Opinion
No. LLI-CV-05-4002121S
January 13, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Whether the defendant's motion to strike count one of the plaintiff's amended complaint should be granted. It is submitted that the defendant's motion to strike should be granted because the plaintiff's allegations are a legally insufficient basis on which to prove his claim of bad faith.
The plaintiff; Michael Crespan, filed suit against the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. According to the amended complaint, the plaintiff and defendant were parties to a contract by which the defendant provided motor vehicle insurance to the plaintiff for his 1994 Chevrolet S10 Blazer from August 8, 2004, through February 8, 2005. The contract allegedly contained a provision providing for the payment of medical bills up to five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) that arose from any collision involving the insured vehicle, regardless of fault.
On November 25, 2004, the plaintiff was operating the insured vehicle on Route 202 in Litchfield, Connecticut, and, when stopped at a stop sign, was allegedly hit from behind by Dorothy Holcomb. As a result of that collision, the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries, some of which required him to undergo surgery. The plaintiff alleges that numerous medical doctors sent letters to the defendant stating that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the plaintiff's injuries were directly related to the accident. As of January 21, 2005, the plaintiff had allegedly accumulated medical bills in excess of $5,000.00, but the defendant had paid only $980.10 worth of those bills. The plaintiff's attorney, sent the defendant a letter on January 21, 2005, requesting that it pay the plaintiff's medical bills, and the defendant responded with a letter dated January 27, 2005, stating that an investigation was pending and no more bills would be paid until the investigation was completed. On February 10, 2005, the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff stating that it had a completed biomedical review of the plaintiff's injuries based on which it concluded that some of the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by the accident and that therefore they were denying all claims associated with the plaintiff's lumbar back injury. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant's opinion is based upon that of a doctor who has never performed a physical examination of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff then filed suit against the defendant for failure to pay his medical expenses up to the insured amount of $5,000.00. The plaintiff's first complaint was dated March 30, 2005, and contained two counts, the first alleging a claim of bad faith and the second alleging violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The defendant then filed a motion to strike both counts of that complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to allege legally sufficient claims. The motion to strike count one was granted by this court on August 2, 2005, on the basis that, "apart from the impermissible legal conclusion in paragraph 25, there are no facts to support a claim of bad faith." The motion to strike count two was denied on the basis that "although the factual allegations are sparse, they are sufficient to support a [CUIPA]/CUTPA claim."
The plaintiff thereafter filed the amended complaint, dated August 11, 2005, consisting of the same two counts as in the original complaint. The defendant then filed this motion to strike count one of the amended complaint on the grounds that the count again fails to allege a legally sufficient claim of bad faith. The plaintiff filed an objection and supporting memorandum.
"The function of a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading; it admits all facts well pleaded . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Company, 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "Although the motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded, it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." Emerick v. Kuhn, 52 Conn.App. 724, 739, 737 A.2d 456, appeal denied, 249 Conn. 929, cert. denied 528 U.S. 1005, 120 S.Ct. 500, 145 L.Ed.2d 386 (1999).
"[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, 275 Conn 105, 154, 881 A.2d 937 (2005).
"Practice Book § 10-44 permits a party to file a new pleading within fifteen days after a motion to strike has been granted . . ." Johnson v. Mazza, 80 Conn.App. 155, 162, 834 A.2d 725 (2003). "Although [a motion to strike and a request to revise] generally serve different functions, either may be used when the amended complaint merely restates the original cause of action that was previously stricken." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Melfi v. Danbury, 70 Conn.App. 679, 684, 800 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 922, 806 A.2d 1061 (2002).
In its memorandum in support of the motion to strike, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has not alleged legally sufficient facts to support its claim of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is inherent in all insurance contracts. The defendant supports this argument by citing case law that, it argues, requires that in alleging a bad faith claim, more than just failure to act promptly and indemnity the plaintiff are necessary to sustain such a claim. In addition, the defendant claims the plaintiff's allegations are merely legal conclusions, which are insufficient to survive a motion to strike.
