Crawford v. State

9 Citing cases

  1. State v. Robertson

    No. A23A1012 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2023)

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Crawford v. State, 301 Ga.App. 633, 637 (2) (688 S.E.2d 409) (2009); see Sandoval v. State, 264 Ga. 199, 200 (2) (c) (442 S.E.2d 746) (1994) (finding the admission of challenged evidence harmless where the testimony of eyewitnesses made evidence against defendant overwhelming, despite the existence of conflicting evidence).

  2. Austin v. State

    356 Ga. App. 839 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times
    Noting that the application of the rule of lenity in one case does not necessarily mean that another defendant convicted of the same offense will be entitled to the rule of lenity

    Although Austin contends that Thompson was not a credible witness, "arguments that go to the weight and credibility that the jury wished to assign to the State's otherwise sufficient evidence present no basis for reversal."Crawford v. State , 301 Ga. App. 633, 636 (1), 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). Nor was the jury required to accept Austin's alternative hypothesis that Thompson was involved in a drug-dealing scheme.

  3. Thomas v. State

    355 Ga. App. 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Crawford v. State , 301 Ga. App. 633, 635 (1), 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009). Accordingly, provided the record shows "some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary" to establish the crime of kidnapping, we will affirm the the jury's verdict.

  4. Logan-Goodlaw v. State

    331 Ga. App. 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 7 times

    “[A]rguments that go to the weight and credibility that the jury wished to assign to the State's otherwise sufficient evidence present no basis for reversal.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Crawford v. State, 301 Ga.App. 633, 636(1), 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009). We find the evidence set forth above sufficient to find Logan–Goodlaw guilty of armed robbery.

  5. Morris v. State

    330 Ga. App. 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 2 times

    (Citation omitted.) Crawford v. State, 301 Ga.App. 633, 635(1), 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009). Given Officer Greenewold's identification of Morris, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Morris was the driver.

  6. Jones v. State

    329 Ga. App. 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 5 times
    Rejecting sufficiency argument that identification of defendant was suspect given that victim saw only perpetrator's eyes during robbery

    Former OCGA § 24–14–8 (2013) (formerly OCGA § 24–4–8 ) provides that, generally, “[t]he testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.” To that end, the reliability of the clerk's identification would go to the credibility and weight of his testimony, a matter which is within the province of the jury, not an appellate court. Crawford v. State, 301 Ga.App. 633, 636(1), 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009). “[A]rguments that go to the weight and credibility that the jury wished to assign to the State's otherwise sufficient evidence present no basis for reversal.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.)

  7. Parrott v. State

    318 Ga. App. 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to excuse juror for cause when "juror indicated that her bias was against the nature of the crime rather than against [the defendant personally], and because she said she could determine the issues fairly based upon the evidence presented"

    Absent such an inference, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. See generally Billings v. State, 278 Ga. 833, 835(4), 607 S.E.2d 595 (2005) (detective's indication in videotape that he found defendant's statements unbelievable was deemed unlikely to trigger an inference regarding defendant's decision not to testify at trial); Crawford v. State, 301 Ga.App. 633, 636–637(2), 688 S.E.2d 409 (2009) (given prior testimony on a closely related subject, a witness's later hearsay statement was deemed unlikely to raise a jury inference as to defendant's guilt). 2.

  8. Bell v. State

    703 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that State's explanation that it struck prospective juror because his job was technical in nature and technical people tend to “overthink” was race-neutral

    Id. See also Overton v. State ("[a] motion for a directed verdict of acquittal should be granted only when there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law"). Crawford v. State, 301 Ga. App. 633, 635 (1) ( 688 SE2d 409) (2009).Overton v. State, 270 Ga. App. 285, 289 (3) ( 606 SE2d 306) (2004).

  9. L.B. v. State (In re L.B.)

    381 P.3d 625 (Nev. 2012)

    To the extent appellant invites this court to reconsider our prior holdings, see, e.g., Steese v. State, 114 Nev. 479, 498, 960 P.2d 321, 333 (1998) ; Wise, 92 Nev. at 183, 547 P.2d at 315, and conclude that eyewitness testimony alone is insufficient as a matter of law to support an adjudication, we decline to do so. See U.S. v. Frampton, 382 F.3d 213, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (rejecting contention that based on “recent developments,” testimony of a single, uncorroborated eyewitness standing alone is insufficient to support a conviction); Crawford v. State, 688 S.E.2d 409, 410–11 (Ga.Ct.App.2009) (arguments regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification pertain to the credibility of the witness and weight to be given the testimony, a province of the jury); Gorman v. State, 968 N.E.2d 845, 847–50 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (rejecting contention that in light of unreliability of eyewitness testimony, eyewitness' testimony is insufficient to sustain a conviction). Further, while we recognize that eyewitness testimony may in some instances be unreliable, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1967) ; White v. State, 112 Nev. 1261, 1266, 926 P.2d 291, 294 (1996) (Rose, J., dissenting), we do not agree that it cannot serve as the basis for an adjudication that comports with due process, see Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 716, 728 (2012).