Opinion
09-20-1877
CRAWFORD v. SHOVER & als.
Cochran and William M. Robertson, for the appellant. Michie and Sheffey, for the appellee Shover. Harrison and Stuart, for William Crawford and Moorman's executors.
Absent, Anderson, J.
I. C died in 1858, leaving a will by which he gave to S $8,000, and appointed W his executor. J qualified as guardian of S. M owed to C, for land purchased in his lifetime, $8,000, secured by the vendor's lien. The legacy to S was reduced to $5,500, and M paid $1,000 to W, who paid it over to J. And M having died in June, 1863, his executor proposed to pay to W a part of the debt of M to C. W declined to receive it, but it was understood between them, that if J, as guardian, would receive it, and J's receipt was brought to W, he would credit the amount on M's bond. J, having consulted counsel, and being informed that the judge would authorize the investment of the money in Confederate bonds, J and the executor went together to the agent of the Confederate government and gave him $4,500 to be invested in a bond, which was afterwards obtained. And at the same time J filed his petition to the judge for leave to invest, which was authorized by an order in vacation, and J gave a receipt for $4,500 to W, and W credited the bond of M with the amount. On a bill filed by S by his next friend, against J and his sureties--HELD:
1. J was guilty of a breach of his trust in receiving the Confederate money in discharge of an ante-war debt well secured on land.
2. That the money was not received in the due execution of his trust, and the judge had no authority to order the investment.
II. By an amended bill by S, W and the executors of M were made defendants, and were charged with participating in and instigating the act of J. But the decree is against J and his sureties, and the amended bill is dismissed. On appeal by J--HELD:
That the plaintiff, S, being satisfied with the decree, and J in his answer, both to the original and amended bill, having averred that he had acted on the advice of his counsel and with the approval of his own judgment, J cannot complain of the decree as not holding W and M's executor liable with him to S.
George W. Crawford died in 1858, leaving a will, which was admitted to record in the county court of Augusta, and William Crawford qualified as his executor. The testator was unmarried, and had in his lifetime provided for two orphan boys, and by his will gave to them legacies. To George T. Shover, one of these boys, he gave a legacy of $8,000, and directed that it should be put out to interest for his benefit. And he directed his executor to place said Shover at some suitable place to be raised, and to pay particular attention to his education and training. By the last clause of his will the testator says: " I wish my friend Wm. Crawford, Sr., to act as executor and take charge of my estate and my two orphan boys, and do the best for them you can, for they will be left in this world without a friend to protect them."
The executor, Wm. Crawford, seems to have attended to these boys until October, 1860, when, at his request, John H. Crawford qualified as guardian of George T. Shover, with James Crawford and Rudolph Turk as his sureties.
After the death of George W. Crawford, in a suit instituted for the settlement of his estate, it was ascertained that it was not sufficient to pay his debts and legacies in full, and the legacies were therefore scaled, that of Shover to about $5,500. Of this sum the executor paid to the guardian $1,000 in March, 1861; and the guardian obtained from the county court two orders authorizing him to expend a part of the principal of his ward's estate in his support.