In addition, the defendant argues that the amended complaint is no more legally sufficient than the first stricken version of count one. The defendant goes on to cite numerous allegations of the plaintiff which, he claims, are unsupported by any facts. Because, as the defendant argues, the plaintiff fails to set forth any allegations in count one that would rise to the level of legal sufficiency required to sustain a claim of bad faith, the defendant argues that the motion to strike should be granted.
In the plaintiff's memorandum in objection to the defendant's motion to strike, he argues that he has alleged legally sufficient facts to support a claim of bad faith. The plaintiff cites what he claims to be the legal standard for bad faith in Connecticut by relying upon Tarabek v. Hartford Ins. Co. for his assertion that he has sufficiently alleged every necessary element to set forth a claim of bad faith. Tarabek v. Hartford Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 51153 (August 26, 2002, Hurley, J.). Tarabek does articulate the elements required for a claim of the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but the plaintiff fails to recognize that it goes on to further articulate what is additionally necessary to sustain a claim of bad faith, specifically, a sinister motive or dishonest purpose. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff fails to fully assert the reasons, such as dishonest purpose or sinister motive, why he alleges that bad faith has been sufficiently alleged in this case. Id.
The plaintiff goes on to also assert that some factual allegations that the defendant claimed as inaccurate were in fact true. The plaintiff argues that, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to him, the motion to strike count one should be denied because he has sufficiently alleged the elements necessary to sustain a cause of action in bad faith.
"It is axiomatic that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or contractual relationship. In other words, every contract carries an implied duty requiring that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement . . . To constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith. Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." Scapa Tapes North America, Inc. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 384 F.Sup.2d 544, 560 (2005), citing De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins, Co., 269 Conn. 424, 869 A.2d 382 (2004). "[B]ad faith is defined as the opposite of good faith, generally implying a design to mislead or to deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation not prompted by, an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties . . . [B]ad faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . [I]t contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hutchinson v. Farm Family Casualty Insurance Co., 273 Conn. 33, n. 4, 867 A.2d 1 (2005), citing Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 205 Conn. 166, 171, 530 A.2d 596 (1987).
"In order to prevail on a claim of bad faith, it is necessary for the complaint to allege a specific act that was performed purposefully, with a sinister intent . . . Even if it was found that there was a breach of contract, not all contracts are breached with a sinister intent." Namoury v. Tibbetts, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Docket No. 3:04 CV 599 (January 11, 2005). "Neglect or refusal to fulfill a contractual obligation can be bad faith only if prompted by an interested or sinister motive." Feinberg v. Berglewicz, 32 Conn.App. 857, 862, 632 A.2d 709 (1993). "The lynchpin of a bad faith claim is a state of mind characterized by an intent to mislead or deceive or defraud." Ravski v. Connecticut State Medical Society, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X01 CV 04 4000582 (January 26, 2005, Sheedy, J.). "In order to make [such a claim] the plaintiff must allege that the defendant did more than simply deny the plaintiff's claim for benefits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bernard v. Buendia, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 04 4003054 (July 20, 2005, Doherty, J.).
There are a significant number of Superior Court cases which, in their rulings, have delineated lines determining what is, and is not, sufficient to sustain a bad faith claim in regards to insurance practices. Therefore, to determine whether this plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the necessary facts to sustain the bad faith claim, this court will examine some of those cases.
In Bernard v. Buendia, the defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim that they had acted in bad faith by breaching the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in regards to the insurance contract they provided for the plaintiff. Bernard v. Buendia, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 04 4004054. The claims resulted from a motor vehicle accident, like in this case. Id. The plaintiff had "alleged only that she made a claim for uninsured motorist's coverage and that [the defendant] `unreasonably and in bad faith' failed to compensate her. [The plaintiff] has not alleged any facts that demonstrate that [the defendant] did more than deny her claim. The statements made [were] conclusory and insufficient to support a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. Therefore, because the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged the required sinister motive or intent to mislead, deceive or defraud, the defendant's motion to strike that count of the plaintiff's complaint was granted. Id.
