Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3467-14T4
01-27-2016
DON R. CRAWFORD, JR., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY; NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE; SUPERINTENDENT COLONEL RICK FUENTES, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPER K. SAGANOWSKI, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPER J. HALL, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPER F. LANE, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPER M. BAGGS, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPER M. GOLENEICKI, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPER T. WELSH, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; THE CITY OF BURLINGTON; THE BURLINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; CHIEF JOHN LAZZAROTTI, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; SERGEANT TRUMBETTI, in his official, personal, and individual capacities; OFFICER BIDDLE, in his official, personal, and individual capacities, Defendants-Appellants.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for appellants (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, and Marvin L. Freeman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Shelley L. Stangler, P.C., attorneys for respondent (Judith L. Rosenthal, of counsel and on the brief; Shelley L. Stangler, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Yannotti and St. John. On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-0114-12. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for appellants (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, and Marvin L. Freeman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Shelley L. Stangler, P.C., attorneys for respondent (Judith L. Rosenthal, of counsel and on the brief; Shelley L. Stangler, on the brief). PER CURIAM
We granted the State of New Jersey leave to appeal from a January 29, 2015 order of the Law Division compelling it to produce 373 Internal Affairs files (the IA files) of the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) requested by plaintiff, Don R. Crawford, Jr. The IA files to be produced are "regarding complaints against troopers for excessive force, assault and complaints against troopers investigating domestic violence incidents," during the period from January 15, 2005 to January 15, 2010. The order permitted plaintiff "to inspect, redact and copy" the IA files.
On January 15, 2010, plaintiff suffered various wounds, including a fractured ankle, while being arrested by a NJSP trooper. On October 25, 2012, plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the above-captioned defendants. The complaint contained several claims, including a claim for excessive force and a claim for violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2. Specifically, plaintiff's NJCRA claim alleged that defendants "ratified and maintained a practice, custom and/or policy of failing to train[,] discipline, and/or supervise the trooper defendants . . . in conformity with clearly established constitutional principles which govern their conduct, including proscriptions against the use of excessive force in effecting seizures of unarmed persons." Plaintiff further alleges that
The NJCRA is New Jersey's equivalent of the Federal Civil Rights Act (FCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and is intended to provide "a remedy for the violation of substantive rights found in our State Constitution and laws." See Brown v. State, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op. at 26-27) (quoting Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 474 (2014).
defendants acted with deliberate and conscious indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights, which violations arise out of a pattern of custom, policy and practice by and of defendants . . . in allowing the use of excessive force, permitting and condoning the use of excessive force and violation of police procedures as well as the failure to properly hire, train and supervise police officers in the proper conduct of their duties and in the use of force.
We begin our analysis by reviewing some basic principles concerning discovery. "An appellate court applies 'an abuse of discretion standard to decisions made by [the] trial courts relating to matters of discovery.'" C.A. ex rel. Applegrad v. Bentolila, 219 N.J. 449, 459 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)). As a result, "[w]e generally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law." Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J. Super. 68, 80 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005)). In civil actions,
[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . . It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; nor is it ground for objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which discovery is sought.
[R. 4:10-2(a).]
"New Jersey's discovery rules are to be construed liberally in favor of broad pretrial discovery." Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 535 (1997) (citing Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50, 56 (1976) ("Our court system has long been committed to the view that essential justice is better achieved when there has been full disclosure so that the parties are conversant with all the available facts.")). Nonetheless, "the scope of discovery is not infinite." K.S. v. ABC Prof'l Corp., 330 N.J. Super. 288, 291 (App. Div.), motion for leave to appeal denied, 174 N.J. 409 (2000). Rather, it is limited to information, "not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action[.]" R. 4:10-2(a). Relevant evidence is "evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action." N.J.R.E. 401.
Even in the absence of a privilege that precludes discovery, our courts have recognized circumstances under which discovery should not be permitted. See, e.g., Dixon v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 110 N.J. 432, 439, 454-55 (1988) (explaining that plaintiff bringing a gender discrimination claim "ought not to be entitled to a general inquisition into the University's [confidential and peer review] files merely on the strength of having filed a complaint[,]" and that a trial court must first "satisfy itself that the discrimination charge is valid and the material requested is relevant") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134, 141-42 (App. Div. 2001) (explaining that, before compelling an internet service provider to disclose the identity of an anonymous internet poster who posted allegedly defamatory material, the court "must balance the defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity").
