Although the contract was amended after Man Sugar became the subcharterer to the Vessel, the F.O.B. delivery term was not among the terms altered. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to find that the F.O.B. terms are responsible for transferring the requisite authority from Man Sugar to Broussard. For an example of a contractor incurring substantially greater costs than initially anticipated when the agreement between the contractor and the vessel's charterers was reached, see Cresent City Marine, Inc. v. M/V Nunki, 20 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 1994). In that case, the contractor was paid $27,644.
. See Admin. Of Tulane, 450 Fed.Appx. at 333 (citing Crescent City Marine v. M/V Nunki, 20 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1994)). Crescent City, 20 F.3d at 669.
Id. at 231. Id. at 231 (citing Crescent City Marine Inc. v. M/V Nunki, 20 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1994); S.C. State Ports Auth. v. M/V Tyson Lykes, 67 F.3d 59, 60 (4th Cir. 1995)). Finally, the Fifth Circuit noted that both the Ninth and Second Circuits require that an entity with authority to bind the vessel direct that the general contractor hire a particular subcontractor in order for that subcontractor to be entitled to a lien, and that other courts had found a subcontractor to be entitled to a lien when subcontractors were identified and accepted by the vessel's owner or charterer prior to performance.
But under the CIMLA's terms, the rebuttable presumption of authority to bind a vessel is only applicable if an agency relationship indeed exists, including one involving apparent authority. See id. ; see also Lake Charles Stevedores , 199 F.3d at 226–27 (analyzing whether usual agency theories applied to trigger the CIMLA's statutory presumption); Crescent City Marine, Inc. v. M/V Nunki , 20 F.3d 665, 668–69 (5th Cir. 1994) (similar). We thus begin with the well-known principles of apparent authority.
In Louisiana law, an agency relationship can be created through express authorization or by an implied appointment arising from apparent authority. See Crescent City Marine v. M/V Nunki, 20 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1994). Though Plaintiffs make a bald assertion that Biomeasure was Ipsen's actual agent, they offer no evidence to support an express authorization for Biomeasure to act as Ipsen's agent with regard to the RFA or Licensing Agreement.
There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the Hornbeck entities authorized or approved Cianbro's actions in subcontracting its fabrication work to Hub, or of Hub's relationship and actions with respect to Dean Steel. None of these actions by Cianbro, Hub, and/or Dean Steel have been shown by Dean Steel to have been taken at the direction or order of the Hornbeck entities. See Crescent City Marine, Inc. v. M/V NUNKI, 20 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1994). As the district court concluded, "(1) Dean Steel has no contractual ties to . . . Cianbro, (2) there is no evidence that [Dean Steel's] selection as a supplier to H[ub] was required or even reviewed by Hornbeck or Cianbro, and (3) [Dean Steel's] performance was not subject to . . . [Cianbro's] or [the Hornbeck entities'] oversight or approval."
To prove apparent authority, Bunge must present evidence that Eleni engaged in some conduct which Bunge could reasonably interpret as a representation to it that Blue Water was Eleni's agent and that as a direct consequence thereof Bunge reasonably relied on Blue Water's purported authority. See Crescent City Marine, Inc. v. M/V NUNKI, 20 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1994), Richard A. Cheramie Enterprises v. Mt. Airy Refining Co., 708 F.2d 156, 158 (5th Cir. 1983). The record contains no evidence of such conduct.
Lake Charles Stevedores, Inc., 199 F.3d at 226. But see Crescent City Marine, Inc. v. M/V Nunki, 20 F.3d 665, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Louisiana mandatary law and general agency law to analyze sufficiency of authority to give rise to maritime lien). "An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act."
Id. at p. 2.Lake Charles Stevedores , 199 F.3d at 231–32 ; see alsoCrescent City Marine Inc. v. M/V Nunki , 20 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir.1994) ; S.C. State Ports Auth. v. M/V Tyson Lykes , 67 F.3d 59, 60 (4th Cir.1995).SeeStevens Tech. Servs., Inc. , 913 F.2d at 1534 ; Galehead, Inc. v. M/V Anglia , 183 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir.1999).
Pursuant to the United States Commercial Instruments and Maritime Lien Act, "[a] person providing necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner — (1) has a maritime lien on the vessel; (2) may bring a civil action in rem to enforce the lien; and (3) is not required to allege or prove in the action that credit was given to the vessel." 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a); accord Crescent City Marine, Inc. v. M/V NUNKI, 20 F.3d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1994). The provision of necessaries includes "repairs, supplies, towage, and the use of a dry dock or marine railway."