Opinion
C/A 8:22-cv-03992-MGL-JDA
07-31-2023
William Cripps, a/k/a William J. Cripps, a/k/a Billy Cripps Plaintiff, v. C.O, Illiff, C.O. Wilson, Medical Provider Wellpath Defendants.[1]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction [Doc. 32] by Plaintiff. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action pro se on November 4, 2022, asserting various claims relating to the medical care he received while he has been a pretrial detainee at the Lexington County Detention Center ("LCDC"). [Doc. 1.]
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). In this case, construing the filing date in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this action was filed on November 4, 2022. [Doc. 1 at 6, 15, 17, 19, 23 (signatures on attachments to Complaint dated November 4, 2022).]
On December 5, 2022, the Clerk docketed a motion from Plaintiff for a TRO and a preliminary injunction. [Doc. 32.] On January 31, 2023, Defendants filed responses opposing Plaintiff's motion. [Docs. 37; 38.] The motion is ripe for review.
The facts in this Background Section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Complaint. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff contends Defendants have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Plaintiff alleges the civil rights violations began when he arrived at LCDC on July 6, 2021, and have continued until the present. [Id. at 5.] He contends that he needs an operation and a walker. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, he was taken to LCDC on July 6, 2021, after having his hip put back in place at the Richland Memorial Hospital. [Id.] Plaintiff's leg has continued to worsen, and he is experiencing pain. [Id. at 6.] He contends that “[t]hey have done nothing to try and make the situation better.” [Id.]
Plaintiff contends a microscopic operation was performed to remove bone fragments. [Id. at 7.] He arrived at LCDC in a wheelchair and, after he was booked, he was left sitting in the wheelchair for hours, despite begging to be taken to a bed. [Id.] However, they had nowhere to put him, because they do not have an infirmary. [Id.] Eventually, he was placed in a one-man cell on the first floor, known as “lock-up,” which is where they place troubled inmates. [Id.] He was given a urinal and a bed roll. [Id.] However, he was not able to move very well and could not get up to empty the urinal, which ended up spilling on Plaintiff or on the floor. [Id.] Plaintiff begged to be seen because he was in terrible pain. [Id.] After two or three days, Plaintiff was taken to medical and was told he needed to be able to move around as much as possible. [ Id. at 7-8.]
Plaintiff was then taken to the A-Pod, which is the medical unit, around July 9, or 10, 2021. [Id. at 8.] However, once in that room, things began to get worse, his pain continued to increase, and he grew weaker and weaker. [Id.] Plaintiff could barely move around in his wheelchair and he was never given the correct medicine. [Id. at 9.] Plaintiff was told that he was healing and it was to be expected to feel pain. [Id.] Some nights, Plaintiff would scream and yell for the corrections officers to call medical. [Id.] Defendant Officer Illiff came in and refused to call medical, or would tell Plaintiff she already called them and they were not coming back, or would blatantly say she was not calling them. [Id.] Officer Illiff repeatedly refused to call medical. [Id.] The pain became so bad that Plaintiff stayed on his left side for so long that he developed pressure sores. [Id.]
At times, Plaintiff could not even make it to the toilet and he would soil himself or urinate on himself in bed. [Id. at 10.] His roommate would have to bang on the door to get the corrections officers. [Id.] Plaintiff would try to clean himself in the shower as well as he could, but he barely had the strength to stand, let alone get into the shower chair. [Id.] Plaintiff's roommate asked Defendant Officer Wilson for new sheets or uniforms when Plaintiff soiled himself, but she said he needed to “do better and make it to the bathroom.” [Id.] Plaintiff felt humiliated and denigrated. [Id. at 11.]
Finally, on August 12, or 13, 2021, more than a month after getting to A-Pod, it was discovered that Plaintiff had an infection and the doctor gave him a shot for five days. [Id.] On August 20, 2021, the doctor took an x-ray and noticed the hip bone had deteriorated. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that the infections was causing hallucinations, weakness, and the inability to control his bladder and bowels. [Id. at 12.] Plaintiff was then admitted to the hospital and underwent surgery on August 24, 2021, to cut out the hip and other infected bone. [Id. at 12.] Plaintiff remained in the hospital for six weeks and was taken back to LCDC on October 6, 2021. [Id. at 12-13.] Plaintiff was supposed to receive a total hip replacement within two to four months, but, at the time of his Complaint, was still waiting on that procedure. [Id. at 13.] Plaintiff contends that the cement spacer grinds and pops when he tries to lay on his side. [Id.] Plaintiff contends he has been denied his antibiotics, and they have postponed numerous appointments. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that he suffered an untreated infection that caused his hip to be cut out. [Id. at 16.] He has a cement spacer in his hip until further operation can be completed. [Id.] He contends that he needs the operation to replace his hip and that he has to use a walker to get around. [Id.] He contends that his leg and hip pain have only gotten worse. [Id.]