The guardian settled his account in February, 1863, showing a balance in his hands of $434.11 of principal, and $30 of interest. In March, 1865, he settled another account, when he was stated to be indebted to his ward on the 25th of October, 1864, in the sum of $4,590.40. This was made by a charge of the guardian with the sum of $4,559.77, as amount received of William Crawford, executor, on the 25th of June, 1863. And he settled a third account in which he is credited with the amount of a seven per cent. bond of the Confederate States, dated the 25th of June, 1863, for $4,500, with interest from that time, $735; and allowing him this credit he was in advance to his ward on the 25th of October, 1865, in the sum of $613.18. It was this credit which was the material subject of controversy in this case; and the facts in relation to it, as gathered from the evidence, seem to be as follows:
After making his will, George W. Crawford sold his tract of land in the county of Augusta to Edward G. Moorman, but did not make him a deed, and after his death William Crawford, by the directions of the court, executed the deed, reserving the vendor's lien for the purchase money, which amounted to upwards of $7,000. The $1,000 before mentioned, was paid by the executor to the guardian by an order on Edward G. Moorman, who seems to have died soon after its payment. After his death his son, John S. Moorman, who was his executor, applied to William Crawford, the executor of George W. Crawford, to receive a portion of the purchase money due on the land, when William Crawford told him to pay the money to the guardian of Shover, as he could not receive it unless the guardian would take it from him, and that would be the shortest way to settle it. Subsequently John S. Moorman requested him to apply to Judge Thompson, who was the judge of the circuit court of Augusta county, to permit the investment of the money due from Moorman's estate to Crawford's estate in Confederate bonds. He replied that he did not know whether or not he was the proper person to receive it, but he would consult his counsel and let him know. He did see his counsel, and was advised by him that it was not his place to make the application, but it was that of the guardian; and this advice William Crawford communicated to Moorman. It then being understood between William Crawford and Moorman that upon his bringing to said Crawford the guardian's receipt to himself for the amount, he would credit the amount on the bond of Edward G. Moorman, John S. Moorman so informed the guardian. The guardian thereupon consulted his counsel to know whether Judge Thompson would authorize the investment, and being advised that the judge would do it, Moorman and the guardian went together to the agent of the Confederate government in Staunton, and putting into his hands the sum of $4,500, obtained from him a certificate of the fact, and he afterwards delivered to the guardian the bond, and the guardian executed a receipt to William Crawford, the executor, for the amount, and delivered it to Moorman, and he took it to the executor, who credited the amount upon Edward Moorman's bond.
At the time the money was delivered to the said agent, the counsel of the guardian filed the guardian's petition to the judge for permission to invest the money in Confederate securities, stating that the fund came into his hands in the due course of his trust; and the judge made the order according to the prayer of the petition. At the time this investment was authorized and made Confederate currency was as eight to one of gold.
In April, 1870, George T. Shover, by his next friend, instituted a suit in equity against John H. Crawford and James Crawford and Rudolph Turk, his sureties, for a settlement of the guardian's account. He protests against the account settled by the guardian, and asks that the account between himself and the said John H. Crawford may be settled from the beginning. He surcharges and falsifies all the items of payments in these accounts, and especially the credit to the guardian of the Confederate bond for $4,500 and the interest upon it.
John H. Crawford answered the bill. After speaking of some other minor objections to his accounts, he comes to the item of $4,500. Of this he says: The estate of Edward G. Moorman was indebted to the estate of George W. Crawford, and Moorman's executor was anxious to pay the amount. Respondent understood that Moorman's executor applied to G. W. Crawford's executor to receive payment of the money in currency, and that the executor replied that he would not receive the money unless he could use it in payment of legacies, & c. Moorman's executor said that Crawford's executor could invest the money; but the executor, upon consultation with counsel, was advised that he had nothing to do with the investment of funds; and so he refused to receive them, unless respondent, as guardian, would consent to receive the money on account of his ward. Respondent was then applied to, and declined, for the reason that he could not use or invest the money; but he was assured that the circuit court was approving of the investments of fiduciary funds in Confederate and state bonds, and he was assured if he would accept the money there would be no difficulty on the subject; or if there should be any, Moorman would take back the money. Under these circumstances respondent consulted his counsel, and was advised that he could, by applying to the judge of the circuit court, get an order to invest the funds. On this advice respondent filed his petition, asking the instruction of the judge, who made a vacation order authorizing the investment. He avers that he acted in perfect good faith in the matter upon the advice of his counsel, and had no interest except to do his duty as well as he knew how.
