argument on the fact that the person who placed the 911 call was not specifically identified as the owner of the vehicle and the information given in the call was information available to any person who had observed the vehicle — the color, make, and model of the car and the license plate number.
The State, as Appellee, argues that the officer did have reasonable and articulable suspicion to perform the stop based on the 911 call, because not just any person who saw the vehicle would know that it was stolen. In addition, the State relies on the testimony of the officer stating that Crockett appeared to be speeding.
C. Lower Court's Decision
The Court of Common Pleas concluded that there was reasonable and articulable suspicion to make the stop, based on the officer's observation of the speed of the vehicle and the information the officer had from the 911 call. Thus, the Court denied Crockett's motion to suppress the evidence obtained after Officer Csapo stopped his vehicle.
Discussion A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for appeals to this Court from the Court of Common Pleas is "limited to correcting errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence exists to support factual findings". This Court will not disturb lower court verdicts where there is competent evidence upon which the findings could reasonably be based.
"Robert J. Smith Companies v. Thomas, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 502 at *5.
Young v. Saroukos, 189 A.2d 437 (Del. 1963).
B. Analysis
The issue before this Court is whether the court below properly considered the facts and applied the law in determining that Officer Csapo had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Crockett's vehicle. A trial court's determination of whether an officer possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain an individual is an issue of law and fact. In determining whether the officer possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. The first step in this Court's analysis is to determine whether there was substantial evidence supporting the court's interpretation of the facts. The second step is to ascertain whether the court properly applied the law.The parties do not dispute the majority of the facts. However, they disagree over whether Crockett was speeding. Crockett contends that because there was no objective evidence of Crockett's speed, the police officer could not have relied on his speed as a basis for stopping him. The State argues that the officer's observation that Crockett appeared to be speeding was sufficient to warrant the stop. The court below based its decision on the speed of the vehicle as reported by the police officer. Officer Csapo testified, "I was traveling approximately 25 to 30 miles an hour; I could see the vehicle's lights distancing itself from our vehicles." Although the officer did not use a radar gun to determine the actual speed of the vehicle, his observation upon following Crockett satisfied the court below that Crockett was exceeding the speed limit of 25 miles per hour in a residential district, in violation of title 21, section 4169 of the Delaware Code. Crockett did not present any evidence that he was not speeding. Thus it was reasonable, and not clearly erroneous under these circumstances, for the court below to conclude that Crockett was driving at a speed in excess of the speed limit.
Trial transcript, p. 9.
The next step is to determine whether the court properly applied the law to these facts. Crockett has relied heavily on Jones v. State, in which the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that an anonymous 911 call stating that a "suspicious black male wearing a blue coat had been standing for some time in front of 98 Karlyn Drive" did not provide the police with the sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to warrant stopping a male who fit that description in the general area. In Jones, the caller did not describe any criminal activity and the police did not witness any activity that would have given rise to reasonable and articulable suspicion.
Id. at 858.
The State relies on Bloomingdale v. State, a recent Superior Court decision, in which this Court upheld a stop based on an anonymous 911 call reporting a vehicle driving erratically. Like in Jones, the police did not observe any criminal activity or erratic driving, but the Court concluded that because Bloomingdale was driving when the police stopped him, he was engaged in a dangerous activity, and the police had an urgent reason for stopping him — suspicion of drunk driving.
2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 378.
This case is not identical factually to either of the cases relied upon by the parties. The anonymous tip received in this case identified specific criminal activity. However, the tip did not describe a possible drunk driver, but rather a stolen car. Thus the public safety exception created by the Superior Court in Bloomingdale would not apply in this case. Jones is not controlling either, since the 911 call in this case did identify specific criminal activity.
The officers in Bloom ingdale and Jones relied only on the information from the 911 call, while the court below relied on the testimony of Officer Csapo regarding the speed of the vehicle in addition to the 911 call. To stop a vehicle a police officer must possess reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Officer Csapo observed Crockett's vehicle traveling in excess of the speed limit and received a radio report of a stolen vehicle. This information gave Officer Csapo the reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to stop the vehicle Crockett was driving. The court below reached the same decision. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas should be affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.