Opinion
No. 1924 C.D. 2011
05-10-2012
John C. Crittenden, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
John C. Crittenden (Claimant) petitions for review from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) that denied his claim for benefits under Section 402(b) (voluntary quit) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law). Claimant's primary contention is that the Board erred in determining he voluntarily terminated his employment, as such conclusion is not supported by credible evidence. In the alternative, Claimant argues he had good cause to quit his job. Upon review, we affirm.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(b).
For approximately five years, Claimant worked full time for Krando Metal Products (Employer) as an operations manager. Then, on March 18, 2011, before work began, Anthony DiAngelus, Sr., Employer's president (Employer's President), met with Claimant concerning his work performance. The meeting took place in Employer's President's office. During this meeting, Employer's President reprimanded Claimant for his recent job performance. In response, Claimant protested, "I don't have to take this sh*t [sic]. I'm not a snot-nosed punk kid. If I'm not doing a good enough job maybe I should leave." Bd. Op., 9/12/11, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 4. In turn, Employer's President responded, "If that's what you feel you have to do." F.F. No. 5.
At that time, Claimant gathered his personal belongings. He then walked to the adjacent office, kissed the office manager on the cheek, said he was sorry, and walked off the job. Claimant later applied for benefits, which were initially denied. Claimant appealed, and a hearing ensued.
At a hearing before a referee, Employer presented the testimony of Krista DiAngelus, Employer's office manager (Employer's Witness), and Claimant testified on his own behalf. Employer's Witness testified as to what transpired at the March 18 meeting, and she stated that Claimant quit at its conclusion. Furthermore, she testified Employer did not fire Claimant, and that continuing work was available to him had he not quit.
In response, Claimant testified that based on several interactions he had with Employer's President he believed he was fired. Specifically, Claimant testified that on the day prior to his termination, Employer's President berated him in front of his co-workers, and threw a 36 inch pipe wrench across the shop floor at him. Additionally, according to Claimant, during the meeting the next morning, Employer's President again screamed at him and told him to "get the fuck out." Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 13a. At that time, he felt he was fired. As such, he collected his things, returned this keys and company phone, asked for his paycheck, and left. Moreover, Claimant explained that when he went back to clean out his office the following week, Employer's President assured him that Employer would not contest an unemployment claim because he regretted how his termination occurred. Notably, both witnesses acknowledged that Employer's President did not tell Claimant he was fired, and Claimant never stated he quit.
Thereafter, the referee determined Claimant voluntarily quit his employment after Employer's President verbally admonished him about his work performance. Thus, the referee denied benefits. Claimant appealed.
The Board made its own findings regarding what occurred at the March 18 meeting. In making its findings, the Board did not consider Claimant credible. Rather, the Board credited Employer's Witness' account of the meeting over Claimant's testimony. Furthermore, the Board did not credit Claimant's testimony that Employer's President berated him and threw a wrench at him the day before the meeting. In sum, the Board concluded Claimant voluntarily terminated his employment without good cause, and denied benefits. Claimant petitions for review.
On appeal, Claimant contends the record does not support the Board's determination that he voluntarily terminated his employment. Specifically, Claimant argues Employer's Witness' testimony was not credible because she did not attend the March 18 meeting, but only overheard it while working in the adjoining office. Additionally, Claimant points out that Employer's Witness is Employer's President's daughter. Furthermore, Claimant asserts the Board erred in not crediting his testimony that Employer's President threw a pipe wrench at him as Employer did not attempt to refute his testimony. Claimant also contends the Board erred in reaching its legal conclusion that he voluntarily terminated his employment without a necessitous and compelling reason.
Our review is limited to determining whether the necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or whether constitutional rights were violated. Oliver v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 5 A.3d 432 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en banc).
