Opinion
LLICV156012852S
10-19-2017
CRCM, LLC v. Alexandra Lange
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#116)
Hon. John D. Moore, J.
I
INTRODUCTION
This case arises out of a breach of an alleged contract between the plaintiff, CRCM, LLC, (plaintiff or counterclaim defendant, depending on the context) and the defendant, Alexandra Lange (defendant or counterclaim plaintiff, depending on the context), for the construction of an addition onto the defendant's home. On May 19, 2017, the court initially denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. On June 6, 2017, the court granted the defendant's motion for reconsideration of its decision denying summary judgment. Reargument of the motion for summary judgment took place on June 26, 2017. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Counsel for the parties have referred to the plaintiff as CFCM, LLC in various filings, but CRCM, LLC remains the name of the plaintiff as reflected on the court docket.
II
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff filed a two-count complaint with a return date of November 3, 2015. The first count sounded in breach of contract, and the second count in unjust enrichment. A set of factual allegations common to both counts averred that, during May 2013, the plaintiff " entered into a contract with [the] defendant for the construction of an addition to the defendant's home, " that the plaintiff completed its obligations under the contract and was due payments totaling $41,004.19 as a result, and that the defendant failed to make such payments. The first count alleged that by failing to make payments when due, the defendant breached the contract with the plaintiff. The second count, while incorporating all previous allegations, also claimed that the plaintiff sought compensation for " interest on materials necessary for completion of the contract charged on the Plaintiff's business credit card." The second count alleged that the credit card charges totaled $3,500.
The defendant answered and filed special defenses and a counterclaim on December 31, 2015. In her answer, the defendant admitted that she entered into a contract with the plaintiff during May 2013, for the construction of an addition on her home, but claimed that the contract was an oral one. The defendant denied all other pertinent allegations of the complaint.
Among the defendant's other pleadings, the first special defense is directly relevant to this motion. In the first special defense, the defendant made the following allegations. The contract between the parties was subject to the Home Improvement Act; General Statutes § 20-418 et seq. (the Act). The plaintiff failed to comply with the Act in the following ways: the contract was not written or signed by both parties; the plaintiff never provided a document to the defendant that listed the parties' entire agreement; the plaintiff failed to state the date of the transaction on any document; the plaintiff failed to state the start and completion dates for the project on any document; the plaintiff failed to provide the defendant with its contractor's license number; and the plaintiff failed to provide the defendant with notice of her cancellation rights. As a result of its violations of the Act, the plaintiff is barred from any recovery against the defendant.
Count one of the defendant's counterclaim is also relevant to the court's consideration of this motion. In that count, the defendant, as counterclaim plaintiff, made the following pertinent allegations. In or around April 2013, the counterclaim plaintiff contracted with the counterclaim defendant to perform several home improvement projects at her property. In or around April 2013, the counterclaim defendant " commenced work on the Counterclaim Plaintiff's property." On or about early June 2014, the " Counterclaim Defendant ceased performing any further work for the Counterclaim Plaintiff."
The plaintiff denied all relevant allegations of the first special defense, and asserted that it was a " Construction Manager as opposed to a contractor." The plaintiff admitted in its answer to the defendant's fourth special defense that the defendant paid a portion of the balance due upon the contract, but claimed that the defendant still owes the plaintiff $41,004.19. In its answer to the defendant's counterclaim, the plaintiff also admitted that in or around April 2013, the plaintiff and defendant contracted for the plaintiff to be involved in several home improvement projects at the defendant's residence, but denied that the plaintiff was hired to perform improvement projects. Rather, the plaintiff alleged that it was hired to serve as a construction manager, whose job was to supervise and oversee contractors as project manager. The plaintiff also admitted that work began on or about April 2013 and that the work ended in or about June 2014.
The plaintiff's responses to the defendant's answer, special defenses, and counterclaim are found in two pleadings; #104 and #107.
On December 15, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law in support as to the allegations against her contained within the plaintiff's complaint. On January 30, 2017, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion. On February 10, 2017, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's objection. On February 14, 2017, the court heard argument at short calendar. On May 19, 2017, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was a home improvement contractor pursuant to the Act. Subsequently, on June 6, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to reargue/reconsider, which was granted by the court on the same day. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was reargued before this court on June 26, 2017.
On June 27, 2017, new counsel appeared for the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant in addition to the appearance already on file for the plaintiff. On August 18, 2017, new counsel for the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant filed a request for leave to amend its answer to the counterclaim and to raise new special defenses to the counterclaim (#130). The defendant/counterclaim plaintiff did not object to this request.
