Because the Court finds there was no evidence to support any constitutional deprivation as alleged by Plaintiff, it need not reach the issue of qualified immunity as it pertains to Defendant Beran's and Defendant Manfredonia's alleged actions. See, e.g., Creighton v. City of New York, No. 12-cv-7454, 2017 WL 636415, at *48 n.49 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017) (“Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he suffered any constitutional deprivation, this Court does not reach Defendants' arguments that they are entitled to absolute or qualified immunity.”); Yap v. Oceanside Union Free Sch. Dist., 303 F.Supp.2d 284, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
generally does not vitiate probable cause.'” McMillan v. Cap. One Bank, N.A., No. 20 CIV. 7981 (NRB), 2022 WL 799661, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2022) (quoting Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395-96 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted), and citing Curley, 268 F.3d at 70 (“[W]e have found probable cause where a police officer was presented with different stories from an alleged victim and the arrestee.”); Creighton v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 7454 (PGG), 2017 WL 636415, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017) (collecting cases)).
Because the Court finds there was no evidence to support any constitutional deprivations as alleged by Plaintiff, it need not reach the issue of qualified immunity as it pertains to Corporal Curatolo's alleged actions. See, e.g., Creighton v. City of New York, No. 12-cv 7454, 2017 WL 636415, at *48 n.49 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017) (“Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he suffered any constitutional deprivation, this Court does not reach Defendants' arguments that they are entitled to absolute or qualified immunity.”)
In accordance with the holding in Russo, district courts in the Second Circuit have recognized that to recover damages for unreasonably prolonged detention, the plaintiff must prove that he would have been released were it not for the defendant's conscience-shocking mishandling of highly significant evidence of the plaintiffs' actual innocence. See Connelly v. Komm, 20-cv-1060, 2022 WL 13679562, at *6 n.9 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2022); Cafasso v. Nappe, 15-cv-920, 2017 WL 4167746, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 20, 2017); Jackson v. City of New York, 29 F.Supp.3d 161, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Creighton v. City of New York, 12-cv-7454, 2017 WL 636415, at *46 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017); Pierre v. City of Rochester, 16-CV-6428, 2018 WL 10072453, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018); Vazquez-Mentado v. Buitron, 12-CV-0797, 2014 WL 12894096, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014). The parties appear to assume that a Russo claim can be brought to recover for unreasonably prolonged imprisonment following a conviction.
(noting that a statement that one “ha[d] no recollection” of a fact “does not constitute a denial”); F.D.I.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 205 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[V]ague denials and memory lapses . . . do not create genuine issues of material fact.”); Creighton v. City of NY, 12-CV-7454, 2017 WL 636415, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding no issue of fact where one witness had a recollection of an event while another witness to same event has no specific recollection “one way or the other”); Percoco v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, 208 F.Supp.3d 437, 440 n.2 (D. Conn. 2016) (“Plaintiff, at various points, fails to admit or deny facts and instead states that she has ‘no knowledge.' . . . The Court deems
Although Plaintiff denies knowledge of this fact, generally a denial of fact may not be supported by a statement that the non-movant lacks memory or knowledge of, or information regarding, the fact. See Genger v. Genger, 663 Fed.Appx. 44, 49 n.4 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (noting that a statement that one “ha[d] no recollection” of a fact “does not constitute a denial”); F.D.I.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 205 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[V]ague denials and memory lapses . . . do not create genuine issues of material fact.”); Creighton v. City of NY, 12-CV-7454, 2017 WL 636415, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding no issue of fact where one witness had a recollection of an event while another witness to same event has no specific recollection “one way or the other”)/
“Where these three elements are established, a court must then decide what, if any, sanction is appropriate.” Creighton v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-7454 (PGG), 2017 WL 636415, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017).
Probable cause exists “when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime,” and “depends, in the first instance, on state law.” Dancy, 843 F.3d at 107 (citations omitted). To determine whether probable cause exists, courts consider the “‘totality of the circumstances' in light of the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Creighton v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 7454 (PGG), 2017 WL 636415, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017) (quoting Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 90 (2d Cir. 2007)). “The question of whether or not probable cause existed may be determinable as a matter of law if there is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the knowledge of the officers....” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). The defendant bears the burden of proving probable cause.
As this Circuit has previously held however, testimony that a nonmovant “does not recall” or that the existence of some fact is “possible” is insufficient to create an issue of material fact where one would not otherwise exist. See FDIC v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Negron v. Suffolk Cty Police Dep't, No. 18-CV-5426 (JS) (ARL), 2020 WL 3506061 at *1 (E.D.N.Y June 29, 2020); Creighton v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-7454 (PGG), 2017 WL 636415 at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017).
; Creighton v. City of NY, 12-CV-7454, 2017 WL 636415, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding no issue of fact where one witness had a recollection of an event while another witness to same event has no specific recollection “one way or the other”); Percoco v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, 208 F.Supp.3d 437, 440 n.2 (D. Conn. 2016) (“Plaintiff, at various points, fails to admit or deny facts and instead states that she has ‘no knowledge.' . . . The Court deems those facts admitted because ‘no knowledge' is a noncognizable response.”)