Opinion
# 2015-041-027 Claim No. 124339 Motion No. M-86195 Cross-Motion No. CM-86203
03-25-2015
WILLIAM CRENSHAW v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
WILLIAM CRENSHAW Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Inmate/claimant's motion to amend wrongful confinement claim to add cause of action alleging that defendant failed to prepare an Unusual Incident Report following use of force incident which led to claimant's disciplinary hearing and confinement is denied; defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing claim is granted based upon defendant's quasi-judicial hearing absolute immunity.
Case information
UID: | 2015-041-027 |
Claimant(s): | WILLIAM CRENSHAW |
Claimant short name: | CRENSHAW |
Footnote (claimant name) : | |
Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
Footnote (defendant name) : | |
Third-party claimant(s): | |
Third-party defendant(s): | |
Claim number(s): | 124339 |
Motion number(s): | M-86195 |
Cross-motion number(s): | CM-86203 |
Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
Claimant's attorney: | WILLIAM CRENSHAW Pro Se |
Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
Signature date: | March 25, 2015 |
City: | Albany |
Comments: | |
Official citation: | |
Appellate results: | |
See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, an inmate, moves to amend his wrongful confinement claim to add a cause of action alleging that defendant failed to prepare an Unusual Incident Report following a use of force incident at Clinton Correctional Facility (Clinton). Defendant opposes claimant's motion and cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the claim based upon defendant's defense asserting its absolute immunity with respect to claims emanating from a quasi-judicial disciplinary hearing. Claimant has submitted an affidavit in opposition to the defendant's cross-motion.
The claim alleges that on April 24, 2014 claimant was issued a misbehavior report alleging that he had committed violations of Clinton regulations involving a "Direct Order" and "Frisk Procedures." The alleged violations arose after claimant was subjected to a "pat frisk" by a Department of Correction and Community Services (DOCCS) correction officer at Clinton who had allegedly observed claimant "put his arms into an unknown cell as he was exiting C-5 Company to his A.M. Callout."
The claim further alleges that claimant was ordered to stop and place his hands on the wall and that claimant complied. As the correction officer "began to pat frisk inmate Crenshaw to rule out any possible contraband . . . [claimant] spun off the wall to his left in an aggressive manner." The correction officer "took [claimant] to the floor . . . [as claimant] began to struggle violently." The correction officer subdued and placed mechanical restraints on claimant, ending the use of force.
Claimant was charged with violations of Clinton regulations involving a "Direct Order" and "Frisk Procedures." According to the defendant's affidavit in support of its cross-motion, claimant was convicted of the charges after a disciplinary hearing and was thereafter confined. The record on the motions shows that the initial disciplinary hearing determination was administratively affirmed and, according to defendant's attorney, the disciplinary determination was not challenged in an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court.
Prior to the disciplinary hearing, a copy of the Clinton Use of Force Report was provided to claimant and a further copy was admitted into evidence at the hearing. Claimant objected to the Use of Force Report at the hearing because it did not contain an Unusual Incident Report, which claimant alleges was required by applicable Clinton regulations.
CPLR 3025 (b) provides for the amendment of a pleading by a party either by stipulation or leave of court. "Leave shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just." "[I]f the amendment is meritorious and does not cause prejudice or surprise to the nonmoving party, the determination is a discretionary matter which will not be disturbed absent abuse" (Matter of Seelig, 302 AD2d 721, 723 [3d Dept 2003]; see Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959 [1983]).
Claimant's motion to amend his claim to add allegations and/or a cause of action based upon the defendant's failure to create and file an Unusual Incident Report is denied because such allegations fail to state a cause of action and otherwise lacks merit.
Claimant's implication that if defendant had created and filed an Unusual Incident Report it would somehow prove that claimant was not guilty of the disciplinary hearing charges is simply speculation, and is belied by the Use of Force Report which supports defendant's version of the facts that underpinned the disciplinary determination.
The standard for review of the defendant's cross-motion is well-established. "A motion for summary judgment should be entertained only after the moving party has established, by competent admissible evidence, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . If the movant meets this initial burden, the opposing party is required to submit evidence which raises a material issue of fact to preclude an award of summary judgment" (Ware v Baxter Health Care Corp., 25 AD3d 863, 864 [3d Dept 2006]).
