Crawford v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc.

2 Citing cases

  1. Woodward v. City of Gallatin

    58 F. Supp. 3d 862 (M.D. Tenn. 2012)   Cited 2 times

    Further, this Court has previously noted that the Sixth Circuit and the Tennessee Court of Appeals both prohibit the use of T.C.A. § 20–1–119 when the potential nonparty tortfeasor is identified through a means other than an original defendant's answer. Crawford v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., No. 3:10–0030, 2010 WL 2901740, at *4 (M.D.Tenn. July 23, 2010) (citing Schultz v. Davis, 495 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Grindstaff v. Bowman, 2008 WL 2219274, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. May 29, 2008) )). Section 20–1–119 will only operate to lift the limitations bar when the pleading of comparative fault identifies the tortfeasors sufficiently to enable service of process upon them. See id.

  2. Moreno v. City of Clarksville

    No. M2013-01465-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    The City argues that judicial interpretations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 do not allow for "equivalent" or "analogous" methods of compliance. The City cites cases holding that an attorney's letter is not an answer for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, Grindstaff v. Bowman, No.E2007-00135-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2219274, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2008); a discovery response is not an answer for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, Shaffer v. Memphis Airport Authority, No.W2012-00237-COA-R9-CV, 2013 WL 209309, at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013), Crawford v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., No. 3:10-0030, 2010 WL 2901740, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. July 23, 2010); and that a motion to dismiss is not an answer for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, Johnson v. Trane U.S. Inc., No.W2011-01236-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 4436396, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2013). The City offers these cases in support of the notion that the notice of claim is not an original complaint under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119.