We agree with the parties that the informal nature of the email communication doesn't necessarily determine whether it was a “final order” within the meaning of § 2342(3)(A). See, e.g., Paskar v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 714 F.3d 90, 97, 99 (2d Cir.2013) (identifying cases in which courts treated agency letters as reviewable final orders); Aerosource, Inc. v. Slater, 142 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir.1998) (stating “letters and other communications can be final orders depending upon the surrounding circumstances and other indicia of finality”); Creed v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Board, 758 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2010) (concluding letter from NTSB general counsel denying Creed's requests to avoid disclosing his medical information in a public meeting was “final order” reviewable under 49 U.S.C. § 1153(a) because “NTSB's decisions about which facts to publicly document” are “central to its investigative duties as mandated by Congress”). Instead, to determine whether the email may be characterized as a final order, we focus on the relevant regulations and the circumstances giving rise to the email.
It is of no import that the parties do not dispute the citizenship determination that provides the foundation for Hobbs Act jurisdiction because "the exclusivity ... of statutory review [does not] depend on the substantive infirmity alleged." City of Rochester , 603 F.2d at 936 ; Creed v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd. , 758 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) ("[T]he specific substantive ground alleged is irrelevant to the application of the special statutory review provision." (citing City of Rochester , 603 F.2d at 936–37 )).
It is of no import that the parties do not dispute the citizenship determination that provides the foundation for Hobbs Act jurisdiction because "the exclusivity . . . of statutory review [does not] depend on the substantive infirmity alleged." City of Rochester, 603 F.2d at 936; Creed v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 758 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) ("[T]he specific substantive ground alleged is irrelevant to the application of the special statutory review provision." (citing City of Rochester, 603 F.2d at 936-37).
There is no reason to force Plaintiffs in this case to refile their action in the D.C. Circuit, especially where it would only exacerbate the timeliness issue, and where they had at least a colorable argument for filing in this court in the first instance. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) ; Creed v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 758 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C.2010). Accordingly, the Court finds that it serves the interests of justice to transfer this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 and 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a).