In another recent case, which involved insurance payments under workers' compensation benefits, the court explored what it deemed to be a split of authority in the Superior Courts "as to what factual allegations are sufficient to constitute the element of bad faith. The first line of cases requires specific allegations establishing a dishonest purpose or malice . . . The second line of cases holds the plaintiff to a less stringent standard . . . [where] the plaintiffs need only allege sufficient facts or allegations from which it may reasonably be inferred that the defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Algiere v. Utica National Ins., Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 04 0569670 (February 7, 2005, Jones, J.).
In Algiere, the court explored both lines of reasoning and concluded that, "[a]lthough the plaintiff [had] not alleged that the defendant acted in bad faith or with a sinister motive she [had] alleged facts sufficient to reasonably infer that an improper motive or reckless indifference of the interest of others existed. The plaintiff [had] alleged that the defendant [had] knowingly, willfully, deliberately and repeatedly ignored the workers' compensation orders [and] such continued defiance is unlikely to be attributable to an honest mistake or mere negligence." Algiere v. Utica National Ins., Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 04 056970. Therefore, the Algiere court denied the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's bad faith claim because it concluded that allegations of a sinister motive were not necessary, and that the plaintiff need only sufficiently allege facts from which it could be inferred that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Id. Though the Algiere decision detailing the split of authority is considered by this court, the more recent Bernard decision should be considered as more controlling, not only because it was issued more recently than Algiere, but also because the Bernard case arises from injuries incurred as a result of a motor vehicle accident, similar to the facts in this case, and not out of a workers' compensation claim.
Two more recent Superior Court cases demonstrate, again, what is and is not bad faith. In Panamsat Corp. v. Millennium Television Network, the court found that the plaintiff's allegations which stated "that the defendants acted in bad faith, and intentionally, willfully and/or in reckless disregard and in derogation of the plaintiff's rights under the payment bond . . . [and] that [the defendants] [had] acted in concert to reject valid claims under the [payment bond] by vendors," were sufficient to allege a bad faith claim, and therefore denied the defendant's motion to strike. Panamsat Corp. v. Millennium Television Network, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 01 0181722 (July 20, 2001, D'Andrea, J.). Conversely, in another 2001 case, the plaintiff's mere "legal conclusion that the failure to defend and indemnify amounts to a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing" was insufficient and did not properly state a claim of bad faith and, therefore, the court granted the defendant's motion to strike that count. OG Industries, Inc. v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 01 0084433 (September 7, 2001, Cremins, J.).
Finally, in a decision by this court in a case regarding a bad faith claim in relation to an insurer's failure to pay a workers' compensation claim, this court found that the bad faith claim had been sufficiently alleged. Bates v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 020088925 (May 29, 2003, Pickard, J.). In Bates, the plaintiff had made numerous allegations, including that the "defendant [had] failed to issue voluntary agreements accepting the claim as compensable despite repeated demands and repeated assurances, both orally and in writing, that it would do so . . . failed to pay medical bills . . . despite written acknowledgments that the claim was compensable . . . failed to make indemnity payments after agreeing to make same at workers' compensation hearings . . . [and] attempted to force the plaintiff to settle his workers' compensation claim for far less than its actual value by repeatedly failing to make indemnity and/or medical payments in a timely manner." Bates v. Utica Mutual Insurance Company, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0088925. This court denied the defendant's motion to strike because it found that the allegations amounted "to more than a mere denial of a claim" and that, if proven, the plaintiff's allegations may amount to, in a reasonable person's view, a dishonest or sinister purpose. Id.
Though this court finds instructive the above referenced Superior Court cases, our Supreme Court determinations of what constitutes bad faith, as articulated in De La Concha, as cited in Scapa, and Buckman, as well as this court's prior decision regarding the sufficiency of allegations of bad faith in Bates, direct the manner in which the court will find in this case.
