Opinion
No. 01 Civ. 4110 (GBD)
January 17, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Donald E. Creadore, a resident of New York, filed a tort action against Defendant Shades of Light ("SOL"), a Virginia corporation and commercial retailer of light fixtures, on May 14, 2001, alleging negligence in the manufacture, design, inspection, distribution, labeling, promotion, and sale of a floor lamp that allegedly caused plaintiff severe and permanent injuries. SOL subsequently filed a third-party action against the manufacturer of the floor lamp, Mario Industries Inc. ("Mario"), a Virginia corporation, on October 19, 2001, demanding indemnification of any judgment filed against SOL as a result of plaintiff's lawsuit. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint on October 22, 2001, joining Mario to its negligence action. On November 16, 2001, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against both defendants adding claims of strict liability and breach of implied warranty of merchantability and seeking both regular and exemplary damages based on alleged gross negligence. On June 14, 2002, plaintiff moved for leave to add claims for punitive damages in a third amended complaint. Defendants oppose plaintiff's motion. For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff's motion is hereby DENIED.
Leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. Leave to amend pleadings "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Leave should generally be granted and denied only in limited circumstances. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) ("In the absence of any apparent or declared reason . . . the leave sought should, as the rules require, be `freely given'."). "Undue delay and futility of the amendment, among other factors, are reasons to deny leave." John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Amerford Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1994). Other factors include "bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, [and] undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment." Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Defendants in this case claim that plaintiff's amendment would be futile as a matter of law. They challenge plaintiff's application for leave on the ground that an amendment seeking punitive damages would not be justified given the factual allegations of the case.
This court has diversity jurisdiction of this case and New York law applies. See Imbrogno v. Chamberlin, 89 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). Under New York law, punitive damages are recoverable in negligence actions and strict liability actions that are founded on a failure to warn. Home Ins. v. American Home Prod. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 935 (N.Y. 1990). Punitive damages may be awarded only "when a defendant's conduct is so reckless or wantonly negligent as to be the equivalent of a conscious disregard of the rights of others." Dumesnil v. Proctor Schwartz, 606 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (App.Div. 1993). Plaintiff must show "egregious and willful conduct" by the defendants that is "morally culpable, or is actuated by evil and reprehensible motives." Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1961).
Plaintiff's lawsuit stems from the purchase by his mother of a floor lamp, manufactured by Mario, and sold through a catalog distributed by SOL. (Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. at 3.) The floor lamp was given to plaintiff as a gift. Id. The lamp, which had arrived disassembled, was put together by plaintiff's father at plaintiff's apartment. (Dep. of E. Donald Creadore at 23.) On or about January 16, 2000, while plaintiff attempted to hide some errant electrical cord under the base of the floor lamp, the glass shade of the lamp fell and struck plaintiff, causing personal injuries. (Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. at 3-4.).
Plaintiff alleges both negligence and strict liability due to a failure to warn. He attempts to justify punitive damages by pointing to several examples of allegedly egregious conduct. None of the conduct alleged, however, could reasonably be found to be wanton or gross negligence that manifests a conscious disregard of the rights of others.
Certain factual assertions in this case are disputed. For purposes of this motion, however, the Court will take all of plaintiff's allegations as true.
First, plaintiff points to the fact that the designer of the lamp, Joseph Seminerio, is "self-taught" and "has undertaken no particular activity [such as a training seminar or trade school] . . . that would qualify him as a designer of lighting fixtures of any type." (Pl.'s Aff. in Supp. of Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff asserts that this goes to the issue of competency and demonstrates "an indifference to issues of consumer product safety." (Pl.'s Reply Aff. at 4-5.)
