If such owner or keeper knew, or ought to have known, that the animal had dangerous propensities, that is sufficient as it is not essential, in order to fasten liability upon them, that they have notice of a previous injury to others. Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506, 30 Am. Rep. 692; Creamer v. McIlvain, 89 Md. 343, 43 A. 935, 45 L.R.A. 531, 73 Am. St. Rep. 186; Looney v. Bingham Dairy, 70 Utah, 398, 260 P. 855, 75 Utah, 53, 282 P. 1030, 73 A.L.R. 427. Under the rule stated, the judgment as to defendant Mrs. Stepp must be reversed.

As was said in Manzoni v. Douglas, 6 Q.B.D. 145, at page 153, "To hold that the mere fact of a horse bolting is per se evidence of negligence would be mere reckless guesswork." Button v. Frink, 51 Conn. 342. Luks v. American Ice Co. 267 Penn. St. 337, 343. Creamer v. McIlvain, 89 Md. 343, 355. Kimble v. Stackpole, 60 Wn. 35, 40. There are expressions to the contrary. Dennery v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co. 53 Vroom, 517. Gorsuch v. Swan, 109 Tenn. 36. Crawford v. Upper, 16 Ont. App. 440.

"The notice which will charge the owner or keeper with liability for the vicious conduct of the animal must be notice that it was inclined to do the particular mischief that has been done." In Creamer v. McIlvain, 89 Md. 343, 43 A. 935, 45 L.R.A., 531, 73 Am. St. Rep., 186, the court said: "A horse of ordinary spirit that will not run away under any circumstances would be a rare animal, and to hold that simply because one did run off on one occasion a jury would be justified in finding that he was vicious, wild, or prone to run, would enable jurors to find verdicts on mere speculation and guesses, instead of evidence."

Goodwin v. E.B. Nelson Grocery Co. 239 Mass. 232. Osborne v. Chocqueel, 2 Q.B. 109. Nor will an action lie for such harm sustained, unless the owner or keeper knew or should have known of the animal's vicious habits; and knew or should have known from the acts done that it was likely to commit an act of the kind concerning which the action is brought. Copeland v. Draper, 157 Mass. 558. Lynch v. Richardson, 163 Mass. 160. Eastman v. Scott, 182 Mass. 192. Cox v. Burbidge, 13 C.B. (N.S.) 430. Creamer v. McIlvain, 89 Md. 343; 45 L.R.A. 531. Benoit v. Troy Lansingburgh Railroad, 154 N.Y. 223. Applying the law to the case at bar, we find no evidence to warrant a finding that the horse had a vicious habit which was shown by other acts of kicking, or that it was generally vicious in a way which should have warned the defendant that it probably would kick some one.

The rule of law here invoked cannot be applied to the state of facts disclosed by the foregoing evidence. The following cases fully support the ruling of the trial court: Button v. Frink, 51 Conn. 342;Quinlan v. Sixth Avenue R.R. Co., 4 Daly, 487; Gollwald v. Bernheimer, 6 Daly, 212; Gray v. Tompkins, 15 N.Y. Supp. 953; Cadwell v. Arnheim, 152 N.Y. 182; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442;Bennett v. Ford, 47 Ind. 264; O'Brien v. Miller, 60 Conn. 214;Creamer v. McIlvain, 89 Md. 343;Herrick v.Sullivan, 120 Mass. 576; Miller v. Cohen, 173 Pa. St. 488; Holmesv. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261.