For his relief, he seeks money damages in addition to other relief. [Id. at 16, 18-19.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe her pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for her. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Some of the claims in this action are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because granting a motion for preliminary injunctive relief “requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or refrain from acting, in a certain way[,] [t]he danger of a mistake in this setting is substantial.” Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
The current standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief is set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under Winter, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate:
1) he is likely to succeed on the merits,
2) he will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not granted,
3) the balance of equities favors him, and
4) the injunction is in the public interest.555 U.S. at 20; see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Winter requires that each preliminary injunction factor “be ‘satisfied as articulated.'” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff'd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). Therefore, the movant bears a heavy burden in seeking a preliminary injunction. Id. at 321.
DISCUSSION
Motion for TRO and Preliminary Injunction
In his motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, Plaintiff seeks an order enjoining LCDC and "each of their officers, agents, employers, and all persons acting in concert or participation with them" from "going through any and all legal mail, and documents and from opening any of them unless in [the detainees'] presen[ce]" and from "keeping copies when [detainees] request [that] legal copies [be] made." [Doc. 32 at 3.] In support of his motion, Plaintiff has attached signed, unwitnessed and non-notarized statements from his cellmate Tony Ebersole as well as an individual identified as Jermiah Gregory. [Doc. 32-1 at 1-4.] The documents assert that certain correctional officers who are not named Defendants in Plaintiff's lawsuit are opening legal mail outside of the presence of detainees and also removing blank mailing sheets from documents when asked to make copies for the detainees. [Id.] Ebersole's statement surmises that LCDC is making copies of his mail in furtherance of LCDC's own purposes. [Id. at 1-2.]
As an initial matter, the allegations in Plaintiff's motion are unrelated to Plaintiff's claims in this action, and he has therefore failed to show that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Winter. “[A] party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). "The purpose of interim equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being harmed in the manner in which the movant contends it was or will be harmed through the illegality alleged in the complaint." Muquit v. Stirling, No. 8:22-cv-02009, 2023 WL 3998170, at *8 (D.S.C. Apr. 28, 2023), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 3996916 (D.S.C. June 14, 2023). "Thus, a preliminary injunction may never issue to prevent an injury or harm that was not caused by the wrong claimed in the underlying action." Id. Here, because Plaintiff's claim in this case is about the medical treatment he received as a detainee at LCDC, and Plaintiff's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction has nothing to do with that, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's motion be denied.
Further, Plaintiff's motion should be denied because he has failed to meet the requirements for an injunction in that she has not made a showing to demonstrate that any of the four factors under Winter weigh in his favor. Specifically, he has made no showing of irreparable harm that will result to him if his motion is not granted. LCDC maintains that it is its policy that legal mail will be opened by correctional officers and inspected for contraband but that the legal mail will not be read. [Doc. 38 at 4.] Plaintiff's motion provides no basis for concluding that detention officers were not following that policy.
LCDC notes that Plaintiff's own filing indicates that any viewing of the legal mail outside of the detainees' presence is the result of the detainees' requests to be given copies of documents, which require officers to take the mail to where the copy machines are located. [Doc. 38 at 4 n.1.]
Plaintiff also does not address the harm that would be caused to Defendants if the Court granted the injunctive relief he requested. The interest of a correctional facility in monitoring and controlling incoming mail in order to stop the transmission of contraband is readily apparent. See also McCloskey v. State of Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964) ("Control of the mail to and from inmates is an essential adjunct of prison administration and the maintenance of order within the prison."). LCDC represents that "staff are concerned about recent instances in neighboring jurisdictions of detainees attempting to educate other detainees about methods of bringing contraband into secure facilities by creating fake legal mail." [Doc. 38 at 5.]
Plaintiff also makes no attempt to demonstrate his likelihood of success of the merits of this case despite the fact that he is required to at least make "a clear showing that [he] is entitled to relief." Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017). And finally, Plaintiff has not shown how the balance of equities and the public interest favors the injunctive relief he seeks. In particular, Defendants have articulated their legitimate interest in preventing the flow of contraband materials into LCDC [Doc. 38 at 5], and Plaintiff has done nothing to call that into question.
For all of these reasons, Plaintiff's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction should be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that Plaintiff's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction [Doc. 32] be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.