By doing so, the new attorney for the plaintiff was amending only docket entry #104 and not #107.
For purposes of considering the instant motion, the new response to the counterclaim effected only the most minor of changes. In filing #130, the plaintiff/counterclaim defendant now admits that it contracted with the counterclaim plaintiff " regarding" several home improvement projects to be completed at the counterclaim plaintiff's property. The previous version of this admission stated that the counterclaim defendant contracted with the counterclaim plaintiff to be involved with this project. The admissions concerning the beginning and end point of the construction remain the same.
III
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A
Contentions of the Parties
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's complaint because the plaintiff acted as a home improvement contractor and did not comply with the Act, thus, the plaintiff cannot sustain an action against the defendant. The defendant cites to the plaintiff's complaint to provide evidence for the proposition that the parties " entered into a contract . . . for the construction of an addition to the defendant's home . . ."
Additionally, the defendant makes the following specific contentions. The construction of a residential addition is a " home improvement" under the Act. The contract between the parties was oral and the plaintiff has not produced a written contract that contained the entire agreement between the parties. The plaintiff never provided, in contract form, the start and end dates of the project, a home improvement contractor's license number, or notice of the defendant's cancellation rights. Moreover, the defendant claims that the manner in which the plaintiff failed to comply with the Act bars the plaintiff from recovering damages under either a contractual or quasi contractual theory, including unjust enrichment. According to the defendant, the plaintiff did not comply with the applicable subsections of the Act that would have permitted recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment.
The defendant supported her motion with an affidavit she executed. In this affidavit, the defendant swore that the plaintiff never provided her with a single document that contained the entire agreement between the parties, and that the plaintiff failed (a) to state the start and completion date of the project on any document, (b) to provide the defendant with a home improvement contractor's license number, and (c) to provide the defendant with notice of her cancellation rights. The affidavit also attested that this action arises from work performed at the defendant's home.
The defendant also attached copies of what purports to be the plaintiff's home improvement contractor licenses that expired on November 30, 2014, and November 30, 2015, respectively. Although these documents purport to establish that the plaintiff is a licensed home improvement contractor, they are not certified copies and the defendant's affidavit failed to provide any sworn evidence to authenticate these documents. Documents in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment may be authenticated in a variety of ways, including, but not limited to, a certified copy of a document or the addition of an affidavit by a person with personal knowledge that the offered evidence is a true and accurate representation of what its proponent claims it to be. Practice Book § 17-46; Conn. Code Evid. § 9-1(a); Bruno v. Geller, 136 Conn.App. 707, 714-15, 46 A.3d 974, cert. denied, 306 Conn. 905, 52 A.3d 732 (2012). As a result, the court will not consider them for purposes of deciding this motion.
The plaintiff countered only with legal arguments. The plaintiff makes the following contentions. The plaintiff acted as a " project manager, " overseeing the construction of an addition to the defendant's property by nineteen other contractors. While the other entities were subject to the Act, the plaintiff, as project manager, was not. In support of this proposition, the plaintiff argues that a project manager is akin to a subcontractor, and subcontractors are not subject to the Act. In further support of this proposition, the plaintiff claims that the defendant paid the other contractors directly. The plaintiff additionally posits, however, that the defendant owes the plaintiff money.
The plaintiff cited to interrogatory answers to support its claims of what the other contractors did, but did not attach these responses and, because they were not attached, could not authenticate them. See footnote 4 of this opinion. The court, therefore, cannot consider these interrogatory responses.
The plaintiff also argues that the defendant acted in bad faith. The plaintiff cites various cases that hold that a consumer's bad faith may prevent the Act from operating to undermine a contractor's claim against the homeowner. The plaintiff then (1) states, in conclusory fashion, that the defendant is trying to hide behind the Act to commit fraud on the plaintiff, (2) surmises why the defendant may be doing this, and (3) refers to several interrogatory responses to support the claim that the plaintiff was in constant contact with the defendant. Nevertheless, the plaintiff submitted no affidavits to support any of these contentions, and did not attach the interrogatory responses. The plaintiff admits that the defendant made payments to it. Most significantly, there is no contract or purported contract attached to the memorandum of law in opposition to this motion.
B
Legal Standard for Deciding Summary Judgment
The Practice Book section on motions for summary judgment, § 17-49, requires that judgment be rendered for the movant " if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meyers v. Livingston, Adler, Pulda, Meiklejohn & Kelly, P.C., 311 Conn. 282, 289-90, 87 A.3d. 534 (2014). " The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).
