Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 99-420 REF: ALL CASES SECTION "L" (1)
August 20, 2002
ORDER REASONS
Before the Court are Defendant's motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc.30) and Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Rec. Doc. 40). For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED AS PREMATURE. reserving Defendant's right to reurge the motion at a later date. if appropriate.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 14, 1998. Obedean Crear was working as a member of the crew aboard Defendant's vessel. M/V WILLARD P. LEBOUGH. While so engaged, a structure on the vessel known as the stern pipe came loose and struck him on the head. Crear originally filed suit in this Court under the Jones Act and general maritime law, alleging severe head, neck and back injuries, mental illness, and substantial claims for lost future earning capacity. Defendant generally denied that Plaintiff suffered injuries or sustained damages and denied liability.
This relatively routine Jones Act case became complicated when, on June 24, 1999 Crear killed his grand mother by striking her multiple times with a hatchet at her home in Moss Point. Mississippi. A Mississippi jury recently found Crear "not guilty due to insanity."
In December of 2001. the eight children of Crear's deceased grandmother filed this suit. alleging that the actions of the defendant in causing Crear's head injury and in failing to supply him with prompt and proper treatment caused his insanity which resulted in his grandmother's death. According to Plaintiffs. "[t]he sole and proximate [cause] of [Crear's] act was the negligence of the defendant in injuring Obedean Crear and in failing to live up to its obligations under the General Maritime law, thus exacerbatinu his mental impairment." See Complaint, ¶ VIII. Plaintiffs seek both compensatory damages for the loss of their mother, as well as punitive damages under Mississippi law.
This suit has been consolidated with Crear's Jones Act suit.
Defendant moves to dismiss the claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant argues that these claims are governed by general maritime law and that Crear's intentional act. i.e., the murder of his grandmother, was an unforeseeable, superseding cause of harm for which Omega is not liable. Additionally. Defendant asserts that the elements of damages Plaintiffs now seek, i.e., loss of society and punitive damages. are not recoverable under general maritime law. Defendant also asserts that "because Crear was a Jones Act seaman, maritime law prohibits state law from supplementing general maritime law and providing additional remedies to plaintiffs. See Defendant's Memo. in Support of Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, at 2. Finally, Defendant argues that the statute of limitations has run on any Mississippi state law claims.
Defendant has also moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defendant argues that there is no medical evidence to support Plaintiff's theory that the accident of May 14, 1998 caused a psychiatric injury and that "there cannot be a clearer case of superseding cause than in this case." The parties have agreed that further discovery is necessary before the issues raised in Defendant's motion for summary judgment can be fully addressed. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED AS PREMATURE, reserving the right of the Defendant to reurge the motion at a later date.
II. LAW ANALYSIS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint based on the "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, assuming all factual allegations to be true. See Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750. 754 (5th Cir. 1999). Rule 12(b)(6) motions are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. See Id. A complaint may not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Lowrey v. Texas A M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997)).
A. Admiralty Jurisdiction
Because Crier's injury occurred on a vessel and the plaintiffs' alleged damages happened on land it is appropriate to first determine whether admiralty jurisdiction is applicable. Historically, admiralty jurisdiction hinged exclusively on location. "The traditional test for admiralty tort jurisdiction asked only whether the tort occurred on navigable waters. If it did, admiralty jurisdiction followed; if it did not, admiralty jurisdiction did not exist." See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1995). The significance of determining admiralty jurisdiction in tort law is not only to establish the availability of a federal forum but also to determine the applicable substantive law. A holding that a particular occurrence is within the admiralty jurisdiction generally amounts to a holding that the law governing that occurrence is the substantive maritime law.
The traditional policy justification for applying substantive maritime law within the admiralty jurisdiction was an overarching interest in promoting uniformity. See generally Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982) (discussing "the need for uniform rules governing navigation").