Once the moving party has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts and the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a legal or factual issue (Svoboda v Our Lady of Lourdes Memorial Hospital, Inc., 31 AD3d 877 [3d Dept 2006]).
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is founded upon the quasi-judicial immunity defense which provides that where employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary proceedings, "act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations . . . their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Varela v State of New York, 283 AD2d 841 [3d Dept 2001]). This immunity attaches even if the conviction is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful CPLR Article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 215).
If, however, prison officials fail to comply with a rule or regulation governing such disciplinary hearings, absolute immunity may be lost and liability for money damages may be imposed if it is proven that the regulatory violation caused actual prejudice or injury to the inmate (see Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089, 1089 [3d Dept 2009]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825 [3d Dept 2004]).
Importantly, not all disciplinary hearing procedural rules and regulations, if violated, form a basis to abrogate the immunity afforded to employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary proceedings. The rule or regulation must implicate minimal due process protections:
"Notably, there is no right to counsel or to confrontation at prison disciplinary hearings. . . Nevertheless, an inmate is entitled to advance written notice of the charges against him; a hearing affording him a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; a fair and impartial hearing officer; and a written statement of the disposition, including the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken" (Sira v Morton, 380 F3d 57, 69 [2d Cir 2004]).
The Court finds that defendant has met its initial burden on its summary judgment motion by showing that the claimant was afforded a hearing comporting with due process requirements, specifically the provision of relevant documentary evidence at the hearing, including a copy of the Use of Force Report, and by also showing that the initial disciplinary hearing determination was administratively affirmed and not challenged in an Article 78 proceeding.
In both his administrative appeal and his claim for wrongful confinement, claimant alleged that the defendant's correction officers, in conducting the "pat frisk" and in writing the underlying misbehavior report, violated a DOCCS regulation regarding authorization to conduct a "pat frisk."
After careful review, the Court finds that neither the DOCCS Directive setting forth "pat frisk" procedures nor the Directive describing the creation and filing of an Unusual Incident Report involve "statutes and regulations" (Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 214) governing disciplinary hearings, within the meaning of the Arteaga and Sira rulings.
Neither Directive implicates disciplinary hearing minimal due process protections. Rather, each Directive is addressed to the manner in which correction officers interact with, and record interactions with, inmates outside of a disciplinary hearing.
It is further clear that whether or not the correction officer was authorized to conduct a "pat frisk" procedure had no legal bearing on whether the claimant thereafter violated rules regarding a "Direct Order" or "Frisk Procedures" in response to the "pat frisk."
Next, in his proposed amended claim, and in opposition to defendant's cross-motion, claimant adds an allegation that defendant violated a disciplinary hearing rule or regulation because he was unable to submit "relevant documentary evidence at the hearing," because defendant did not create and file an Unusual Incident Report after the incident which led to the disciplinary hearing.
Claimant asserts in his proposed amended claim that the defendant's failure to create and admit into evidence at the disciplinary hearing an Unusual Incident Report caused claimant to be "found guilty at the Superintendent's Hearing held April 30, 2014." In his affidavit in opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion, claimant essentially repeats this allegation, stating that defendant's "failure to complete or file and [sic] Unusual Incident Report amounted to claimant being wrongfully confined."
In essence, claimant unpersuasively argues that he was prevented from submitting a non-existent document at the disciplinary hearing.
Even assuming that defendant should have created an Unusual Incident Report, the claim must be dismissed because claimant presents no evidence that the hypothetical Unusual Incident Report, presumably setting forth the same facts revealed in the Use of Force Report, would have benefitted him in any way at the disciplinary hearing.
Claimant offers only speculative and conclusory statements that the defendant's failure to create and admit into evidence an Unusual Incident Report caused actual prejudice or injury to claimant at the hearing. Claimant thus raises no triable issue of law or fact with respect to the defendant's quasi-judicial immunity defense.
Claimant's motion to file and serve an amended claim is denied. The defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim is granted. The claim is dismissed.
March 25, 2015
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Claimant's Notice of Motion, filed January 12, 2015;
2. Affidavit of William Crenshaw, sworn to January 6, 2015, and annexed exhibits;
3. Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion, filed January 20, 2015;
4. Affidavit of Michael C. Rizzo, sworn to January 16, 2015, and annexed exhibits;
5. Reply Affidavit of William Crenshaw, sworn to January 22, 2015, and annexed exhibit.