" [T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " Once the movant shows the nonexistence of any material fact, 'a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue . . . Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment].' . . . Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 202, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995)." Credit One, LLC v. Head, 117 Conn.App. 92, 100-01, 977 A.2d 767, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 907, 982 A.2d 1080 (2009). Neither can a party " successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment by . . . rely[ing] solely on allegations that contradict those offered by the moving party, whether raised at oral argument or in written pleadings; such allegations must be supported by counter affidavits or other documentary submissions that controvert the evidence offered in support of summary judgment." GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 178, 73 A.3d 742 (2013). " Mere statements of legal conclusions . . . and bald assertions, without more, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact capable of defeating summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Coolbeth, 147 Conn.App. 183, 193, 81 A.3d 1189 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 925, 86 A.3d 469 (2014). " To oppose a motion for summary judgment successfully, the nonmovant must recite specific facts . . . which contradict those stated in the movant's affidavits and documents." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut, 167 Conn.App. 347, 358, 143 A.3d 638 (2016).
Conversely, when a party moves for summary judgment " and there [are] no contradictory affidavits, the court properly decide[s] the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the [movant's] affidavits and other proof." Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 795, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).
" [U]nadmitted allegations in the pleadings . . . do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact on a motion for summary judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Lantz, 129 Conn.App. 437, 449, 20 A.3d 88 (2011). Nevertheless, an admission in the defendant's answer is a judicial admission conclusive on the defendant, and the matter admitted is not in issue. Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, 161 Conn. 191, 199, 286 A.2d 308 (1971); see Thomas v. Collins, 129 Conn.App. 686, 691, 21 A.3d 518 (2011) (" [a]n admission in pleading dispenses with proof, and is equivalent to proof" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, " [f]actual allegations contained in pleadings upon which the cause is tried are considered judicial admissions and hence irrefutable as long as they remain in the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) West Haven Sound Development Corporation v. West Haven, 201 Conn. 305, 312, 514 A.2d 734 (1986).
IV
DISCUSSION
The court must first deal with the issue of the belated request to amend the counterclaim defendant's answer and special defenses to the counterclaim. At first blush, it seems blatantly unfair to allow a party to submit an amended pleading after a summary judgment has been argued. However, under the circumstances in this case, as set forth below, and pursuant to binding precedent, the court will consider the amended answer and special defenses to the counterclaim when deciding the instant motion.
As set forth supra, the new counsel for the counterclaim defendant filed the request on August 18, 2017, almost two full months after the motion for summary judgment was reargued. Although this request appears to be so late as to be almost unsporting, the court notes that the counterclaim plaintiff did not object. When the adverse party does not object to a request to amend, the trial court has no discretion to deny such a request, absent extraordinary circumstances. Darling v. Waterford, 7 Conn.App. 485, 487, 508 A.2d 839 (1986). Moreover, even when the court has such discretion, our Supreme Court has advised that the " trial court may be well-advised to exercise leniency when" the amendment is filed in response to a motion for summary judgment, rather than on the eve of trial. Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 216-17, 455 A.2d 857 (1983). The most compelling reason to consider the amendment for purposes of this motion is that it effects no substantive changes to the judicial admissions made by the counterclaim defendant's previous counsel. The only change is in the answer to the first paragraph of the counterclaim and consists of the insertion of the word " regarding" in place of the phrase " to be involved with" to express the contractual relationship of the counterclaim defendant to the home improvement project at the counterclaim plaintiff's home. Given the case law cited immediately above and the fact that the amendment makes no substantive change to judicial admissions made by the plaintiff that are relevant to the court's consideration of this motion, the court will take the amended pleading into account while deciding this motion.
The court will now consider the application of the Act to the arguments made in this motion.
" [T]the [A]ct provides that a home improvement contract is not enforceable against a homeowner, either by way of an action for breach of contract or for unjust enrichment, unless the contract complies with the mandatory writing requirements of General Statutes § 20-429(a)." Andy's Oil Service, Inc. v. Hobbs, 125 Conn.App. 708, 714-15, 9 A.3d 433 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 928, 16 A.3d 703 (2011). In particular, § 20-429(a)(1)(A) provides in relevant part: " No home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner unless it: (i) [i]s in writing, (ii) is signed by the owner and the contractor, (iii) contains the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor, (iv) contains the date of the transaction, (v) contains the name and address of the contractor and the contractor's registration number, (vi) contains a notice of the owner's cancellation rights . . . (vii) contains a starting date and completion date, (viii) is entered into by a registered salesman or registered contractor, and (ix) includes a provision disclosing each corporation, limited liability company, partnership, sole proprietorship or other legal entity . . . in which the owner or owners of the home improvement contractor are or have been a shareholder, member, partner, or owner during the previous five years."