However, there is no legal requirement that lamp designers avail themselves of any training seminars, trade school or professional organizations. Moreover, in Seminerio's deposition, provided to the Court by plaintiff in his moving papers, it is made clear that Mr. Seminerio had been designing lamps for fifteen years, (Dep. of Joseph Seminerio at 8, Aff. of Robert J. Anders, Ex. B), and studied general product design at the Ridgwood School of Art. Id. at 15. Nothing about Mr. Seminerio's training or the fact that he designed the lamp at issue in this cases suggests moral culpability.
Second, plaintiff points to the absence of any warning label affixed to the lamp or its packaging notifying potential buyers that it required assembly, that assembly should be conducted with the and of instructions, or that assembly should not be attempted if parts are missing. (Pl.'s Aff. in Supp. of Mot. at 4.) Plaintiff argues that "[t]he absence of this type of warning label violates accepted [Underwriters Laboratories ("UL")] guidelines and establishes a gross indifference to the issue of product safety on the part of the manufacturer." Id. at 5.
The lack of warning labels may be helpful in establishing negligence on the part of the manufacturer. However, it is far from an indication that the manufacture acted recklessly or with evil intentions, as required for punitive damages. It is undisputed that the lamp in question arrived disassembled in its package. The fact that it required assembly would have been obvious to the average consumer. The absence of any warning that such assembly is preferably done with instructions, and with all of the required parts, would not constitute gross negligence warranting punitive damages. Indeed, a strong argument exists that no warning label was even required. See Scardefield v. Telsmith Inc., 699 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238 (1999) (noting "settled rule that a manufacturer owes no duty to warn users of obvious risks and dangers inherent in the use of a product").
That the lack of the warnings may violate UL guidelines also does not establish gross indifference. Underwriters Laboratories is an independent, not-for-pro fit organization that promulgates minimum safety standards for various industries. See Underwriters Laboratories Inc., About Underwriters Laboratories (Jan. 16, 2003), available at www.ul.com. Its guidelines are not mandated by law and are purely voluntary. See Pfeiffer v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1133, 1136 (D. Kansas 1991) (noting that safety standards issued by UL are voluntary, do not have the force of law, and are not entitled to the presumption of validity which would be accorded administrative regulations.) The fact that a manufacturer has not followed voluntary UL guidelines does not conclusively establish regular negligence let alone gross indifference to product safety. See Bauer v. Female Acad. of Sacred Heart, 767 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (N.Y. 2002) (noting that violation of statute under certain circumstances may of itself establish negligence). of course, whether the lack of a warning label constituted negligence is an issue for the trier of fact in this case. However, no trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the lack of a warning label constituted such moral culpability so as to justify punitive damages.
Next, plaintiff argues that the assembly instruction sheet for the lamp in question was grossly inadequate. It notes that the instruction sheet lacked any identifying information of the product or its manufacturer, that it failed to properly identify the parts comprising the product, and that the illustrations for certain parts on the instruction sheet differed in appearance from the actual parts. (Pl.'s Aff. in Supp. Mot. at 5-9.) Plaintiff argues that the instruction sheet was so unclear that it could lead a purchaser to assemble the lamp improperly. Id.
The adequacy of the product's instruction sheet, however, is irrelevant to the case at bar. Plaintiff acknowledges in his moving papers that no instruction sheet was ever found when the product was open. Id. at 9. Plaintiff's father also testified in his deposition that he never found an instruction sheet when he assembled the lamp. (Dep. of E. Donald Creadore at 25.) It is clear that any injuries caused by the lamp in this case were not the result of the inadequacy of its instruction sheet. Since the inadequacy of the instruction sheet is irrelevant to prove negligence in this case, it bears little relevance as to whether the nature of defendants' conduct warrants potential punitive damages.
To the extent that a poorly labeled and poorly designed instruction sheet has any relevance to defendants' conduct to the public at large, it is insufficient to justify punitive damages. At most the inadequate instruction sheet would justify a finding of carelessness. It would not justify a finding of moral culpability.
