Opinion
UWYCV166030551S
12-21-2017
Cornelio CRESPO v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
AGATI, J.
The plaintiff, Cornelio Crespo, commenced this action against the defendant/third-party plaintiff, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (" Liberty Mutual"), seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff’s claim for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits is predicated upon his assertion that he was injured due to the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the uninsured/underinsured motorist, Michael Cropley. Liberty Mutual has answered the plaintiff’s complaint and it has denied that Cropley was negligent. Furthermore, Liberty Mutual has pleaded several special defenses, including a comparative negligence defense that alleges, among other things, that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent as he operated his vehicle " under the influence of [an] intoxicating substance."
Liberty Mutual filed a Motion to Implead the third party defendant, Ordinary Joe, Inc. (" Ordinary Joe"), on March 21, 2017. That motion was granted and Liberty Mutual filed a third-party complaint pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102a on April 21, 2017. Liberty Mutual’s one count third-party complaint brings a claim against Ordinary Joe for wanton and reckless misconduct and alleges the following facts. Ordinary Joe served the plaintiff a large volume of alcohol for consumption on December 9, 2015, and it knew, or consciously disregarded, that it had served the plaintiff a quantity of alcohol dangerous to his health and well-being. It is further alleged that Ordinary Joe knew or consciously disregarded determining the plaintiff’s mode of transportation upon his departure from the premises, and that it chose a manner of service of alcohol knowing a serious danger existed as a result thereof. As such, Liberty Mutual claims that Ordinary Joe is liable to it for all or part of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Ordinary Joe filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 29, 2017, as to Liberty Mutual’s third party complaint. Liberty Mutual filed its objection on August 21, 2017. The matter was heard at short calendar on October 20, 2017.
The plaintiff filed a motion to join Liberty Mutual’s motion on August 29, 2017.
" Summary Judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried." (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).
Ordinary Joe claims that Liberty Mutual cannot maintain its cause of action. for wanton and reckless misconduct against it because under § 52-102a, Ordinary Joe’s liability is not secondary to, or derivative of, Liberty Mutual’s liability for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits. Accordingly, Ordinary Joe asserts that the third-party complaint is improper, and summary judgment should be granted in its favor.
The court commences review of General Statutes § 52-102a, which states the following in subsection (a):
Sec. 52-102a . Impleading of third party by defendant. Rights and remedies of third-party defendant . (a) A defendant in any civil action may move the court for permission as a third-party plaintiff to serve a writ, summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him. The motion may be filed at any time before trial and permission may be granted by the court if, in its discretion, it deems that the granting of the motion will not unduly delay the trial of the action nor work an injustice upon the plaintiff or the party sought to be impleaded.
The court was unable to find any Appellate authority regarding the joining of dissimilar claims under § 52-102a. There are Superior Court cases which have expounded on this issue and ruled both for and against allowing this manner of third-party claim.
In the absence of any controlling authority the court will undertake its own analysis of § 52-102a. In analyzing statutory provisions the court must follow the line of Appellate authority regarding statutory construction.
In the recent case of Garvey v. Valencis, 177 Conn.App. 578, 173 A.3d 51 (2017), the Appellate Court reviewed the tenets of statutory construction as follows:
The court’s fundamental objective in construing a statute " is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ... In other words, [the court] seek[s] to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ... In seeking to determine that meaning ... § 1-2 directs [the court] first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 324 Conn. 292, 307-08, 152 A.3d 488 (2016), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 2217, 198 L.Ed.2d 659 (2017). " It is the duty of the court to interpret statutes as they are written ... and not by construction read into statutes provisions which are not clearly stated ... Moreover, principles of statutory construction require the court to construe a statute in a manner that will not frustrate its intended purpose or lead to an absurd result." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn.App. 150, 165-66, 738 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928, 742 A.2d 363 (1999).
A statute is plain and unambiguous when " the meaning ... is so strongly indicated or suggested by the [statutory] language as applied to the facts of the case ... that, when the language is read as so applied, it appears to be the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely meaning." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinsey v. Pacific Employers, Ins. Co., supra, 277 Conn. At 407-08, 277 Conn. 398, 891 A.2d 959. " [S]tatutes should be interpreted so as to form a rational, consistent whole, rather than an irrational and inconsistent statutory scheme ... Another principle is that statutes should be interpreted so as to avoid bizarre or unworkable results ... and courts should interpret statutes on the premise that the legislature intended to accomplish reasonable result ... The final principle is that statutes should be interpreted so as to conform to common sense, rather than so as to violate it." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Housing Authority, 117 Conn.App. 30, 45-46, 978 A.2d 136 (2009), appeal dismissed, 302 Conn. 158, 24 A.3d 596 (2011).Garvey v. Valencis, supra, 177 Conn.App. 586-87.
The salient provision of General Statute § 52-102a(a) provides that a party may be impleaded if they are " a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to [the party seeking impleader] for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him." The plain language of this provision indicates and implies that in order for impleader to be proper the third-party defendant must be liable for indemnification or contribution to the third party plaintiff for the plaintiff’s claim against the third party plaintiff.
In this case, the plaintiff brought an action for uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits against Liberty Mutual, his motor vehicle insurance carrier, pursuant to his motor vehicle insurance policy. This is a contractual claim that is triggered by an underlying motor vehicle accident claim alleging negligence.
Liberty Mutual’s claim against Ordinary Joe is not a claim for negligence, indemnity, or contribution. Liberty Mutual claims that Ordinary Joe acted recklessly in its service of alcohol to the plaintiff. There is no conceivable way that Ordinary Joe would be liable to Liberty Mutual for any of the plaintiff’s claims against Liberty Mutual. Interpreting § 52-102a to allow such a result would be " bizarre or unworkable." Garvey v. Valencis, supra, 177 Conn.App. 587. Liberty Mutual may maintain its special defenses against the plaintiff for his alleged comparative negligence in the underlying action.
The court concludes that the motion to implead the third-party defendant, Ordinary Joe, was granted improvidently. Ordinary Joe has no relationship, contractually or otherwise, to the third-party plaintiff, Liberty Mutual.
Therefore, the court grants the third party defendant’s, Ordinary Joe’s motion for summary judgment.