We have addressed discovery of confidential personnel files in both criminal and civil matters. In criminal cases, when a defendant demands to inspect a police officer's personnel file, the trial court must balance the public interest in maintaining confidentiality of police personnel records and the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation. State v. Harris, 316 N.J. Super. 384, 397-98 (App. Div. 1988). In such a situation, a court must conduct an in camera inspection of the file once the defendant has advanced "'some factual predicate which would make it reasonably likely that the file will bear such fruit and that the quest for its contents is not merely a desperate grasping at a straw.'" Id. at 398 (quoting State v. Kaszubinski, 177 N.J. Super. 136, 141 (Law Div. 1980)). "It is generally not necessary for a defendant to establish that the personnel file actually contains relevant information so long as the proper factual predicate has been met." Ibid.
In Bayer v. Twp. of Union, 414 N.J. Super. 238, 273-74 (App. Div. 2010), we tacitly approved, in the context of a civil case, the court's in camera review of police personnel files demanded by the plaintiff during discovery. We upheld the trial court's denial of plaintiff's discovery request because, after conducting the in camera review of all of the files, "[t]he court concluded that nothing in the materials reviewed was relevant to plaintiff's claims against the Township . . . ." Ibid.
In McClain v. College Hospital, the Court considered whether the investigatory records of a state licensing board should be released for use in a civil proceeding. 99 N.J. 346, 351 (1985). The Court held that such records should be released where there is a
particularized need that outweighs the public interest in confidentiality of the investigative proceedings, taking into account (1) the extent to which the information may be available from other sources, (2) the degree of harm that the litigant will suffer from its unavailability, and (3) the possible prejudice to the agency's investigation.
[Ibid.]
The Court noted that, when the inquiry revolves around law enforcement investigatory information, the situation "invites case-by-case consideration of whether access would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest." Id. at 357.
With the foregoing discovery principles in mind, we turn to the trial court's opinion. In its oral decision, the court determined that plaintiff was "entitled to a full review of all documents that may lead to discoverable evidence," not just documents which may be used at trial. However, for the following reason, we conclude the trial court mistakenly exercised its discretion.
Although we reject the State's blanket rationale as to why the IA files should not be disclosed, we nevertheless are compelled to remand the matter to the Law Division for further proceedings. Here, the trial court did not explicitly weigh the balancing factors in its ruling or subsequent order with respect to each of the IA files.
More importantly, the court did not conduct an in camera review of the IA files to first determine the relevancy of each file by judging whether each file contains "evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action." N.J.R.E. 401. Further, once a document is deemed relevant, the trial judge is required to "examine each document individually and make factual findings with regard to why [a plaintiff's] interest in disclosure is or is not outweighed by [the State's] interest in nondisclosure." Keddie v Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 54 (1997); see also Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 142 N.J. 356, 381-82 (1995) (dealing with sealing of documents in civil cases concerning health, safety, and consumer fraud, and noting, "[t]he need for secrecy must be demonstrated with specificity as to each document . . . . The trial court, or a master appointed for such purpose pursuant to Rule 4:41-1 to -5, must examine each document individually and make factual findings").
When a New Jersey trial court reviews documents in camera, it must "make specific determinations regarding plaintiff's access to them, including an expression of reasons for the court's rulings." The trial court must examine each document individually, and explain as to each document deemed privileged why it has so ruled.
[Seacoast Builders Corp. v. Rutgers, 358 N.J. Super. 524, 542 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Payton, supra, 148 N.J. at 550).]
When stating the reasons for nondisclosure, a judge should "state with particularity the facts, without disclosing the secrets sought to be protected, that . . . persuade the court to seal the document or continue it under seal." Hammock, supra, 142 N.J. at 382. However, where a judge is unable to reveal factual findings without disclosing the confidential material sought, the disclosure of those factual findings can be sealed for appellate review, thus permitting a meaningful determination by us whether the judge correctly exercised his or her discretion. See Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 258 N.J. Super. 573, 589 (1992).
In cases where a judge adopts findings of a master, the master's report itself should contain the required level of detail. --------
We note that, subsequent to issuing the January 29 order compelling discovery of the IA files, the court denied defendant's motion for a stay. In a comprehensive opinion in connection with the denial order, the court weighed the competing interests of the parties and considered the potential prejudice each might suffer. It found that plaintiff "asserted a valid need" for the IA files, and that disclosure was unlikely to prejudice defendant. However, because the court never conducted an in camera review of the IA files, it could not make specific determinations about which specific files, and which documents in those files, were relevant and discoverable.
We therefore remand the matter to the trial court with directions to review the IA files in camera and render a decision making specific reference to particular documents or groups of documents and provide factual findings, if necessary, in the form of a separate sealed decision. Only then can we effectively review the factual basis of the judge's decision and determine whether he "'abused [his] discretion after weighing the competing considerations of the balancing test.'" Shuttleworth, supra, 258 N.J. Super. at 588 (quoting State v. Milligan, 71 N.J. 373, 384 (1976)). The IA files, and any specific reference to the contents of the IA files made by the court following an in camera review, shall remain under seal pending any subsequent appeal.
Remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION