Opinion
24A-CR-714
08-21-2024
Cornelius Crawford, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana Steven J. Halbert Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Helen W. Marchal, Judge The Honorable Matthew E. Symons, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D26-2312-CM-34378
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Talisha R. Griffin
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana
Steven J. Halbert
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Kathy Bradley
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges May and Pyle concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Brown, Judge.
[¶1] Cornelius Crawford appeals his domestic battery conviction and asserts the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend its charging information. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On December 9, 2023, Crawford was intoxicated and asleep on the couch in the duplex where he lived in Indianapolis with his wife A.C., their child, and A.C.'s child from a previous relationship. A friend of A.C. picked up the children to take them out for dinner. Crawford woke up as the children were leaving, became angry because he did not want them to leave with A.C.'s friend, and demanded that A.C. retrieve the children. A.C. did not leave. Crawford walked to a liquor store and returned to the duplex fifteen to twenty minutes later. He was angry, yelling, screaming, and aggressive. He demanded that A.C. retrieve the children, and she told him "no" and that she "was about to get ready for work." Transcript Volume II at 32.
[¶3] Crawford picked up a piece of "Hotwheel track," which was about eight to ten inches long, and "started swinging it at" A.C. Id. The track was "a child's toy . . . racecar track" and was made of "[h]ard plastic." Id. Crawford struck A.C. with the piece of plastic track on her right shoulder blade, she turned around, and he struck her stomach with the track. When he struck her, "it hurt." Id. At 34. A.C. went upstairs, locked herself in a bathroom, and contacted the police. When A.C. heard the police "banging on the door," she went downstairs, Crawford asked her not to open the door, and she opened the door and exited the duplex. Id. An evidence technician took photographs of A.C.'s injuries.
[¶4] On December 10, 2023, the State charged Crawford with domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. The information alleged: "On or about December 9, 2023, CORNELIUS CRAWFORD did knowingly touch [A.C.], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner[.]" Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 16. The State also filed a probable cause affidavit on December 10, 2023. An entry in the chronological case summary on December 12 stated "Omnibus Date 2-15-24," and an entry on December 18 stated a bench trial was scheduled for March 4, 2024. Id. at 11. On February 15, 2024, Crawford filed a "Notice of Taped Statement" stating that he intended to take a taped statement of A.C. on February 22. Id. at 59.
[¶5] On March 3, 2024, the State filed a motion to amend the charging information. The State alleged that it had filed a probable cause affidavit on December 10 and that, "on February 22, 2024, defense by Counsel, conducted a taped statement with [A.C.] and questioned her about the specific touching alleged in COUNT 1." Id. at 65. The State requested leave to amend the information to allege: "COUNT 1: On or about December 9, 2023, CORNELIUS CRAWFORD did knowingly touch [A.C.], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner by striking her and/or using an object to strike her[.]" Id. It argued that "the Probable Cause Affidavit and the taped statement conducted by defense gave Notice to [Crawford] of the specific touching alleged in COUNT 1." Id.
In his appellant's brief, Crawford states:
Crawford filed [a] Notice that [A.C.'s] statement would be made on February 22, 2024 and it apparently took place on that date. (App. p. 59) According to the State, A.C. claimed in this statement that the marks were caused by a piece of plastic track that Crawford was swinging around. She did not claim that Crawford touched, hit or struck her with his hands.Appellant's Brief at 7.
[¶6] On March 4, 2024, prior to holding the scheduled bench trial, Crawford's counsel objected to the State's motion to amend the information and argued that the motion was made after the omnibus date and that the amendment would be prejudicial to Crawford. The court asked how the amendment was prejudicial, and Crawford's counsel replied, "It adds an additional element." Transcript Volume II at 23. The court asked "how does adding the additional element make it prejudicial," and she replied, "Because now less than one day before trial I have now had to figure out how to - I have not been able to with [sic] my client, to have a meaningful discussion about this added, additional element now and how it could impact our defense or our trial strategy especially since he is in custody and we just found out about this." Id. The State argued the probable cause affidavit "talked about the mechanism of touching that was alleged," "[d]efense did a taped statement with" A.C., Crawford had "been on notice since the inception of the case what the alleged touching was and that is [sic] remained consistent throughout the pendency of this case," and "[d]efense counsel has had an opportunity to examine [A.C.] and inquire as to that touch." Id. at 24. The court granted the State's motion to amend the information and found that the amendment did not prejudice Crawford. The court held a bench trial and found Crawford guilty.
Discussion
[¶7] Crawford asserts the trial court "improperly allowed the State to make a substantive amendment to the charges the day before trial depriving [him] of the ability to maintain a defense." Appellant's Brief at 7.
[¶8] After the trial court granted the State's motion to amend the charging information, Crawford did not move for a continuance. Thus, he waived his right to challenge the amendment. See Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 918 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) ("Wilson had the opportunity to request a continuance for the purpose of giving himself the opportunity to prepare his defense after the trial court allowed the State to amend the charging information over his objection but chose not to pursue that course. Therefore, Wilson has waived this issue for appellate review."), trans. denied.
[¶9] Even if Crawford had not waived his right to challenge the amendment, reversal would not be warranted. Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 provides:
(a) An indictment or information which charges the commission of an offense may not be dismissed but may be amended on motion by the prosecuting attorney at any time because of any immaterial defect ....
(b) The indictment or information may be amended in matters of substance . . . by the prosecuting attorney, upon giving
written notice to the defendant at any time . . . before the commencement of trial; if the amendment does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant....
(c) Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may, at any time before, during, or after the trial, permit an amendment to the indictment or information in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.
(d) Before amendment of any indictment or information other than amendment as provided in subsection (b), the court shall give all parties adequate notice of the intended amendment and an opportunity to be heard. Upon permitting such amendment, the court shall, upon motion by the defendant, order any continuance of the proceedings which may be necessary to accord the defendant adequate opportunity to prepare the defendant's defense.
[¶10] "A defendant's substantial rights include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the charge; and, if the amendment does not affect any particular defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate these rights." Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400, 405 (Ind. 2014) (citation and quotations omitted), reh'g denied. "Ultimately, the question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the charges." Id. at 405-406 (citations omitted).
[¶11] The record reveals that the probable cause affidavit, which was filed the same day as the charging information, detailed the alleged domestic battery offense committed by Crawford against A.C. In particular, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Luis Lopez stated that officers were dispatched to A.C.'s address to investigate a domestic disturbance, that A.C. "stated that her husband, [] Crawford, had been drinking and had hit her with a Hot Wheels toy track," that he "observed injuries to [A.C.'s] stomach," and that an "Evidence Technician arrived on scene to take pictures of [A.C.'s] injuries." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 15. Also, Crawford acknowledges that he took a taped statement of A.C. on February 22, 2024. Crawford had a reasonable opportunity to prepare for and defend against the allegations against him. We find no error.
[¶12] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Crawford's conviction for domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor.
[¶13] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.