Under an order of the court made in the cause, Commissioner Ranson returned his report in 1872 upon the accounts of the guardian. Charging him with the $1,000 received from the executor in March, 1861, but not charging him with the amount of the Confederate bond, and scaling the payments made for the ward, he reported the guardian indebted on the 25th of October, 1865, in the sum of $801.67. He however made several alternate statements, in the second of which he charged the guardian with the said sum of $4,550 on June 23d, 1863; and found the guardian indebted on the 25th of October, 1865, in the sum of $5,656.49.
The plaintiff by his counsel excepted to the report of the commissioner, because in his first and approved statement he failed to charge the guardian with the sum of $4,500 invested as before stated; and because in all his statements he stops the compounding of interest against the guardian on the 25th of October, 1865, instead of continuing it until the 9th of March, 1872, when the ward came of age. On the commissioner's own principle, it should have been continued to April, 1866, when the guardian's resignation was accepted by the court.
In June, 1873, the plaintiff Shover having come of age, he filed an amended and supplemental bill in the cause, in which he made William Crawford, the executor of George W. Crawford, John S. Moorman and Mary L. Moorman, executor and executrix of Edward G. Moorman, parties defendant. In his amended bill he sets out the relationships between the executor, the guardian and Moormans. He charges that his necessities did not require the collection of the money from Moorman's estate; that the guardian had no use for it, and could not lend it out or pay it over. He charges that John S. Moorman, William Crawford and the guardian, John H. Crawford, confederated and conspired together, and that they intended and designed to secure the acquittance of the Moorman estate from liability cotemporaneously with the investment of the Confederate funds paid over, so as to relieve the trusted fiduciaries from all personal risk and loss; that these acts should be considered as a part of the same transaction, dependent upon and concurrent with each other, and that said John S. Moorman and John H. Crawford were both present and consenting together in carrying out the arrangement that had been agreed upon in pursuance of the advice and direction of William Crawford, the executor. He insists that neither William Crawford, the executor, nor John H. Crawford, the guardian, received the money in the due course of the administration of his trust, and that John S. Moorman not only knew that such was the case, but urged that such course should be pursued as a matter of accommodation to him and his co-representative of E. G. Moorman's estate.
William Crawford and Moorman severally answered the bill, and John H. Crawford also answered it. They deny all confederation or fraud, and set out the circumstances attending the transaction. John H. Crawford says, in receiving the Confederate money he acted solely with the view of promoting the best interests of his ward; he had never doubted the goodness of the then currency, but had received and payed it out in his own transactions as freely and with as little hesitation as he now receives the present currency. When Moorman's executor proposed to pay the money due to respondent's ward, it struck him as the very best thing that could be done with complainant's funds to have it invested in seven per cent. bonds, furnishing, as he thought, a safe investment, yielding a regular income; but being wholly inexperienced in such matters he was not willing to take any step without the advice of counsel. And it was upon the advice and information of his counsel, and with the full approbation of his own judgment, he had acted in receiving the money and making the investment. He denies emphatically the charge of confederacy and conspiracy with William Crawford and Moorman to injure the plaintiff. Respondent received the money on the advice of his counsel, and upon his own judgment that it was right and proper he should receive it.
The cause came on to be heard on the 20th of June, 1874, when the court being of opinion that Commissioner Ranson's second alternate statement constituted the proper basis for a decree, confirmed the same and decreed that John H. Crawford and his sureties, James Crawford and Rudolph Turk, should pay to the plaintiff, Shover, five thousand six hundred and eighty-two dollars and twenty-three cents, with interest thereon from the 25th of October, 1865, until paid, and his costs. And the amended and supplemental bill was dismissed as to William Crawford and the executors of E. G. Moorman. And thereupon John H. Crawford applied to a judge of this court for an appeal; which was allowed.
Where a guardian accepted, in 1863, Confederate money in discharge of an ante-war debt secured by a lien on land, such money did not come into his hands in the due course of his trust, within the meaning of Act March 5, 1863 (Acts Assem. 1862-63, p. 81, c. 46), entitled " An act authorizing fiduciaries to invest funds in their hands for certain cases and for other purposes," making it lawful for a fiduciary having in his hands money received in the due exercise of his trust, which, from any cause whatever, he is unable to pay over to the parties entitled thereto, to apply by motion or petition to any judge of a circuit in vacation for leave to invest in interest-bearing bonds or certificates of the Confederate States, etc.
Cochran and William M. Robertson, for the appellant.
Michie and Sheffey, for the appellee Shover.
Harrison and Stuart, for William Crawford and Moorman's executors.
MONCURE, P.
The court is of opinion that the appellant, John H. Crawford, as guardian of the appellee, George T. Shover, committed a breach of trust, by receiving of the appellee, William Crawford, executor of George W. Crawford, deceased, on the 25th day of June, 1863, four thousand five hundred dollars in Confederate States treasury notes, in payment and discharge of so much of the legacy of eight thousand dollars, bequeathed by the will of the said testator to his adopted son, the said George T. Shover.
The said legacy, to the extent of the amount thus paid, was, at the time of such payment, perfectly secure; and it would have so remained until actual payment in good money, but for the payment in Confederate money as aforesaid. The estate of the said testator had been ascertained, by judicial inquiry, to be ample for the payment of at least that portion of the said legacy which was thus paid in Confederate money. The said estate being insufficient to pay the legacies in full, the amount thereof entitled to payment was respectively scaled according to the value of the estate which was applicable to such payment. The executor, therefore, whose pecuniary ability has not been questioned in the case, and the securities in his official bond, were liable for the payment of the amount ascertained to be due to the legatee Shover as aforesaid. And there was, if possible, a still firmer and more permanent, or at least a great additional security of the said amount, arising from the fact that the estate of the testator consisted almost exclusively of a debt of upwards of seven thousand dollars, balance still remaining due of the purchase money of a very valuable tract of land in the county of Augusta, which had been sold by the testator after making his will and shortly before his death, on which land there had been retained, and there still existed, a vendor's lien for the payment of the purchase money, which rendered such payment, in good money, perfectly secure. Of all these facts the appellant, the guardian of the legatee Shover, was fully informed and cognizant.
Under these circumstances it was a palpable breach of trust in the said guardian to receive payment of the said sum of $4,500 in Confederate money on account of said legacy as aforesaid. Such money was, at the time of such payment, very heavily depreciated; that is, depreciated to the extent, in comparison with gold, of eight dollars in Confederate money to one dollar in gold. So that the scaled value of the $4,500, received by the guardian as aforesaid in Confederate money at its nominal amount, was but $562.50 in gold!
Certainly nothing short of the most overruling necessity could have warranted the guardian in making so great a sacrifice as is thus apparent. And certainly no such necessity existed in this case.
It is not sufficient to say that many, and, indeed, most of the southern people had strong faith in the ultimate triumph of the Confederate cause, and in the ultimate payment of the Confederate debt; that while Confederate money was never made a legal tender, yet it was receivable in payment of taxes, and its currency was encouraged as much as possible by legislation, and it was considered by many, and perhaps most of the southern people as their patriotic duty, in the management of their own individual transactions, to accredit Confederate money as much as possible, and to receive it without question in payment of debts.
But what a man, sui juris, may do in the management of his own individual affairs, and what he may do as guardian of an infant in the management of the affairs of his ward, are two very different things. He may be as patriotic as he pleases in giving away his own, and it will be often meritorious for him to do so. But he cannot be patriotic at the expense of his ward, and cannot give away his ward's estate or any part of it.