Nevertheless, Connecticut courts recognize a " bad faith" exception to the bar of recovery pursuant to § 20-429(a). " The statutory language of the Home Improvement Act does not provide a bad faith exception to compliance with the [A]ct, but our courts have incorporated such an exception into the statute. This exception excuses a contractor's noncompliance with the [A]ct if the contractor's failure to comply was caused by the other party's bad faith." Connecticut Home Health Services, LLC v. Futterleib, 172 Conn.App. 182, 191, 160 A.3d 352, 358 (2017). " [P]roof of a homeowner's bad faith will preclude that homeowner from repudiating with impunity a home improvement contract that violates the [A]ct." Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 224 Conn. 240, 247-48, 618 A.2d 506 (1992). Our Supreme Court has recently stated that the Act does not " override the general principle embodied in the bad faith exception: that an individual should not profit from his own deceptive and unscrupulous conduct . . . Thus, [p]roof of bad faith . . . serves to preclude the homeowner from hiding behind the protection of the [A]ct." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burns v. Adler, 325 Conn. 14, 34, 155 A.3d 1223 (2017).
Accordingly, the defendant will be entitled to summary judgment on both the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims if there is no genuine issues of material fact that: (A) a " home improvement contract" existed between the parties that failed to comply with the requirements of § 20-429(a); and (B) that she did not act in bad faith.
A
Home Improvement Contract
The phrase " home improvement contract" is defined by the Act to mean " an agreement between a contractor and an owner for the performance of a home improvement." General Statutes § 20-419(5). The Act defines " contractor" as " any person who owns and operates a home improvement business or who undertakes, offers to undertake or agrees to perform any home improvement. 'Contractor' does not include a person for whom the total price of all of his home improvement contracts with all of his customers does not exceed one thousand dollars during any period of twelve consecutive months." General Statutes § 20-419(3). Under the Act, " home improvement" is defined as including, but not being limited to, " the repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, modernization, improvement, rehabilitation or sandblasting of, or addition to any land or building or that portion thereof which is used or designed to be used as a private residence; dwelling place or residential rental property, or the construction, replacement, installation or improvement of driveways, swimming pools, porches, garages, roofs, siding, insulation, sunrooms, flooring, patios, landscaping, fences, doors and windows, waterproofing, water, fire or storm restoration or mold remediation in connection with such land or building or that portion thereof which is used or designed to be used as a private residence, dwelling place or residential rental property or the removal or replacement of a residential underground heating oil storage tank system, in which the total price for all work agreed upon between the contractor and owner or proposed or offered by the contractor exceeds two hundred dollars." General Statutes § 20-419(4).
General Statutes § 20-419(4) also defines what " home improvement" does not include, however, these further definitions are not applicable to the present case.
Notwithstanding these unambiguous definitions, the plaintiff argued that " project managers" are not subject to the Act's definition of " contractors" pursuant to § 20-419(3), because " project managers" are akin to subcontractors, which are not subject to the Act. Although subcontractors are not subject to the Act; see Meadows v. Higgins, 249 Conn. 155, 166, 733 A.2d 172 (1999); Taylor v. King, 121 Conn.App. 105, 994 A.2d 330 (2010); this principle does not establish that project managers are also excluded. The plaintiff did not endeavor to establish the similarities between a " project manager" and a " subcontractor." Indeed, the plaintiff's memorandum provided no law supporting this argument nor has the court's research found any.
In the present case, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the parties entered into a " home improvement contract" pursuant to § 20-419.
To establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the defendant relies, in part, upon the plaintiff's own pleadings, including allegations made in the plaintiff's complaint and answers given in response to the counterclaim. Unamended allegations, West Haven Sound Development Corporation v. West Haven, supra, 201 Conn. 312 and answers, Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, supra, 161 Conn. 199, are conclusive as judicial admissions. In particular, the plaintiff has alleged, (and the defendant has admitted in her answer), that in May 2013, the parties " entered into a contract . . . for the construction of an addition to the defendant's home . . ." The plaintiff, as counterclaim defendant, has admitted the allegations in the counterclaim that work on the addition began in April 2013 and ceased in June 2014. Furthermore, the plaintiff admitted in its answer to the defendant's fourth special defense that the defendant paid a portion of the balance due upon the contract, but that she still owes the plaintiff $41,004.19. These admissions establish the undisputed factual conclusion that the plaintiff was a contractor under the Act because it contracted to participate in the construction of an addition on the defendant's home. § 20-419(3). The admissions also establish that (1) the plaintiff was the defendant's contractor for more than twelve months: from April 2013, until June 2014, and (2) within the last twelve-month period, because the defendant owed the plaintiff more than $41,000 for work performed, that the plaintiff had a contract with the defendant that exceeded $1,000. § 20-419(3). Likewise, it cannot be disputed that the contract was for home improvement because it was undertaken explicitly for an " addition" to the defendant's home. § 20-419(4).
