Opinion
DA 22-0279
07-26-2022
CREMER RODEO LAND AND LIVESTOCK COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. LINDA MCMULLEN, Defendant and Appellant.
ORDER
Appellant Linda McMullen seeks relief, pursuant to M. R. App. P. 22(2), from the Sixth Judicial District Court's June 24, 2022 order denying stay of its final judgment in part pending appeal. Appellee Cremer Rodeo Land and Livestock Company (Cremer) objects.
Cremer brought the action to establish its claimed right to a prescriptive easement across McMullen's property, commonly known as the "Lien Road." McMullen disputed Cremer's right to the claimed easement. By agreement of the parties, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting Cremer from interfering with or disturbing the status quo and otherwise using the Lien Road on McMullen's property "during the pendency of this case, or until the preliminary injunction is lifted by order of the Court, or upon final resolution of this matter." The parties' stipulation stated in part:
Since 2015, before the lawsuit was filed, Linda maintained a fence and ditch across the Lien Road as it enters her property to prevent traffic on the road on her property. The parties agree and stipulate that that condition represents the status quo-that is, the last "actual, peaceable, non-contested condition"-and that the status quo should be maintained while this action is pending. .
The District Court held a bench trial in May 2021 and entered final judgment on April 27, 2022. The judgment declared that Cremer has a prescriptive access easement over the Lien Road as it runs through McMullen's Sections 3 (T03 N R16 E) and 10 (T03 N R16 E) and over the Medley Spur Road portion within McMullen's Sections 3 (T03 N R16 E) and 10 (T03 N R16 E) for purposes related to the ranching, hunting and guiding activities occurring on Cremer's various surrounding properties. The final judgment directed McMullen to remove fencing or any other obstructions preventing Cremer from making use of its prescriptive easements. It ordered McMullen to replace the cattle guards on the north end of the Lien Road and on the west end of the Medley Spur Road that originally had been set on concrete blocks. The court allowed McMullen to gate the entrance and exits of the Lien and Medley Spur Roads on her property, provided it does not interfere with Cremer's prescriptive access easements. If McMullen chooses to lock any installed gates, the District Court required her to promptly provide a key or passcode to Cremer.
The Medley Road is accessible through McMullen's-property only via the Lien Road.
McMullen filed a notice of appeal and moved for stay of judgment pending appeal. Cremer opposed the stay. In a brief order, and without explanation, the District Court adopted Cremer's proposed compromise, staying the order insofar as it required McMullen(to replace the cattle guards on the north end of the Lien Road and the west end of the Medley Spur Road. It denied the requested stay insofar as the filial judgment allowed Cremer access to the Lien Road and the Medley Spur Road. The court declared that, "[w]hile the appeal is pending, the Cremers shall have the prescriptive access described in ... the Court's Order and McMullen shall be' obligated to remove any fencing or other obstructions preventing Cremers from making use of said prescriptive easements."
McMullen seeks relief from the District Court's refusal to stay its judgment or restore the injunction pending final decision on the merits. Her affidavit in support of the: motion attests that she started ranching the property in 1990, acquired it in 2000, and installed a locked steel gate in 2005, giving Cremer permission to use the gate. McMullen removed the gate and installed a fence across the Lien Road in 2013; she claims that Cremer stated at that time that it did not need or use the road across her property. McMullen constructed a ditch in 2015 to block access after twice removing gates Cremer had installed and replacing her fence. She states that Cremer did not attempt to use the road from 2015 until this action was filed in 2017. McMullen argues that her work on the property has allowed the ground over which the Lien and Medley Roads "once existed" to return to its natural state, full of grass and free of weeds. She maintains that, to preserve the property pending appeal and avoid potentially unnecessary expenses of "unwinding" the ordered alterations if she succeeds, this condition should be allowed to continue until this Court finally resolves the parties' dispute.
Cremer argues, as it did before the District Court, that the "status quo" to be maintained pending appeal is that condition in existence before McMullen first came to own the real property at issue. Cremer contends that McMullen's argument for staying the judgment pending appeal "ignores the expenses Cremer has already endured in having to use alternate, less efficient routes to access its ranchlands due to [McMullan's] ultimately wrongful obstruction in the years both before and during the Injunction's existence."
In reviewing a motion for stay, we are guided by M. R. App. P. 22(2)(a)(i), which requires that an appellant demonstrate good cause for the relief requested. In determining good cause, we generally consider the District Court's explanation and the parties' submissions to determine the relative prejudice to the parties if the trial court's refusal to stay its judgment is overturned. In this case, our review is hampered by the District Court's lack of any explanation, as we are unable to discern its reasons for denying a stay. We similarly are hampered by Cremer's failure to explain-beyond a conclusory assertion- the harm it will suffer by continuing the injunction to which it agreed "while this action is pending." McMullen's affidavit explains the harms she will suffer should her appeal ultimately succeed; Cremer submitted no affidavit or other supporting material in fits opposition and referenced no record evidence for its assertion of expense.
The Court is disinclined to sift through the entire record of the case to satisfy itself whether McMullen has made the required good cause showing. Without findings or reasoning from the trial court or evidentiary support for Cremer's claimed harms, and considering the parties' prior agreement to enjoin Cremer's use of the roads pending "final resolution" of the case, the Court concludes that McMullen has met her burden.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Plaintiff and Appellant's motion for relief from the District Court's June 24, 2022 order, to the extent it denied her request for stay, is GRANTED. The judgment of the District Court shall be stayed pending this Court's consideration of the appeal.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the appeal in this matter otherwise shall continue in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The Clerk of the Supreme Court is directed to give immediate notice of this Order to all counsel of record and to the Hon. Brenda Gilbert, presiding judge.