There was certainly no necessity for making such a sacrifice as appears to have been made in this case. The guardian had received of the executor on account of the legacy to his ward, one thousand dollars in good money, or its equivalent, and received it about the time of the commencement of the war. This sum, judiciously applied, would, it seems, have been amply sufficient for the support of the ward during the war. And if more had been required, no doubt it would have been small in amount, and could have been obtained of the executor in further part of the said legacy. It appears that the ward was very inexpensive, and his wants very small. In fact neither the executor nor the guardian expressed, or seem to have felt, any desire to receive Confederate money at par for good money, and each refused at first to do so in regard to the debt due by Moorman to the testator's estate. They both knew that debt to be perfectly secured, in any event of the war; while they knew that Confederate money and Confederate bonds would only be good in the event of the success of the Confederate cause, if even then; and it is not strange, therefore, that their first impulse was, notwithstanding their hope and belief in regard to the result of the war then flagrant, and to the ultimate payment of Confederate notes and bonds, not to embark the ward's estate in the venture of the revolutionary struggle which was then in progress. And it was not until they were informed and advised, as they seem to have been, that the transaction could be legalized by an investment in Confederate bonds, made by the guardian under the sanction of a judge of a circuit court in vacation, under an act passed March 5, 1863, entitled " an act authorizing fiduciaries to invest funds in their hands in certain cases and for other purposes," (Acts of Assembly 1862 and 1863, p. 81, ch. 46,) that they consented to the payment of Confederate money in discharge of the legacy due to the ward.
Certainly that act was not designed to authorize, and did not authorize a fiduciary to receive payment of a well-secured good money debt in Confederate money at par when greatly depreciated in value, unless there was some overruling necessity for such a sacrifice, nor a judge to sanction such a proceeding by ordering such Confederate money to be invested as mentioned in the act. On the contrary, its only purpose, as expressly declared in the act, was to make it lawful for a fiduciary having in his hands money received in the due exercise of his trust, which, from any cause whatever, he was unable to pay over to the parties entitled thereto, to apply by motion or petition, to any judge of a circuit court in vacation for leave to invest, & c., in interest bearing bonds or certificates of the Confederate States, & c. That act was certainly not designed to create the very necessity for which it was intended to provide; that is, to authorize the receipt of depreciated Confederate money in payment of a good money debt in order that such Confederate money might be invested in a Confederate bond; but only to authorize such an investment of Confederate money which might be already in the hands of a fiduciary, having been received by him in the due exercise of his trust, and he being unable from any cause to pay it over to the parties entitled thereto.
Therefore the order obtained from Judge Thompson in this case affords no sanction to the act of the guardian in receiving the Confederate money and making the investment thereof as was done in this case. The judge had no jurisdiction to make such an order, and certainly would not have made it if the facts of the case had been set out in the petition, or otherwise made known to him. This is a very clear proposition according to several decisions heretofore made by this court. Campbell's ex'ors v. Campbell's ex'or, 22 Gratt. 649; Crickard's ex'or v. Crickard's legatees, 25 Id. 410; Kirby v. Goodykoontz & c., 26 Id. 298.
It is not a good defence to the guardian in this case that he did not actually intend to injure the ward by the act complained of, if such injury was the necessary or actual result of such act; nor that he derived no profit from the act complained of. Jennings v. Jennings, 22 Id. 313; Crickard's ex'or v. Crickard's legatees, supra; Moss & c. v. Moorman's adm'r & c., 24 Id. 97. In 2 Perry on Trusts, sec. 847, it is said that " in awarding compensation to the cestui que trust for a breach of trust, the court does not regard it as material that the trustee has made no profit nor advantage out of the estate. If there is a breach of the trust, and an inevitable calamity destroy the property, the trustee must account for it. If he varies from his duty, he must account for the property at all events." Citing Clough v. Bond, 3 M. & C. 496.
Much was said in the pleadings and proofs, if not in the arguments in this case, in regard to the facts that John H. Crawford is the first cousin of John S. Moorman; that William Crawford, the executor of George D. Crawford, is second cousin of John H. Crawford and John S. Moorman, and first cousin of Mrs. M. L. Moorman, widow and executrix of E. G. Moorman; that John H. Crawford's father and Mrs. M. L. Moorman were brother and sister of George W. Crawford, and would have been two of his heirs-at-law if he had died intestate, and that the ward and appellee, G. T. Shover, was a stranger in blood to the family. But these facts are not sufficient to warrant the inference that there was any conspiracy between these near relations to practice a fraud upon the said ward and legatee, and there was doubtless no such conspiracy. My opinion is based upon the conduct of the parties, in the absence of any such imputation.