Notwithstanding the degree of certainty and predictability which the "locality" test afforded, commentators began to question the advisability of a jurisdictional rule for maritime torts based entirely on the situs of the injury or damage. Benedict voiced early concerns over the strict locality rule in his treatise on admiralty, noting "[i]t has nevertheless been doubted whether the civil admiralty jurisdiction, in cases of tort. does not depend upon the relation of the parties to some ship or vessel and embrace only those tortious violations of maritime right and duty which occur in relation to vessels to which the admiralty jurisdiction in cases of contract applies." 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 171 (7th ed. 1995)
This comment became known as "Benedict's celebrated doubt."
Courts responded by creating exceptions to the strict locality test. An early exception emerged in 0'Donnell v. Great Lakes Drudge Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943). where the Supreme Court held that the liability of an employer to furnish medical care and to provide subsistence to the disabled seaman until he reaches maximum cure is not limited by the locality rule. In O'Donnell the Court noted:
[t]he maritime law, as recognized in the federal courts, has not in general allowed recovery for personal injuries occurring on land. But there is an important exception to this generalization in the case of maintenance and cure. From its dawn, the maritime law has recognized the seaman's right to maintenance and cure for injuries suffered in the course of his service to his vessel, whether occurring on sea or on land.
The extension inland of the doctrine of seaworthiness is another example of a judicial exception to the locality rule. This exception was first recognized by Judge Learned Hand in Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950) where a longshoreman was allowed to recover for injuries received while standing on a wharf when a ship's gear failed and caused a hatch cover to fall on him. The Supreme Court also sanctioned the shoreside extension of the doctrine of seaworthiness in Gutierrez v. Waterman Sreawship Co., 373 U.S. 206, 210 (1963), allowing a longshoreman to recover for injuries he received while working on a wharf when he slipped on beans that had leaked out of broken sacks.
Congress eventually addressed the locality issue with the passage of the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act 46 U.S.C. § 740. The Act provides that "[t]he admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on on navigable waters. notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land" See 46 U.S.C. App. § 740 (emphasis added). Thus, after the Extension Act, the "location" test for admiralty jurisdiction is satisfied if the act occurred on navigable water or if the injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable waters, See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534.
The Supreme Court eventually refined admiralty jurisdiction to include a "nexus" or "maritime flavor" element. See generally Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). In Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990). the Court applied admiralty jurisdiction to tort claims stemming from a fire that started on a pleasure boat but ultimately caused damage to several structures, including a nearby land-based marina. Focusing on the "connection with maritime activity," the Court developed a two-part test to determine "nexus." First, a court must "assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether such an incident is likely to disrupt commercial activity." See Id. at 363. Second, the court must examine the general conduct from which the incident arose" to determine whether there is a "substantial relationship between the activity giving rise to the incident and traditional maritime activity." See Sisson. 497 U.S. at 364.
This nexus element reflects a gradual alignment of admiralty tort and contract jurisdiction. Unlike tort, admiralty contract jurisdiction is not contingent upon locality, instead "the true criterion is the nature and the subject-matter of the contract." See New England Mutual Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1, 26 (1970). See also 1 Thomas 1. Schoenbaum. Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-10, at 119-20 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that "admiralty jurisdiction over contracts has been conceptual rather than spatial. and if a contract is maritime, it will be within the jurisdiction").
In the present case, both prongs of the nexus inquiry are easily satisfied. First, Crier's injury involves the alleged negligence of a vessel owner and the unseaworthiness of a vessel. Both of these allegations have a "potentially disruptive impact on commercial activity." Second. the "general conduct from which the incident arose," i.e., alleged negligence and unseaworthiness of Defendant's vessel and the Defendant's alleged failure to fulfill its duty of maintenance and cure. clearly bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.