In his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted in bad faith because it "[r]epeatedly and unreasonably" denied payment of the plaintiff's medical bills; refused "to pay [p]laintiff's claim without conducting a reasonable investigation;" ignored the "unanimous opinions of the [p]laintiff's physicians who concluded [his] injuries were caused" by the accident; failed "to investigate [p]laintiff's claim in a reasonable time period;" and that the defendant failed "to have [p]laintiff examined by a medical doctor before determining that [his] injuries were not caused" by the accident. Because of the defendant's alleged actions in bad faith, the plaintiff alleges that he suffered financial losses, emotional anguish, medical and physical consequences. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant had an overall strategy "to frustrate and delay" him in receiving payment for his medical bills.
The plaintiff has significantly amended count one of his complaint in response to this court's previous decision striking count one for failure to allege facts that were legally sufficient to support a claim of bad faith. The amended complaint does allege more specifically and in greater detail what the plaintiff believes to be the defendant's bad faith actions than it appears occurred in Bernard, as here he did more than just state impermissible legal conclusions such as that the defendant acted in bad faith. Bernard v. Buendia, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 04 4003054. However, the plaintiff's amended version of count one still does not rise to the level of legal sufficiency necessary to sustain the plaintiff's objection to the motion to strike. The plaintiff's allegations would not, as they did in this court's decision in Bates, arise to the level necessary to sustain a claim of bad faith. Bates v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0088925.
The plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level necessary to sustain the claim of bad faith, as they did in Bates, for several reasons. The plaintiff fails to allege that the defendant had "an intent to mislead or deceive or defraud." Ravski v. Connecticut State Medical Society, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X01 CV 044000582. Though the plaintiff's allegations may be more than the mere legal conclusions that comprised the first complaint, the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently make any allegations demonstrating "some interested or sinister motive . . . [or] a dishonest purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra. 269 Conn. 433. The plaintiff has done more than "simply deny the plaintiff's claim for benefits," however, his allegations still do not contain the sinister or dishonest attitude necessary to surpass mere negligence, which in itself does not prove bad faith. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bernard v. Buendia, supra, Superior Court Docket No. CV 04 4003054. Though the plaintiff has made allegations which, if proven, may show that the defendant did not fulfill its insurance contract with the plaintiff, the allegations that the plaintiff has made, such as, but not limited to, that the defendant did not reasonably investigate the claim before denying it, that that was not done in a reasonable time period, would not, if proven, show any dishonest purpose or sinister motive on the part of the defendant.
Unlike in Bates, there are no allegations in this case claiming that the defendant committed to make payments, both orally and in writing, and then failed to follow through on that commitment, or any other similar that would show that the defendant acted with the "intent to mislead or deceive or defraud." Ravski v. Connecticut State Medical Society, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury. Docket No. X01 CV 044000582 (January 26, 2005, Sheedy, J.), see also Bates v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 02 0088925. Such actions did, in Bates, clearly show something more than mere negligence. Id. Here, however, the plaintiff's allegations, though, if proven, may show that the defendant did not fulfill its contractual obligations in a reasonable time period, do not evoke any evidence of a sinister motive or dishonest purpose, as the allegations in Bates did by the demonstration that the defendant, in numerous ways, made promises to indemnify the plaintiff which it then broke. Id. Though the plaintiff may have proven that the defendant did something wrong, bad faith requires more than mere negligence, and nothing about the plaintiff's allegations rises to the level necessary to sustain a claim of bad faith.
Even when the plaintiff's allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as they should be in a motion such as this, if proven, the allegations would fail to be a sufficient basis on which to prove a claim of bad faith. Therefore, because the plaintiff has failed to allege a legally sufficient claim of bad faith, the defendant's motion to strike count one of the plaintiff's amended complaint is granted.