Besides the cases cited, supra, the following, which were also cited in the argument, have an important bearing on the subject: Bennett v. Claiborne & c., 23 Gratt. 366; Ammon's adm'r v. Wolfe & c., 26 Id. 621; Tosh & c. v. Robertson & c., 27 Id. 270; and Omohundro's ex'or v. Omohundro & c., Id. 824.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the said guardian is chargeable as for good money, with the amount received by him in Confederate money of the said William Crawford, executor of the said George W. Crawford, on account of the said legacy to the said G. T. Shover; and that there is no error in holding the said guardian and his official sureties liable for the balance due by said guardian on the basis of his being so chargeable. But it appears by an inspection of the record that such balance on the 25th day of October, 1865, was $5,656.49, according to Commissioner Ranson's alternate statement No. 2, adopted and confirmed by the circuit court as the basis of its final decree in this case, instead of $5,682.23, the principal sum decreed for in favor of the said George T. Shover, against the said guardian and his sureties, with interest thereon from the said 25th day of October, 1865, till paid, and the costs of said Shover in this suit in the said court. But that small mistake in the principal of the said balance, being plainly apparent on the record, can be corrected by this court without reversing the said decree for that purpose. And if there be no other error in the decree, and it be correct and complete in all other respects, it will only be necessary to amend it by correcting the mistake aforesaid and to affirm it as so amended, with damages and costs.
But a very serious question yet remains for decision, which was discussed by counsel in the argument of this case, both in the court below and this court, and that question is, whether the said E. G. Moorman's executors, and the said William Crawford, executor of George W. Crawford, or any or either of them, are also liable on account of the said breach of trust of the said J. H. Crawford.
This question was not put in issue by the original pleadings in this case, the bill, answer and replication to the answer, and it could not, therefore, have been decided in the case if it had come on to be heard in that state of the pleadings. But the question was put in issue by the amended and supplemental bill and answers thereto and replications to the answers; and the cause came on to be heard on all the said pleadings, and the decree appealed from was rendered thereon, and must be construed and have the same effect as if the matter of the subsequent pleadings had been embraced in the original pleadings in the case. The suit, then, must be considered as a suit not only against J. H. Crawford as guardian of the plaintiff Shover, and the official sureties of such guardian, seeking a recovery against them for a breach of trust committed by the guardian, but also against the executors of E. G. Moorman and William Crawford, executor of George W. Crawford, seeking a recovery against them for having aided and participated in the commission of such breach of trust. If they, or any of them did so, and participated, they, or such of them as did so, are liable accordingly.
In my opinion they did aid and participate in said breach of trust.