The location component presents a more complex question in this case. Here, Plaintiffs seek damages for the death of their mother — an event which occurred "on shore" in Moss Point, Mississippi over one year after Crear's alleged accident aboard the M/V WILLARD P. LEBOUGH. While the Extension Act extended jurisdiction to injuries suffered on land if caused by a vessel on navigable waters, earlier cases imposed temporal and spatial limits on admiralty jurisdiction. See Gutierrez, 373 U.S. at 210 (finding maritime jurisdiction where "shipowner commits a tort while or before the ship is being unloaded, and the impact of which is felt ashore at a time and place not remote from the wrongful act"): see also Duluth Superior Excursions, Inc. v. Makela, 623 F.3d 1251, 1253 n. 5 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that "[a]lthough it might be argued that the injury is remote from the wrongful act, the accident occurred some six minutes after the [vessel] docked, on a street that adjoined the dock").
The Supreme Court has. however, more recently rejected the argument that the "damage must be close in time and space to the activity that caused it." See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 535. Citing the "demerits of this argument," the Court in Grubart instead adopted the "classic tort notion" of proximate cause as the appropriate limit to admiralty jurisdiction. The Court noted that "its use should obviate not only the complication but even the need for further temporal or spatial limitations." See Id. at 536. See also 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 3-5, at 93 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that "[t]he Court rejected the argument that the injury and the wrongful act must be close in time and space to be within admiralty jurisdiction").
In the present case, the injuries sustained, while far removed in time and space from the "injury-causing event," may nevertheless have been proximately caused by the Defendant's negligence or the unseaworthiness of the Defendant's vessel. The scope of proximate cause in maritime cases involving land based injuries has been discussed in a recent smate of "dram shop" cases, involving passengers who are served excessive amounts of alcohol on vessels, often "floating casinos," and after disembarking are involved in "on shore" automobile accidents. Courts have routinely held that admiralty jurisdiction applies to these cases because the injuries sustained in the land-based automobile accidents are proximately caused by the provision of alcohol on the vessel. See, e.g., Young v. Players Lake Charles, L.L.C., 47 F. Supp.2d 832, 834 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding the location prong satisfied because "the alleged negligence, the serving of copious amounts of alcohol on the casino boat, occurred on navigable waters"); Bay Casino, L.L.C. v. M/V Royal Empress, 199 F.R.D. 464, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying admiralty tort jurisdiction over claims arising from motor vehicle accident where alleged negligence was "the provision of large amounts of alcohol to an underage customer attending [a] gambling cruise"); Horak v. Argosy Gaming Co., No. 99-1941, 2002 WL 1559095, at *6 (Iowa July 17, 2002) (finding admiralty' jurisdiction over automobile accident where the "harm complained of — the sale and service of alcohol to an intoxicated adult — occurred on a vessel"); Quinn v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 815 So.2d 963, 966 (La.Ct.App. 3d Cir. 2002) (applying admiralty jurisdiction and finding that the provision of alcohol "was a proximate cause of the collision which resulted in [the decedent's] death"); see generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., of Incidents, Activities, and Maritime Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential Exegesis, 56 La. L. Rev. 519, 520 (1996) (describing evolution of maritime jurisdiction and noting that "a basic dram shop claim became a maritime tort claim as a result of the [Extension Act]"); see also In re Horizon Cruises Litig., 101 F. Supp.2d 204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (claims for injuries resulting from illness sustained at sea fail within admiralty jurisdiction "notwithstanding the fact that the "victims did not exhibit symptoms until they had come ashore"), Harp v. Pine Bluff Sand Gravel Co., 750 So.2d 226, 229 (La.Ct.App. 3d Cir. 1999) (applying admiralty jurisdiction to land-based business owners claims of economic loss stemming from vessel's collision with bridge). But compare Complaint of Luhr Bros., 100 F. Supp.2d 1156, 1161 (E.D.Mo. 2000) (finding "locality prong clearly lacking" because of the remote time and place of the accident and "the lack of any facts that indicate that the injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water").
Similarly, courts will apply the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA") if negligence begins on the high seas, although death or other damages occur much later on land. As the Fifth Circuit explained in Motts v. M/V Green Wave, 210 F.3d 565, 571 (5th Cir. 2000), "[t]his Circuit's precedents look only to the location of the accident in determining whether DOHSA applies . . . as long as the decedent is still on the high seas at the time the negligence begins, DOHSA must apply to post-accident negligence."