The plaintiff has also alleged in its complaint that the defendant owes the plaintiff this much money for performance of this contract and $3,500 for monies charged on plaintiff's credit cards for the project.
Moreover, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the home improvement contract is unenforceable against the defendant because the plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of § 20-429(a). See Andy's Oil Service, Inc. v. Hobbs, supra, 125 Conn.App. 714-15. The defendant's uncontroverted affidavit establishes that the plaintiff failed to: (a) state the start and completion dates of the project on any document, (b) provide the defendant with a home improvement contractor's license number, and (c) provide the defendant with notice of her cancellation rights. The plaintiff had an opportunity to produce a written contract that complied with § 20-429(a) as an attachment to its objection, yet, failed to do so. These violations render the home improvement contract unenforceable against the defendant. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact that a " home improvement contract" existed between the parties that failed to comply with the requirements of § 20-429(a).
B
Bad Faith Exception
The defendant is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact that the bad faith exception to the Act is inapplicable. " [P]roof of a homeowner's bad faith will preclude that homeowner from repudiating with impunity a home improvement contract that violates the [A]ct." Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, supra, 224 Conn. 247-48. " [B]ad faith on the part of the homeowner is an exception to what might otherwise be a harsh lesson to the home improvement contractor unable to recover due to a violation of the [A]ct. The central element giving rise to this exception is the recognition that to allow the homeowner who acted in bad faith to repudiate the contract and hide behind the [A]ct would be to allow him to benefit from his own wrong, and indeed encourage him to act thusly. Proof of bad faith therefore serves to preclude the homeowner from hiding behind the protection of the [A]ct." Habetz v. Condon, 224 Conn. 231, 237, 618 A.2d 501 (1992). " Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive . . . Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
" [I]t is the burden of the party asserting the lack of good faith to establish its existence and whether that burden has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of fact." Id., 237 n.11. " There is a requirement . . . that a contractor prove that the homeowner acted in bad faith. The mere fact that the contractor provided goods and services that the homeowner ultimately did not pay for, in and of itself, is not evidence of the homeowner's bad faith." Burns v. Adler, supra, 325 Conn. 14, 38 n.16. " [E]ven with respect to questions of motive, intent and good faith, the party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for his argument in order to raise a genuine issue of fact." Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, supra, 224 Conn. 250.
In the present case, the plaintiff has neither pleaded nor presented any evidence in support of a claim of the defendant's bad faith. In fact, the plaintiff has only raised bad faith as an argument in opposition to this motion. There is, therefore, no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant did not act in bad faith.
Although the defendant did not argue legal insufficiency in her motion, a recent, well-reasoned decision of the Superior Court held that insufficient pleading of bad faith in a case involving the Act rendered the complaint subject to a motion to strike. Deitch Energy, LLC v. Ernest Johnson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-16-6071728-S (July 10, 2017, Noble, J.) [64 Conn. L. Rptr. 713, ]. More importantly, the plaintiff has submitted absolutely no evidence to support its contention of bad faith and relies solely on its unsubstantiated arguments. In attempting to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendant's bad faith, the plaintiff (1) states that the defendant is trying to hide behind the Act to commit fraud on the plaintiff, (2) speculates as to why the defendant may be doing this, and (3) refers to several interrogatory responses to support the claim that the plaintiff was in constant contact with the defendant. However, the plaintiff failed to attach these interrogatory responses and submitted no affidavits to back up any of these contentions. Likewise, nothing else properly before the court on the instant motion, including, but not limited to, the defendant's affidavit and the aforementioned undisputed allegations of the plaintiff create a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendant's bad faith. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the bad faith exception does not preclude the Act's bar on the plaintiff's recovery.
V
CONCLUSION
The defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to both the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims because there are no genuine issues of material fact that a home improvement contract existed between the parties that failed to comply with the requirements of § 20-429(a), and that the defendant did not act in bad faith.
SO ORDERED.