In the first place, the executors of E. G. Moorman did so aid and participate. On the 25th day of June, 1863, they paid to the guardian of the plaintiff, on account of his legacy under the will of G. W. Crawford, $4,500 in Confederate States treasury notes at par, said payment being made out of an ante-war debt due by E. G. Moorman to G. W. Crawford, secured by a lien on real estate of much greater value than the amount of the debt, and with full knowledge that said notes were to be immediately invested by the said guardian, as they actually were on the same day, in a bond of the Confederate States, bearing seven per cent. interest. At the time of such payment said notes were depreciated in value, as compared with gold, in which the said debt was payable, to the extent and in the proportion of eight to one. In other words, the $4,500 thus paid in Confederate notes were worth but $562.50 in gold, and being invested in a Confederate bond as a permanent investment, it thus remained until the end of the war, when it became utterly worthless. Both William Crawford and J. H. Crawford refused to receive the said payment in Confederate notes, until at length they were persuaded to do so by E. G. Moorman's executors, or one of them, J. S. Moorman, who assured them that Judge Thompson would make an order for such an investment. And accordingly on the same day, the whole arrangement was made and executed. Moorman's executors paid the notes to the guardian, J. H. Crawford, took his receipt therefor to William Crawford, executor of G. W. Crawford, on account of the legacy, handed the said receipt to the said executor, who entered a credit for the amount thereof on the bond of E. G. Moorman to G. W. Crawford, a petition was filed by the guardian to Judge Thompson praying for an order for the said investment, which was accordingly thereupon made. By this operation, supposing it to have effect, the estate of E. G. Moorman was benefited to the extent of the difference between $4,500 and $562.50; that is, to the extent of $3,937.50, and the ward was injured to the same extent; in fact was injured to the whole extent of $4,500 in good money! This was a palpable breach of trust on the part of the guardian, in which the executors of E. G. Moorman, or one of them, J. S. Moorman, not only participated, but which he advised and instigated, and actively brought about by his agency, and which enured only to the benefit of E. G. Moorman's estate.
In the second place, William Crawford, executor of G. W. Crawford, also aided and participated in the said breach of trust. He co-operated in the perpetration of the same, and without such co-operation it could not have been perpetrated. He alone had a right to receive payment of the debt due to his testator's estate by E. G. Moorman, or any part of it. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, to obtain his consent and co-operation to the arrangement whereby the payment was made in Confederate notes as aforesaid. The act of J. S. Moorman in paying $4,500 in Confederate notes to J. H. Crawford, the guardian, and taking his receipt as for so much money paid to him on account of the legacy to his ward by William Crawford, executor of G. W. Crawford, was in fact as well as in law, the act of the said executor through the agency of the said J. S. Moorman, and as much implicates and binds the said executor as if he had done it by his own hand. It was done by his advice and instigation and authority. He was under peculiar obligations to conserve and take care of the interest of the infant legatee of his testator, who uses in his will this strong language on the subject: " I here wish my friend William Crawford, Sr., to act as executor, and take charge of my estate and my two orphan boys (George T. Shover being one of them) and do the best for them you can, for they will be left in this world without a friend to protect them, and my prayer is," & c. He had before said in his will, " I direct my executor, who will hereinafter be named, to place the said George T. Shover at some suitable place to be raised, and to pay particular attention to his education and training," & c. William Crawford was thus constituted testamentary guardian of this orphan and adopted child of his testator, and accordingly acted as such for several years, though he probably never qualified by giving bond and security according to law. At his instance John H. Crawford consented to act as guardian of the said infant, and was appointed and qualified as such. He had it in his power completely to guard and protect the estate of the said infant by refusing to receive the well-secured debt out of which his legacy was payable in anything but gold; and certainly not in Confederate treasury notes, so greatly depreciated in value as they then were. And that was certainly his duty. But he did not do it. He was guitly of a breach of trust in that respect. And he advised and instigated and aided in the breach of trust committed by the guardian, which could not in fact have been committed without his co-operation.
These parties, J. S. Moorman and William Crawford, thus participated in the breach of trust committed by J. H. Crawford, guardian of G. T. Shover, and are liable therefor on principles which have been well settled by this court in several cases. See Cocke & c. v. Minor & c., 25 Gratt. 246; Jones' ex'ors v. Clark & c., Id. 642; and the cases cited in those two cases. See also Tosh & c. v. Robertson & c., 27 Id. 270.
I am therefore of opinion that the said J. H. Crawford, J. S. Moorman and William Crawford are jointly and severally liable in this case, and that the decree ought to be against them all and the sureties of the said guardian, instead of against the said guardian and his sureties only. But as my brethren differ with me in regard to the liability of the said J. S. Moorman and William Crawford, and concur with me only in my opinion in regard to the liability of the said guardian and his sureties, it follows, therefore, that the decree appealed from must be amended as aforesaid and affirmed.