The Court recognizes that there is only "partial overlap" in the analyses used to determine admiralty jurisdiction and that used to determine the applicability of DOHSA, but finds the rationale in DOHSA cases such as Motts, instructive in this unusual case.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that this incident falls within admiralty jurisdiction. The alleged damages were "consummated on land" but were allegedly "caused by a vessel on navigable waters." The incidents complained of — maritime negligence and/or unseaworthiness, and failure to provide maintenance and cure — have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce and the general character of the activity shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.
B. Damages
Defendant asserts that because Plaintiffs' claims fall within admiralty jurisdiction, "the application of substantive admiralty law preempts the application of state law" and damages for loss of society and other nonpecuniary damages are not available. According to the Defendant. "because Mr. Crear was a seaman, state law may not supplement the general maritime law and "even if plaintiffs do state a claim, their damages should be limited solely to their pecuniary losses." See Defendant's Memo. in Support of Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, at 13.
The present case is governed by the Supreme Court's ruling in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). In Yamaha twelve year old Natalie Calhoun was killed in a collision in territorial waters off Puerto Rico while riding a jet ski manufactured by Yamaha. Natalie's parents, residents of Pennsylvania, filed a federal diversity and admiralty action for damages against Yamaha, invoking Pennsylvania's wrongful death and survival statute. The manufacturer contended that state remedies were not applicable because the incident occurred on navigable waters within admiralty jurisdiction and general maritime law controlled to the exclusion of state law.
The Court recognized that the matter was within admiralty's domain and with admiralty jurisdiction generally comes the application of substantive admiralty law. Nevertheless, the Court observed that "the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction . . does not result in automatic displacement of state law". see, Yamaha, 116 S.Ct. at 623. In Yamaha the Court made a distinction between seafarers — Jones Act seamen and longshoremen — and non-seafarers. Id. Since Congress has not prescribed remedies for the wrongful death of non-seafarers in territorial waters, the Court concluded that state statutes were applicable to them. Id. at 623. See also Kelly v. Bass Enterprises Production Co. et. al. 17 F. Supp.2d 591, 595 (F D. La. 1998).
In the present case Plaintiffs seek damages for the wrongful death of their mother. Parnell Crear. a non-seaman whose death occurred on land. Yamaha teaches, that where, as here, Plaintiffs' claims stem from the death of a non-seafarer. and Congress has not prescribed a comprehensive remedy for such claims, state law may supplement general maritime law. See, e.g.. In re Plaquemine Towing Corp., 190 F. Supp.2d 889, 893 (M.D. La. 2002) ("[D]ue to the fact that the ferryboat passengers in this case are not seamen and are not covered by any of Congress' maritime statutes, under Yamaha, their spouses' claims for loss of consortium are governed by general maritime law and supplemented by any applicable Louisiana state law."); Liner v. Dravo Basic Materials Co., No. Civ. 00-1908, 2000 WL 1693678, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2000) (explaining that "Yamaha stands for the proposition that non seamen, those not covered by Congressional statute, pursuing a claim resulting from an accident in state territorial waters, may supplement that claim under general maritime law with applicable state law."). According, in this case. Plaintiffs' claims relative to the death of their mother may be supplemented by applicable state law.
Defendants remaining arguments are directed to whether the death of Mrs. Crear was the result of an unforeseeable, superseding cause and whether Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred under Mississippi state law. Neither of these issues is ripe for disposition at this time. The issue of causation is pregnant with facts, and is more appropriately raised after further discovery, at the summary judgment phase. Plaintiffs have not articulated which theories or causes of action they are pursuing under Mississippi state law, and neither party has fully briefed the timeliness of any potential state law claims. Accordingly, both issues are properly reserved, to be reurged, if appropriate, at a later date.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED AS PREMATURE, reserving Defendant's right to reurge the motion at a later date.