Collin CRIM, a Minor, BY His Parents and Next Friends, Kristopher CRIM and Teri Crim, Appellees, v. Gina DIETRICH, Appellant. JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. ¶ 1 In this appeal, the circuit court of Adams County certified the following question for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 308 (eff. July 1, 2017)): "Whether the ruling of the appellate court, 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, 409 Ill.Dec. 221, 67 N.E.3d 433, reversing the judgment and remanding this case for a new trial requires a trial de novo on all claims." The appellate court answered this question in the affirmative.
Instead, the Crims appealed, arguing the trial court erred by entering a directed verdict on their informed consent claim. Crim ex rel. Crim v. Dietrich, 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, ¶ 3, 67 N.E.3d 433. This court agreed and reversed the trial court's judgment, remanding the case for a new trial. Id. ¶ 48.
In a medical malpractice claim based on the doctrine of informed consent, the plaintiff is basically contending that they agreed to a particular treatment that they would not otherwise have consented to had they known the material risks of the treatment. See Crim v. Dietrich, 67 N.E.3d 433, 438-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (to prevail on an informed consent claim, the plaintiff must prove that "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment [he] otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." (citing Davis v. Kraff, 937 N.E.2d 306, 314-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010))).
To prevail on an informed-consent complaint, the plaintiff must establish "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment [he] otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment." Crim ex rel. Crim v. Dietrich , 409 Ill.Dec. 221, 67 N.E.3d 433, 438–39 (2016) (quoting Davis v. Kraff , 405 Ill.App.3d 20, 344 Ill.Dec. 600, 937 N.E.2d 306, 314–15 (2010) ). In essence, a plaintiff must "point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it."
For example, in Crim ex rel. Crim v. Dietrich, the appellate court was tasked with determining whether the trial court erred by entering a partial directed verdict on an informed consent claim when the only “reasonable person” evidence presented was a statement from the plaintiff that she would have opted for a C-section had she known of the risk of complications that could arise from the natural delivery of a large baby. 67 N.E.3d 433, 435-36 ( Ill. App. 2016). Ultimately, the appellate court relied on Coryell and held that when dealing with issues of informed consent, the plaintiff's testimony as to what she would have done was sufficient.
¶ 14. The appellate court granted the doctor's application for an interlocutory appeal, and it answered the question in the affirmative because the appellate court in Crim v. Dietrich, 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, issued a general remand without specific instructions. Id. ¶¶ 15, 22.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crim v. Dietrich, 2016 IL App (4th) 150843, ¶ 35. ¶ 94 Here, plaintiff submitted evidence on each of these four elements at trial.