CHRSTIAN, J.
If the suit in this case had been brought for the purpose of fixing liability upon the executor of Moorman and the executor of Crawford, as well as upon the guardian and his sureties, and if it had been charged in the bill that the guardian and his sureties were insolvent and that he had committed a breach of trust, in which the executor of Moorman and the executor of Crawford had participated, upon such a bill, sustained by the proofs, a very different question would be presented, involving very different considerations. That is not the case before us, and need not be decided here. But in this case the ward has recovered his decree against his former guardian and his sureties. He is satisfied with that decree and does not appeal from it. The question is, therefore, whether the guardian (not the ward) upon the pleadings and proofs in the cause, can be heard to complain now, for the first time in the appellate court, that the decree of the circuit court is erroneous because he, having committed a breach of trust, ought not alone be held responsible therefor, but that others who participated with him in such breach of trust ought to be held equally liable with him. This is a position which the ward might properly take, but which the guardian, certainly in the pleadings in this cause and in the face of his sworn answers, ought not to be permitted to assume. So far as Moorman's executor is concerned it is sufficient to say, that, it being his duty to pay the debts of his testator, he had the right to pay in a depreciated currency if there was the hand of a party, sui juris, who was willing to receive it, and a discharge by such an one was a full and complete discharge and satisfaction of the debt. The debt was due to Crawford's executor; he agreed to receive it if Moorman would bring to him a receipt from the guardian, to whom the money was to be paid over by Crawford's executor. Upon the production of this receipt Crawford's executor credited Moorman's bond by that amount. In the absence of all proof of fraud, or participation in any breach of trust, this was a valid payment of Moorman's debt which could never afterwards be questioned.
Now, as to Crawford's executor, the record abundantly shows that he acted with the utmost prudence and good faith. When the proposition was made to him to receive the Moorman debt, well secured upon real estate, he (after taking the advice of an able and distinguished lawyer, the lamented Baldwin,) peremptorily refused to receive it; but said in substance to Moorman, that if the guardian was willing to receive it and would take all the responsibility of receiving a gold debt so well secured, in a depreciated currency, he would accept the guardian's receipt and credit it on Moorman's bond. The guardian, both in his answer to the original and amended bills, affirms positively that he received on his own responsibility and on his own judgment the Confederate money from Moorman, and defends himself in the court below in all the pleadings and evidence which he has taken, upon the ground that it was the best arrangement he could make for his ward; that what he did in the premises was done in good faith, from which he received no profit or advantage, and that, therefore, he ought not to be held responsible for a collection and investment which he thought at the time was for the advantage of his ward, and which he could not then foresee would be worthless. He nowhere affirms, or even intimates, that he was induced or instigated to the course he pursued by Crawford's executor or Moorman's executor, but on the contrary, emphatically affirms in the last paper filed in the cause (his answer to the amended bill), that he acted upon his own authority and his own judgment, and seeks to justify his action in this respect as one made in good faith and for the best interest of his ward.
After this, he cannot now, for the first time in the appellate court, shift upon the shoulders of others the burthen which he deliberately took upon himself. It is clear that but for the conduct of the guardian in this case, the investment for the ward, as left by the testator, would have remained intact. The loss was occasioned not by Crawford's executor, but by the act of the guardian, and he and his sureties alone are responsible. The pleadings and evidence in the cause do not, in my opinion, justify this court in saying, what the appellant has never pretended or said, that in collecting Confederate money for a gold debt well secured, and investing the same in Confederate bonds, he was instigated, aided, and advised by Crawford's executor and Moorman's executor.
I am for fixing the liability in this case where it has been fixed by the parties as well as by the law, and am for affirming the decree of the circuit court without any change or modification whatever.
STAPLES and BURKS, J's, concurred in the opinion of Moncure, P., except as to the liability of William Crawford and Moorman's executors. On that point they concurred with Judge Christian.
DECREE AMENDED AND AFFIRMED.