Plaintiff also asserts that the lack of an instruction sheet is indicative of gross negligence. He argues that the lack of instructions violated guidelines established by UL and other accredited agencies. (Pl.'s Aff. in Supp. of Mot. at 9-10.) Plaintiff makes the similar assertion regarding defendants' other alleged violations of UL guidelines. Plaintiff claims that while the accused lamp was sold with a UL label, Mario has no record establishing that the proper UL label was attached or that the product sufficiently met the standards required for such a label to be attached. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff also notes that UL has cited Mario for various other violations unrelated to the lamp at issue in this case. Id. at 13-15. As discussed earlier, however, the fact that defendants may have violated voluntary safety guidelines is not sufficient to support punitive damages.
Finally, plaintiff argues that both defendants lack quality control policies and that this manifests an indifference to consumer product safety. Id. at 10. He contends that SOL merely affixes its own shipping label over the shipping label of the manufacturer and perform no quality control of its own. Id. at 10-11, 17. Plaintiff claims that this "deceptive practice" obliterates any manufacturer markings, making it difficult for a potential plaintiff to properly assert a claim. (Pl.'s Reply Aff. at 4.)
SOL's conduct, however, merely reflects a common market practice. Gift products, such as lamps and frames, "are not as identifiable by consumers as the more mass brands, partially because of the industry's third-party nature: a manufacturer makes a product to sell to independent retailers, who then re-label the product with their stores' own tags and sell it to consumers, who rarely know where their gift product originates." Rachael Kelly, The Brand Plan, Giftware Business, Sept. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 11261831. Indeed, "most gift product[s are] meant to be stylish, yet anonymous." Id.
Plaintiff's concern that a manufacturer will be unidentifiable in the event of personal injury is belied by the circumstances of the case at bar. The identifiable defendant, the retailer, in order to avoid sole legal responsibility will almost always join the manufacturer in a case. In addition, as plaintiff acknowledged in his papers, the product in this case was affixed with a UL label. Potential plaintiffs could always contact UL directly and request the manufacturer information for the particular label. These facts therefore fail to establish a basis to find a wonton disregard for the rights of others.
With regard to Mario, plaintiff asserts that it too had inadequate quality control practices. Plaintiff points to deposition testimony that indicated that Mario's president would only visit the factory floor from time to time. (Pl.'s Aff. in Supp. of Mot. at 11.) In addition, Mario failed to keep records of any of these visits. Id. While Mario claims to use a checklist to ensure that its products have been properly assembled, plaintiff complains that Mario was only able to produce a representative checklist, providing no indication that it was used for the lamp in question or that it was even created at the time the lamp was produced. Id. at 11, 15.
Mario claims that the checklist provided was indeed being used when the lamp was produced. (Def. Mario's Answering Aff. at 6.) It also notes that it is a family business in which six individuals were responsible for product packaging, thus requiring only limited quality control practices. Id. at 7. Whether Mario's assertions are true and whether plaintiff's allegations make out a case for negligence under these circumstances is an issue for the trier of fact to determine. However, as plaintiff acknowledges, some effort was made to supervise the production and packaging of the lamp. Plaintiff's allegations, even if taken as true, does not evince a gross indifference to the rights of others.
Even taken together, plaintiff's claims do not justify punitive damages. Ultimately this case is about an injury allegedly caused by a defective lamp. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to conclude that this is an inherently dangerous product, for which ordinary carelessness or negligence might be found to rise to the level of gross indifference. Nor has plaintiff alleged any facts indicating that the public at large has been threatened or injured by defendants' conduct, thereby justifying the deterring effects of punitive damages. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. American Home Prod. Corp., 550 N.E.2d 930, 934 (N.Y. 1990) ("[P]unitive damages are intended to act as a deterrent to the offender and to serve as a warning to others. They are intended as punishment for gross misbehavior for the good of the public."). In light of this, no trier of fact could reasonably conclude that punitive damages are warranted. Plaintiff's request for punitive damages would therefore be futile.
Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint is DENIED.
SO ORDERED