It is fundamental that questions of credibility and evidentiary weight are within the sole discretion of the Board, and as such, are not subject to re-evaluation by this Court on appeal. Tapco, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 650 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
In an unemployment compensation case, the Board's factual findings are conclusive on appeal so long as the record taken as a whole contains substantial evidence to support those findings. Grieb v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 573 Pa. 594, 827 A.2d 422 (2003). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we view the record in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed before the Board, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable and logical inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. Tapco, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 650 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Moreover, the Board is the exclusive arbiter of all credibility and evidentiary-weight determinations. Id. In considering the credibility of a witness, the Board may accept or reject his testimony in whole or in part. McCarthy v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 829 A.2d 1266 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). --------
Here, Employer's Witness testified she heard the entirety of the March 18 meeting while sitting in her office because the doors to both offices were open. R.R. at 9a-10a. She stated that during the meeting, Employer's President admonished Claimant. Id. Moreover, she testified in pertinent part:
[Claimant said,] I don't have to take this shit, I'm not a snot-nosed, punk, kid. If I'm not doing a good enough job maybe I should leave. [Employer's President's] exact words were, if that's what you have to do -- if that's what you feel you have to do. He got -- [Claimant] went in to his office, grabbed his coat and his keys, threw them on [Employer's President's] desk, came into [my office] kissed me on the cheek, said I'm sorry and walked out the door.Id. Thus, in light of Employer's Witness's credited testimony, substantial evidence supports the Board's findings regarding what transpired at the meeting that led to Claimant's termination. See F.F. Nos. 2-8.
Furthermore, Claimant's argument that the Board must accept his testimony where it is not contradicted is without merit. Daniels v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 755 A.2d 729 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (the Board is free to reject uncontradicted testimony). As such, because the Board did not credit Claimant's testimony, it did not err in disregarding his account of Employer's President's actions the day before the meeting. See R.R. at 7a-8a. See Bruce v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 2 A.3d 667 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (it is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence supporting findings other than those made by the Board). Therefore, Claimant's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the Board's credibility determinations are meritless.
Next, we consider Claimant's argument that the Board erred in determining he voluntarily terminated his employment without good cause.
The consideration of whether an employee voluntarily quit or the employer discharged him is a question of law. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 955 A.2d 1070 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Where the parties dispute this issue, a reviewing court looks to the language the parties used leading to the employee's termination. Torsky v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 474 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). In so doing, we determine whether the employer's language contains the immediacy and finality of a firing. Keast v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 503 A.2d 507 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986); Wentovich v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 425 A.2d 483 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981). An employer does not need to say specific words such as "fired" or "discharged" to show the necessary immediacy or finality. Bell v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 921 A.2d 23 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
Additionally, in considering whether an employee's actions constituted a voluntary termination, we consider the totality of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the employee manifested a conscious intent to quit. Iaconelli v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 892 A.2d 894 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). An employee abruptly leaving work is not, in itself, sufficient proof of an intent to quit. Id.
Here, Employer's President's statements to Claimant did not evidence the immediacy and finality of a firing. Rather, Employer's President made it clear that it was Claimant's decision to terminate his employment. R.R. at 9a-10a See Keast (telling an employee he may make the decision to terminate employment lacks the immediacy and finality of a firing); Wentovich (an employer's use of the word "if" is evidence the employee had a choice); cf. Bell (an employer's use of statements akin to "pick up your pay," "turn in your key," or "there's the door" can be evidence of a firing).
Additionally, the totality of the circumstances, including Claimant's conduct, reveals his intent to voluntarily terminate his employment. See Porter v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 434 A.2d 245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (walking off the job and turning in badge is evidence of intent to quit). Here, Claimant not only left work before his shift began, but he collected his personal things, and returned his keys and company phone to Employer. See F.F. No. 6, R.R. at 13a-14a. Therefore, we discern no error in the Board's determination that Claimant's behavior exhibited his intent to voluntarily terminate his employment when he walked off the job.
Moreover, Claimant did not present credible testimony in support of his averred good cause. F.F. No. 10. Specifically, the Board did not credit Claimant's testimony that Employer's President told him to "get the fuck out" at the conclusion of their meeting, or threw a pipe wrench at him. See R.R. at 13a. As such, the Board did not err in concluding Claimant lacked good cause to terminate his employment. Lynn v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 427 A.2d 736, 737 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) ("resentment of a reprimand, absent unjust accusations, profane language, or abusive conduct ... [does] not amount to necessitous and compelling [cause]").
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of May, 2012, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge