Opinion
Case No. 1:12-cv-356 WDS/ACT
02-21-2013
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
The Court previously deferred ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss CARE's claim for unconstitutional delegation of authority. [Doc. 40 at 19-20.] The Court now concludes that the claim should be dismissed, though not for the reasons Defendants put forth in their motion.
Allegations of Count I
In Count I of its complaint, Plaintiff CARE challenges the constitutionality of the purported delegation of authority by the State to a private accrediting body. [Doc. 1, ¶¶ at 61-67.] Specifically, CARE alleges that the "licensure scheme does not allow an applicant for air ambulance service to either obtain a timely inspection and review with respect to CAMTS accreditation, or in the alternative, to obtain an inspection and certification from the State - so as to avoid the improper delegation of the ultimate responsibility for accreditation to a private, third party entity such as CAMTS." [Doc. 1, ¶ 67.] Elsewhere in the complaint, CARE alleges that the delay which resulted from the delegation of authority violated CARE's federal and state due process rights. [Doc. 1, ¶ 48.]
Defendants' arguments
Defendants seek dismissal on the ground that the unconstitutional delegation of authority claim is purely a matter of state law and does not raise a federal question. [Doc. 17 at 13-15.] The Court does not agree.
The contours of a constitutional right can be defined by state law, but the question whether a state has afforded sufficient process to protect a constitutional right is not a question of state law. See Cleveland v. Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985). Here, CARE alleges the delegation of authority results in a "licensure scheme" that deprives applicants of due process. The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of this claim, but rejects Defendants' argument that it does not raise a federal question. The Court also rejects Defendants' alternative argument that the unconstitutional delegation of authority claim should be evaluated using state law standards.
Sua sponte grounds for dismissal
Count I appears to assert only claims against Defendants Schroeder and Vette, and only claims for monetary damages. [Doc. 1, ¶ 67.] Dismissal of Count I is in order because the complaint contains no factual allegations implicating either Schroeder or Vette in the alleged unconstitutional delegation of authority. See Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010).
Count I also should be dismissed to the extent it can be read as seeking either a declaration that the State's delegation of authority to CAMTS is unconstitutional, or an injunction prohibiting the delegation. CARE lacks standing to seek such relief. To receive forward-looking declaratory or injunctive relief of this nature, it is insufficient for CARE to claim that it was harmed by the "licensure scheme" in the past; CARE must demonstrate that injury is imminent. Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 493-94 (10th Cir. 1998). CARE reportedly has regained its certification and concedes there is no imminent threat of injury. [Doc. 43 at 2, n. 1.]
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Count I (Unconstitutional Delegation of Authority) is DISMISSED.
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W. DANIEL SCHNEIDER
United States Magistrate Judge